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Abstract 
The number of people living with multiple chronic illnesses (multimorbidity) is increasing and this 
trend is set to continue. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in epidemiological 
and clinically informed research into this patient population. However, the extant literature offers 
relatively little insight into how lay individuals make sense of multimorbidity.  
Social resources, or the physical and emotional sustenance provided by others, are recognised 
increasingly as a means towards affecting health outcomes.  Social resources are apparent as a 
nascent theme at the levels of health and social care policy, service organisation, and increasingly, 
at the level of primary care delivery. However, the apparent enthusiasm for social resources is not 
universal, and critics have questioned both the socio-political motives behind this trend as well as 
its underlying social theory.  
This study employs in-depth qualitative interviews and applies an interpretive approach to 
analysis. 15 participants living with (at least) osteoarthritis and cardiovascular disease took part in 
up to two interviews. In addition, a small number of participants’ spouses (four) were recruited 
into the study.  
Findings illustrate the ways in which lay individuals make sense of multimorbidity. This thesis 
draws attention to certain biomedical assumptions made by clinically informed literature. These 
assumptions are discussed with regard to the concept of illness prioritisation and the relevance of 
multimorbidity (in conceptual terms) to lay experience. 
Findings also illustrate the complexity of social resource exchange during illness. A novel 
conceptual model is developed to elucidate participants’ accounts of supportive practices. 
Further, findings highlight the role of morality in shaping the experience of support. These 
observations are synthesised under the theoretical banner of gift-exchange theory, and 
implications are identified for the application of social resources in policy and service delivery. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
This study emerged in response to two prevailing topics of interest: multimorbidity, and the 
role of social resources in the experience of illness.  
In the past decade, multimorbidity has received increasing attention within academic and 
clinical research and is recognised increasingly within various spheres of health and social 
care policy. The impetuses behind this focus are familiar: an ageing population, 
improvements in medical intervention, more effective public health initiatives, and 
technological advances all contribute towards a situation whereby more people are living 
with multiple concurrent chronic conditions (Fortin, 2005). To date, multimorbidity has 
been shown to impact negatively upon a wide range of outcomes including quality of life 
(QOL), mortality, healthcare utilisation, disability, and adverse complications from 
treatment effects (Fortin, 2007).1  
The study of people living with more than one disease or chronic condition is not new, and 
the related term ‘co-morbidity’ is well-established in medicine and its affiliated sub-
disciplines.  Co-morbidity was defined originally by Feinstein (1970) as ‘any distinct 
additional clinical entity that has existed or may occur during the clinical course of a 
patient who has the index disease under study’ (Feinstein 1970: 455). Valderas, Mercer, 
and Fortin (2011), however, describe the emergence of multimorbidity as a ‘modern 
alternative to “comorbidity”’, and have argued that that multimorbidity represents a ‘more 
“democratic” approach, [where] no particular condition is privileged over any other’ 
(Valderas, Mercer and Fortin, 2011). In this regard, multimorbidity is seen by many as a 
                                                          
1 These issues will be addressed in greater detail throughout the literature review chapter 
of this thesis.  
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more progressive and realistic (in terms of planning health systems) way of 
conceptualising illness.  
In recent years, a number of studies have begun to explore how multimorbidity is 
experienced and understood from a lay perspective (in contrast to the clinical perspective 
identified above). A growing body of literature suggests that multimorbidity presents 
challenges that are particular and distinct from those experienced during single-condition 
illness. Studies have claimed to demonstrate that the practices of everyday ‘illness work’ 
and self-management are shaped by a particular dynamic stemming from a multiplicity of 
conditions which are experienced as concurrent. It has been argued that for people living 
with multimorbidity there is often a necessity to ‘prioritise’ the self-management of certain 
conditions at the expense of others (Morris et al., 2011; Kerr et al., 2007).  This thesis 
makes a direct contribution towards this issue, and questions the validity of illness 
prioritisation as a concept. Specifically, this thesis identifies certain biomedical 
assumptions which have been accepted tacitly within qualitative studies, and it is argued 
that these assumptions result in the concept of illness prioritisation being applied 
inappropriately in self-management literature.   
A distinct yet related theme in this thesis concerns the role of social resources and social 
networks – friends, family, and work colleagues – in shaping the experience of illness . 
This thesis adopts the definition of social resources contributed by Corbin and Strauss as 
the ‘physical and emotional sustenance’ provided by others during illness (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1988; 109). There is growing consensus across various levels of healthcare 
policy and organisation that formal services are limited to the extent that they are able to 
affect positive health outcomes (Cabinet Office [CO], 2011; Coulter, 2009; Institute for 
Public Policy Research [IPPR], 2009). For a decade or more, calls have been made for 
health and social care policy and practice to recognise the role played by social 
resources, and to utilise informal social networks as the basis for intervention and the 
amelioration of illness (Foot, 2012).  
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A good deal of sociological research – both theoretical and applied – has considered the 
role of social networks in shaping the experience of illness. A significant amount of 
research has been directed towards care giving during older age and illness, and further 
research has explored how the form and structure of social networks affect the availability 
and provision of support. Here the most widely invoked sociological contribution continues 
to be that of social capital. Despite this apparent enthusiasm, however, the socio-political 
motives for involving social resources in health and social care have been critiqued 
(Praphakar, 2013), as has the conceptual apparatus of social capital (Fine, 2010). This 
thesis draws upon in-depth accounts of people living with multimorbidity, and in doing so 
highlights several weaknesses inherent to social capital and social network perspectives. 
As redress, this thesis draws upon diverse sources of social theory to enable an insightful 
and novel analysis of social resource exchange during illness.  
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis addresses questions directed at two aspects of illness experience. Firstly, 
relating to multimorbidity, this thesis asks how people living with multimorbidity experience 
their illness as meaningful.  In answering this question, emphasis will be placed upon how 
illness is experienced, not just in terms of its symptoms and the individual’s engagement 
with healthcare systems, but rather as situated within individuals’ particular social, cultural, 
and biographical contexts.  
Having addressed this question, the larger portion of this thesis concerns social resources 
and the meaning of supportive practices whilst living with multimorbidity. Here again, an 
exploratory approach is adopted, and this thesis considers the ways that supportive 
exchanges are experienced as meaningful in social, cultural, and biographical contexts. 
Further, these issues will be discussed critically with a view towards the socio-political 
context of supportive practices. In doing so, this thesis is set apart from a body of 
literature which has detailed the experience of social support in instrumental terms.  
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Specific research questions will be outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
1.3 The structure of this thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter Two takes the form of a thematic literature review. This review includes literature 
from across the social sciences, and also incorporates epidemiological and policy 
literature. The aim of this chapter is to provide an outline of the salient themes and extant 
research in the fields of multimorbidity and social resources. This chapter will also detail 
the specific research questions which this thesis will answer. 
Chapter Three outlines the study design and methods adopted within this study. This 
chapter will also discuss the philosophical underpinnings of this thesis, and will provide an 
account of epistemological and ontological considerations.  
Chapter Four delivers the first findings of this study. This chapter is titled ‘The lay meaning 
of multimorbidity’ and reports on the ways participants understood multimorbidity to be 
meaningful. Emergent themes are discussed in the context of illness self-management 
which is identified as a salient theme through the literature review of this thesis.  
Chapter Five – entitled ‘Social resources: three participant cases’ – reports on the role of 
social resources during the experience of multimorbidity. This chapter details three 
participant’s cases and highlights the complexity of supportive practices. In this regard, 
this chapter poses several conceptual problems which are ill-served by social theory 
common to the health sciences. Specifically, it will be argued that existing perspectives – 
particularly that of social capital – fail adequately to conceive of the meaning or value of 
social resources, and do not sufficiently consider the role of morality in shaping supportive 
practices.  
Chapter Six represents a break in terms of study findings and does not introduce any 
primary data. Rather, this chapter – entitled ‘Theoretical review’ – addresses the issues of 
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value and morality which are identified as problematic in the preceding chapter (Chapter 
Five). By tracing the conceptual lineage of contemporary perspectives, this chapter makes 
an argument against theories based upon individualist social exchange. This chapter then 
introduces parallel theoretical perspectives derived from gift exchange literature. A 
conceptual framework for value forms based upon the work of Baudrillard (1981) is 
outlined. Further, the issue of morality is considered with important aspects outlined for 
consideration in a subsequent results chapter (Chapter Eight). 
Chapter Seven is titled ‘The value forms of social resources’. This chapter incorporates 
the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Six, and argues for social resources being 
understood according to distinct logics of value: use-value, semiotic-value, symbolic-
value, and exchange-value. These logics of value are introduced individually, before being 
drawn together into a model termed the interpretive economy of meaning. This model 
allows us to consider how the preceding value forms coalesce and intersect during the 
exchange of support.  
Chapter Eight returns to the issue of morality. This chapter is premised upon the argument 
that reciprocity is an insufficient concept to account for morality in social exchange. This 
chapter outlines a number of moral principles as they appeared in participants’ accounts 
of support. Specifically, the principles of independence, dependence and mutuality will be 
identified. In discussion, it will be argued that these principles bear striking affinities with 
the concept of ‘possessive individualism’ – a perspective within socio-political theory 
which critiques the constitution of individualism within liberal democratic society. These 
issues will be considered in terms of their consequences for social resources and the 
experience of illness.    
The final chapter of this thesis takes the form of a discussion, and will draw together the 
various themes which will have been addressed within this thesis. This chapter will identify 
the implications of this thesis for social science and health research, and will outline the 
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specific contribution of this thesis to knowledge. Finally, this chapter will identify 
prospective topics for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This study aims to investigate how people living with multimorbidity experience multiple 
concurrent illnesses as meaningful, and also how these people experience the receipt of 
support and assistance from other people.   
The first part of this chapter will introduce the concept of multimorbidity as a nascent 
population health concern and as a challenge to existing structures of healthcare 
organisation. Literature will be presented from epidemiology, health economics, and 
health services research, and the ways in which multimorbidity has been addressed within 
policy will be detailed. Following this, literature pertaining to the lay experience of 
multimorbidity will be introduced. Here, literature will be drawn from social science, and 
particularly qualitative research. 
This review will then address the issue of social resources which is taken to mean the 
‘physical and emotional sustenance’ provided by others during illness (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1988; 109).2 Literature will be introduced from a range of disciplines including 
social epidemiology, social policy, and medical sociology.    
In concluding this chapter it will be argued that the lay experience of multimorbidity has 
been researched only in a narrow sense and requires further attention. Further, the 
experience of support and assistance within this patient population has been largely 
neglected.  Research questions will be established in recognition of the gaps in 
knowledge. 
 
                                                          
2 The term ‘social resources’ has been used variously by authors from diverse social 
scientific fields: in particular by Corbin and Strauss (1988) and Lin, Vaughn and Ensel 
(1981).  
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2.2 The challenge of multimorbidity   
The prevalence and costs associated with multimorbidity mean that it is now recognised 
as a fundamental challenge to existing models of healthcare organisation (Mercer et al., 
2009). The following section details the evidence base supporting this assertion, and 
outlines some of the ways by which multimorbidity is beginning to shape health policy and 
practice.  
2.2.1 Prevalence, costs and outcomes  
Understanding the scale of the challenge posed by multimorbidity as a population health 
issue is not a straightforward task. The epidemiology of multimorbidity is itself an 
emergent field and as such there remains a good deal of inconsistency in terms of how 
multimorbidity is conceptualised, operationalised, and measured. Furthermore, the variety 
of methodological models employed across epidemiological studies makes comparison of 
findings problematic.  
Identifying prevalence estimates of multimorbidity is itself a difficult task, and one that 
continues to push advances in the field of epidemiology.  Within epidemiological literature, 
multimorbidity is generally taken to mean the ‘co-existence of two or more long-term 
conditions in an individual’ (Mercer et al., 2009).3 However, within this definition there is 
sufficient ambiguity to allow for multimorbidity to be operationalised in a number of 
different ways. By way of illustration, Salisbury et al. (2011) define multimorbidity as 
‘multiple coexisting chronic medical conditions’ and within this definition investigate two 
different  operational models of multimorbidity. Firstly, multimorbidity measured as the 
presence of one or more chronic illnesses from the 17 chronic illnesses incentivised by 
the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Secondly, multimorbidity defined as the 
presence of one or more chronic illness from an extended list of chronic illnesses as 
                                                          
3 This definition has also been applied in this study, specifically in terms of defining the 
sampling framework  
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detailed within the Johns Hopkins University Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACG*) Case-Mix 
System (the ACG/EDC approach). Both of these operational variants measure 
multimorbidity as ‘multiple chronic conditions’. However, across both measures of 
multimorbidity, the authors report prevalence as varying greatly – 14% using QOF 
multimorbidity and 56% using ACG/EDC approach.  This disparity in prevalence is 
illustrative of the variety of prevalence figures generated by the wider epidemiological 
literature. Schneider et al. (2009), for example, report a prevalence of > 1 chronic 
condition as 12.7%, (this study calculated multimorbidity based upon an inclusion criteria 
of just 6 chronic conditions). In stark comparison, Schram et al. (2008) report 
multimorbidity prevalence of 72% (this based upon inclusion criteria of 185 chronic 
conditions derived from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)). A recent 
systematic review of multimorbidity prevalence in primary care (Fortin 2012) found just 
two prevalence studies specific to UK primary care. Prevalence of multimorbidity in these 
studies was estimated at between 49% (Macleod et al., 2004) and 81% (Kadam et al., 
2007). In recognition of these issues, the international epidemiological community has 
taken the standardisation in definition and measurement of multimorbidity to be a primary 
focus of its attention (Goodman et al., 2013; Mercer et al., 2009), and epidemiological 
studies continue to research multimorbidity prevalence across various populations.  
Beyond prevalence studies, epidemiological literature has also investigated associations 
between multimorbidity, patient outcomes, and service resource utilisation. In this regard, 
multimorbidity is associated with increased mortality rates (Gijsen et al., 2001; Menotti et 
al., 2001; Landi et al., 2010), and is inversely related to health related quality of life 
(HRQOL).  A systematic review into multimorbidity and HRQOL among patients in primary 
care (Fortin et al., 2004) identified this inverse relationship across a range of studies, with 
multimorbidity threatening to impact negatively across all dimensions of HRQOL. The 
authors also point out that existing studies have demonstrated this inverse relationship 
more clearly demonstrated in relation to the physical components of HRQOL, and that 
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social and psychological components remain under-researched. It should also be noted 
that epidemiological research into HRQOL relies almost exclusively upon the Short-Form-
36 Health Survey (SF-36) and Short-Form-20 Health Survey (SF-20) instruments, and this 
poses some clear conceptual limitations upon this research (Guyatt, 1997).  In more 
focused studies of patient outcomes, multimorbidity has been shown to affect physical 
functioning negatively (Bayliss et al., 2004; Rijken et al., 2005; McDaid et al., 2013; 
Lawson et al., 2013), to limit social and domestic participation (Wilkie et al., 2013), and 
has also been associated with depression (Gunn et al., 2012; Spangenberg et al., 2011) 
and psychological distress (Fortin et al., 2006).   
In terms of the economic costs of multimorbidity, a large number of studies have identified 
multimorbidity as a major source of expenditure within health care systems which are 
oriented towards a single disease model of illness (Fortin, 2005). Multimorbidity has been 
shown to be a valid predictor of hospital inpatient costs (Friedman et al., 2006) and is 
associated with both unplanned admissions to hospital (Payne et al., 2013) and increased 
length of hospitalisation (Bergeron et al., 2005). People living with multimorbidity are more 
likely to consult their doctor (Schneider et al., 2009; Starfield et al., 2005), and costs 
associated with prescribed medications also increase with multimorbidity (Nagl et al., 
2012; Ramage-Morin, 2009).  More generally, studies into the total costs of healthcare 
provision identify that the costs of general healthcare increase dramatically among people 
living with more than one chronic illness (Glynn et al., 2011; Fishman and Von Korff, 
1997). 
The weight of evidence now linking multimorbidity to both adverse patient outcomes and 
increased economic costs has resulted in multimorbidity being identified as one of the 
more pressing challenges to contemporary health care delivery.  
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2.2.2 Meeting the challenge of multimorbidity  
In recent years, health care professionals (HCPs), researchers, and policy makers have 
begun to take steps towards meeting the challenges posed by multimorbidity.  
At the forefront of such efforts have been critiques of clinical guidelines (CGs). Despite the 
aforementioned evidence linking multimorbidity with adverse outcomes, CGs in the UK 
continue to be structured around a single disease model of illness (Guthrie et al., 2012; 
Hughes, McMurdo, and Guthrie, 2013). The rationale for single disease guidelines is 
increasingly being questioned by researchers and policy professionals working within the 
field of multimorbidity research. Evidence exists to suggest that the implementation of 
existing CGs may be detrimental to the care of people with multimorbidity (Boyd et al., 
2005).  In particular, strict adherence to clinical guidelines has been associated with 
undesirable and potentially harmful polypharmacy (May, Montori, and Mair, 2009; Guthrie 
et al., 2011). A further line of criticism concerns the evidence base for CGs, and the fact 
that clinical trials often exclude potential participants with co-morbidities in the interest of 
maintaining sample homogeneity. The outcome of this tendency is, of course, that clinical 
trials often do not take account of people living with more than one chronic condition 
(Fortin, 2006). Hughes et al., (2013) have identified the single disease focus of clinical 
trials as a key driver in shaping the single disease focus of CGs.   
In recognition of these issues, there have been calls for CGs to take account of 
multimorbidity. Hughes et al. (2013) call for CGs to cross-reference one another 
systematically, to include specific common multimorbid vignettes, and for a change in the 
ways that CGs are evidenced. Recent commentaries have also called for increased 
emphasis upon the role of clinical judgement and patient preferences, and for clinical 
guidelines to be considered heuristic aids, rather than statutory regulation (Guthrie et al., 
2012). However, despite tentative recognition of these issues by the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2012; Haslam, 2014), CGs continue to assume a 
single disease model of illness.   
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In terms of UK primary care, there have been growing calls for general practice to take 
account of the realities of caring for patients with multimorbidity. Kadam (2012) notes 
particular challenges posed to GPs by multimorbidity and identifies three lines of 
associated work: i) the weight of clinical information needed to be collected, ii) the need 
for flexibility in terms of care planning as conditions progress, and iii) the challenge of 
communicating with other services and across disciplines in patient management. The 
author identifies that the recommended 10 minute general practice consultation is an 
unrealistic timeframe within which to accomplish this work, and does not facilitate best 
practice in caring for patients with multimorbidity.  
More recently, academic research has sought to address the challenge of multimorbidity 
through the design and implementation of interventions geared towards improving patient 
outcomes, and reducing service utilisation and costs. A recent systematic review (Smith et 
al., 2012) has mapped out the design and scope of such interventions, and reported that 
interventions tend to address the organisational structure of care delivery, case 
management and interdisciplinary team working. The authors identify the results of such 
interventions as mixed, but note the potential for interventions to improve practices of 
prescribing among HCPs and medication adherence among patients.  The authors further 
consider the apparent difficulty in improving outcomes among patients with multimorbidity, 
and suggest that that a focus upon particular risk factors or functional difficulties may be a 
more effective basis for intervention.  In general, however, the efficacy of such 
interventions is mixed, and the evidence base supporting multimorbidity interventions is 
limited.   
2.3 Qualitative studies of multimorbidity 
In light of the above evidence, the past decade has witnessed an increasing number of 
qualitative studies addressing the issue of multimorbidity from a patient perspective. It 
should be noted, however, that while this body of literature continues to grow it remains 
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limited in scale and scope. The following sections consider the conceptual scope of this 
literature and the role of self-management policy as a driver of this research.  
2.3.1 Multimorbidity and self-management research   
Existing literature concerning the patient experience of multimorbidity has been shaped, to 
a large degree, by wider policy imperatives concerning the management of long-term 
conditions in primary care. In particular, the drive towards patient self-management as a 
means of chronic illness management has directed the focus of qualitative studies 
towards the ways in which people with multimorbidity self-manage their illnesses. In 
recognition of this, before progressing to review this literature directly, it is worthwhile to 
consider the emergence of self-management and the ways by which self-management 
policy has shaped qualitative literature more generally.    
Self-management has been central to NHS long-term condition strategy since the late 
1990s and proponents regard self-management as advantageous in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, self-management is considered a means of involving patients and wider family 
members in issues of choice and decision making – this is understood in both practical 
and ethical terms as a superior mode of healthcare delivery. Secondly, self-management 
is seen as a mode of health care delivery which is less costly, and as means of working 
towards easing the financial pressures posed by an ageing population living with 
increasing levels of chronic illness. These tenets have been subject to a number of 
trenchant critiques which question both the political impetus behind self-management and 
also its underlying evidence base (Bury and Taylor, 2007; Kendall and Rogers, 2007; 
Kendall et al., 2011). However, despite such criticism, self-management continues to be a 
defining principle in the organisation and delivery of health care in the UK (DOH, 2013).  
While any further review or critique of self-management policy is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is important to recognise the conceptual and theoretical influence that self-
management exerts in related qualitative literature. This issue is particularly pertinent 
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once we recognise the influence of psychological models of agency and action in self-
management literature. For example, Ong et al. (2014) have charted the role of 
psychological models in mapping out the relationship between the concept of ‘behaviour 
change’ and self-management interventions. The authors consider the dominance of 
psychological models of behaviour to be problematic, particularly with regards to the 
privileging of cognitive theories of the individual. As the authors note: ‘The rise of cognitive 
approaches to understanding behaviour and emotion have increasingly focused interest 
and behaviour change technologies on the intra-psychic processes of belief and attitude 
formation, cognitive styles and mental models’ (Ong et al., 2014). This, the authors argue, 
should be met by an affirmation of the role of the social, with self-management being 
recognised as an inherently social practice.  Similar issues concerning the influence of 
‘health behaviourism’ have elsewhere been outlined in genealogical fashion (Armstrong 
2009). Armstrong traces the concept of health behaviour, highlighting that in recent years 
the concept of health behaviour has been influenced heavily by psychological and micro-
economic theory. Armstrong relates this to the emergence (within health research) of an 
understanding of patient agency as the ‘self-appraising patient’ who ‘increasingly (makes) 
autonomous choices about whether or not to act in the name of health’ (Armstrong, 2009: 
291).   
The implications of these issues for this thesis are twofold. Firstly, it should be recognised 
that the development of the field of qualitative multimorbidity research has been shaped 
by wider policy drivers geared towards illness self-management. Secondly, given the 
potential association between self-management and cognitive / behavioural models of 
agency (Cohn, 2014; Ong et al., 2014), multimorbidity self-management literature should 
be considered critically in terms of the assumptions made about individual agency, and 
the extent to which social and cultural factors are recognised as shaping self-management 
practices.   
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2.3.2 Multimorbidity and illness prioritisation  
As has already been suggested, the majority of qualitative studies to address 
multimorbidity have done so in terms of illness self-management. The following section 
outlines this literature to date.  
Early literature in the direction of multimorbidity self-management identified that 
multimorbidity is often accompanied by complex and demanding medication regimens 
(Townsend, Hunt, and Wyke, 2003; Townsend, 2005). However, perhaps the most 
significant early contribution was that made by Bayliss et al. (2003), who  highlighted the 
potential complexity of multimorbidity self-management, in addition to a number of 
‘barriers’ to self-management (including social, environmental, and economic difficulties). 
Most significant, however, was the authors’ observation that approximately half their 
sample ‘cited a single dominant condition as an impediment to the care of other 
conditions’ (Bayliss et al., 2003:19). The authors also noted, however, that ‘There was no 
pattern to these dominant conditions’ (Bayliss et al., 2003: 19). This observation – that lay 
individuals recognise a particular condition to be ‘dominant’ – has endured within much of 
the subsequent literature, and latter studies have taken up the challenge of identifying 
apparently elusive patterns to patients’ ‘priorities’ within multimorbidity.  
Illness prioritisation is premised upon the assumption that people living with multimorbidity 
are faced with competing condition specific claims towards their time, their energy and 
their social resources. As a result of these demands, it is argued that people with 
multimorbidity prioritise the self-management of particular conditions or symptoms, often 
at the expense of others. While the literature in this direction is limited, there exists some 
variation in how prioritisation is understood to work in practice.  
Schoenberg et al. (2009) argue that prioritisation in multimorbidity should be understood 
as the ways in which resources (including time, money and informal support) are spent 
upon particular conditions. Prioritisation in this sense is conceived as a ‘strategic choice’ 
made by the individual with multimorbidity who aims towards the maximisation of health 
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and well-being. Accordingly, the authors describe the ‘strategic accommodation of 
multimorbidity’ to include: 
…allotting a great deal of time to self-care activities, figuring out ways to pay for 
expensive treatments, and, even without drawing on many informal networks, juggling 
these numerous and complex combinations of chronic illnesses  (Schoenberg et al., 
2009:10).  
The authors continue to identify that such strategies are informed by two issues: the 
individual’s knowledge of particular condition severity, and the potential of conditions to 
cause disability.  While these are useful observations, this insight remains somewhat 
underdeveloped. The authors provide no explanation as to the form and content of 
condition specific knowledge, nor is the notion of the ‘potential to cause disability’ explored 
in any depth. Further, the authors assume some form of causal link between these factors 
and specific self-management ‘strategies’; the article does not develop a sufficient 
discussion as to how such a process should be understood.  
Similar psychologically-informed studies into illness prioritisation include that of Mc Sharry 
et al. (2013). This study involved people living with depression and diabetes, and the 
authors report that participants’ ‘cognitive representations’ of these conditions affect self-
management priorities. While useful in a descriptive fashion, the insight afforded by this 
study appears to be limited by its reliance upon a cognitive model of agency, and does not 
sufficiently explore the relationship between ‘cognitive representations’, lay priorities, and 
self-management practices set in a social context.  Similarly, Elliot et al. (2007) identify 
medication self-management as a key site of patient prioritisation, and suggest that 
prioritisation is linked to individuals’ perceptions of medication efficacy and future risk of 
disease. Here again, useful insight is provided into how people with illness interpret 
medication efficacy and the concept of risk. However, the reliance upon psychological and 
cognitive models of agency limit the scope of this insight – the authors regret, for instance, 
 18 
 
that they are unable to identify ‘adherent personalities’ among participants with 
multimorbidity.   
In contrast to psychological perspectives, Lindsay (2009) suggests that illness 
prioritisation should be understood as a dynamic process in which social context is key. In 
accordance with Bayliss et al. (2003), Lindsay (2009) observes that people with the same 
combination of conditions often understand illness priorities differently. A number of 
influences upon illness prioritisation are identified, which include: the unpredictable nature 
of the disease, conditions which are not controlled by medication, and conditions that ‘set 
off’ other conditions (Lindsay, 2009: 994). The author also suggests that prioritisation is 
likely to be a dynamic process informed, primarily, by lay and cultural frameworks of 
knowledge. The authors suggest the importance of biography in shaping individual 
perceptions of priorities; however, it is also reported that Bury’s (1982) concept of 
biographical disruption does not account for the complexities of multimorbidity illness 
trajectory and biography. 
Morris et al. (2011) present a similar reading of illness prioritisation as a dynamic and 
deliberative process. The authors coin the process one of ‘shifting priorities’ wherein 
individuals’ priorities change according to a number of factors. The authors identify 
significant factors such as: ‘timing between diagnoses, prior experiences, recommended 
self-management activities, bereavement, contact with health services and flare-up of 
conditions’ (Morris et al., 2011:153). The model of ‘shifting priorities’ is designed to 
perceive of the transitory nature of prioritisation as something which is continually re-
evaluated and re-organised.  The dynamic nature of prioritisation has been further 
emphasised by Cheraghi-Sohi et al. (2013) who suggest that illnesses priorities shift 
according to social context, clinical interactions, and the ability to control symptoms. The 
authors also sound a cautionary note in terms of the previously assumed link between 
illness priorities and self-management practices, suggesting that the relationship between 
illness priorities and self-management practice is complicated by the burden of illness and 
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perceived antagonisms between condition-specific self-management practices. This 
insight challenges the previously assumed link between illness priorities and specific self-
management practices (although this is not stated explicitly by the authors).  
The notion of prioritisation is further complicated in an important contribution by Pickard 
and Rogers (2012). Here the authors emphasise what they consider to be an epistemic rift 
between the concept of self-management (underpinned by biomedical knowledge), and 
lay knowledge. In contrast to a normative model of self-management, the authors present 
a phenomenologically informed critique which argues for multimorbidity self-management 
to be understood in terms of embodied knowledge – a form of lay knowledge which the 
authors consider at odds with the ‘abstract, rational model of patient knowledge assumed 
in programmes like the EPP ’ (Pickard and Rogers, 2012:16). The authors inject a sense 
of epistemic doubt into earlier readings of multimorbidity self-management, and question 
the frameworks of knowledge which are presumed to inform lay agency or ‘behaviour’ in 
primary care self-management literature.   
A similar challenge to the rational model of self-management in multimorbidity is provided 
by Hurd Clarke and Bennett (2012) who contend that individuals with multimorbidity not 
only manage the practicalities of illness, but also attend to self-management in moral 
terms. Accordingly, it is argued that individuals with multimorbidity work towards the ‘moral 
responsibility’ of preventing additional chronic conditions and functional loss (Hurd Clarke 
and Bennett, 2012:14). This perspective further emphasises the place of exogenous 
frameworks of sense making (in this instance morality) which shape lay meaning.  An 
appreciation of such factors offers the potential for more insightful interpretations of 
prioritisation in multimorbidity. 
A final challenge to the rationalised model of multimorbidity self-management is delivered 
by Townsend (2012) who applies an interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the 
patient experience. Townsend presents the individual living with multimorbidity as located 
 20 
 
within social and cultural schemes (adopting the motifs of habitus and field). While this 
paper does not add to the author’s earlier publications in describing the practicalities of 
living with multimorbidity (see Townsend, 2006), it makes an important contribution in 
terms of questioning the ways in which individuals understand and manage concurrent 
conditions, and in emphasising the role of culture in shaping these practices.  
In summarising the existing qualitative literature concerning multimorbidity, the influence 
of self-management policy as a driver of research is clear. The majority of qualitative 
literature addressing multimorbidity takes up the issue of how people manage concurrent 
conditions, and ‘illness prioritisation’ has emerged as the leading explanatory model. 
Within this literature there exists significant variety in terms of the theoretical approaches 
applied to self-management and prioritisation. The most insightful and illuminating 
literature is found in studies grounded in medical sociology. Recent contributions from 
sociological literature have begun to develop earlier empirical observations about the 
complexity of multimorbidity (Pickard and Rogers, 2012; Hurd Clarke and Bennett, 2012; 
Townsend, 2012). These contributions employ various models of the individual agency 
and social action which are grounded in theories of social practice (Ortner, 1984). 
However, this literature remains limited to a handful of empirical studies, and more 
research is needed to discern the lay meaning of multimorbidity: how lay meaning shapes 
attitudes towards illness management, and how these issues are experienced in particular 
combinations of chronic illnesses.  
 
2.4 Social resources and health 
Of primary concern to this thesis is to explore how people living with multimorbidity 
experience the receipt of support and assistance as meaningful.  The following sections 
take up this issue, and consider the place of social resources in emerging models of 
health care organisation and delivery, the various disciplinary approaches towards 
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conceptualising social resources and health, and the ways in which medical sociology has 
addressed social resources in chronic illness literature.4  
2.4.1 Social resources in health policy and practice 
In recent years, the theme of social resources has assumed an increasingly prominent 
role in UK health and social care policy and practice.  The following section details some 
of the ways in which social resources have been incorporated at the levels of policy, 
health care organisation, and primary care practice.  
At the level of government policy, social resources are apparent in the UK coalition 
government’s White Paper ‘Vision for adult social care: capable communities and active 
citizens’ (Department of Health [DH], 2010). This document provides a clear indication as 
to the role envisaged for social resources in future UK health and social care policy. 
According to this document, social care is no longer to be understood as ‘solely the 
responsibility of the state’, but rather ‘Communities and wider civil society must be set free 
to run innovative local schemes and build local networks of support’ (DH, 2010: 4). 
Throughout this document, emphasis is placed upon the notion that individuals are not 
isolated consumers of care, but rather, are connected members of social groups. These 
social groups are understood in terms of their capacity to affect the care and outcomes of 
individuals. Individuals are conceived as ‘active citizens’ rather than passive recipients of 
care, and ‘capable communities’ as a source of potential resources. Throughout this 
document, the concepts of social support, social networks and social capital are deployed 
regularly, with (often oblique) reference to social epidemiology and sociological theory as 
an evidence base.  This policy strategy may be located within a wider political narrative 
which questions the role of the state (as a traditional provider of care), and as part of a 
trend whereby the status of care providers is extended towards non-state agents and 
                                                          
4 To date, no study exists to the author’s knowledge which addresses social resources 
and multimorbidity directly – insight will therefore be drawn from wider literature 
addressing chronic illness.  
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agencies, voluntary and community groups, and informal carers. This policy trend has 
been subject to a range of critiques with regards to underlying socio-political theory 
(Kisby, 2010; Levitas, 2012; Sage 2012); however, while important, such criticisms are 
beyond the remit of this review. It is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to recognise 
that social resources – through concepts such as community and social networks – are 
increasingly apparent in policy discourse, particularly in relation to the design of services 
and care provision.  
At a slightly less nebulous level, social resources are also apparent in emerging models of 
healthcare service organisation such as in the ‘asset-based approach’ to healthcare. 
Asset-based approaches seek to identify individual and community resources or ‘assets’ 
which may be built upon in order to affect health outcomes. Such approaches have their 
origins in community development theory which, during the 1990s, moved away from 
conceptualisations of community in terms of a deficits model, and towards an approach 
which considered the potential of community assets (Kretzmann and McKnight, 1996). 
When applied to health care, proponents of an asset-based approach argue that it:  
… makes visible and values the skills, knowledge, connections and potential in a 
community. It promotes capacity, connectedness and social capital (McLean, 2011: 
2).  
Here, as in the above White Paper, concepts from sociological literature are deployed – 
community, social connectedness, social capital. The most widely invoked concept in this 
literature is that of social capital (the implications of this will be addressed later in this 
thesis). Asset-based approaches to healthcare are increasingly apparent in the UK, and 
may be seen in examples such as the ‘capable communities’ programme of public service 
reform (IPPR, 2010), and in the public health strategy of NHS Scotland (Burns, 2011). As 
an indication of the enthusiasm and optimism which has accompanied asset-based 
 23 
 
approaches to health, we need look no further than a recent endorsement from Sir 
Michael Marmot: 
The health and wellbeing of people is heavily influenced by their local community 
and social networks. Those networks and greater social capital provide a source of 
resilience. The extent to which people can participate and have control over their 
lives makes a critical contribution to psychosocial wellbeing and to health. Taking an 
asset-based approach at a local level fosters greater local confidence and self-
esteem for people and communities (Marmot, in Foot, 2012: 3). 
Here again, the influence of sociological and social epidemiological theory and research is 
clear: social networks and social capital provide a requisite theoretical foundation. The 
influence of social science in this respect reflects what Blaxter (2004) has termed the 
‘socio-biologic transition’, or the adoption of sociological and psychological theory and 
method in the wider corpus of biomedicine. However, despite widespread endorsements 
from policy makers and population health experts, the asset-based approach has received 
criticism. Friedli (2012), for example, posits that asset-based approaches are less 
concerned with the progressive delivery of health and social care, but rather ‘sound the 
drum beat for the retreat of statutory, state provision of both public health services and 
public health’ (Friedli, 2012: 10). It should also be added that the association between 
communitarian and neo-liberal theory (in policies of community and citizenship) has 
elsewhere been considered a strategy of population management within the sociological 
critique of governmentality (Houdt and Schinkel, 2013). However, further consideration of 
these critiques is beyond the scope of this review.  
At a more localised level, individuals’ social and community networks are increasingly 
recognised as a resource in primary care. In particular, the emergent concept of ‘social 
prescribing’ incorporates much of the wider literature concerning social networks, social 
capital and health assets. Social prescribing is presented as a means of extending the 
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capabilities of general practice and primary care beyond a singularly biomedical focus, 
and towards a more holistic model of prescribing patients those ‘assets’ located in the 
community. According to Brandling and House, familiar examples of social prescribing 
include:  
… voluntary work agencies, further education, libraries, social or lunch groups, self-
help groups, befriending organisations, hobby clubs, horticulture, sports clubs, 
nature conservation, book groups, art or dance classes (Brandling and House, 2009: 
454).  
Social prescribing is a recent development in terms of health policy and service design, 
and the related literature is limited. However, social prescribing is now actively being 
incorporated into primary care intervention studies (Blickem et al., 2013).5 Proponents of 
social prescribing have begun to argue for its benefits in terms of patient outcomes 
(Horne, Khan, and Corrigan, 2013) and also the promise of efficiency savings (National 
Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts [NESTA], 2013). In light of these 
factors, social prescribing is likely to continue to garner attention and enthusiasm. It might 
be added, however, that through sharing a common theoretical and evidential basis as the 
aforementioned ‘asset-based’ perspective, social prescribing is liable to be subject to 
similar critiques in terms of underlying political and economic drivers.  
2.4.2 Epidemiological foundations and psychological ‘mechanisms’  
Much of the foregoing discussion into social resources and health is founded upon social 
scientific research from social epidemiology, psychology and sociology. The following 
section outlines the main concepts and themes from social epidemiology and 
psychological literature, before progressing towards a more focussed discussion of 
perspectives from medical sociology.  
                                                          
5 The results of this trial have yet to be published.  
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The association between social relationships, social integration and health is long 
established. In his seminal text Suicide (1999) Durkheim demonstrated statistical 
associations between social integration and rates of mortality through suicide. Durkheim’s 
legacy is apparent not only in sociology, but also in social epidemiology where Suicide 
remains a foundational text. Despite Durkheim’s pioneering contribution, the association 
between social connectivity and health remained largely neglected until the late 1970s 
when the Alameda County Study (Berkman and Syme, 1979) again focused 
epidemiological attention upon social connectedness. Berkman and Syme (1979) 
investigated the relationship between social and community ties and mortality using a 
large-scale prospective study design. This study found that participants who reported a 
lack of social ties at baseline were between 1.9 and 3.1 times more likely to die by the 9-
year follow-up point. Following the Alameda County Study, similar findings have been 
reported across a variety of studies from a range of countries (House et al., 1982; 
Schoenbach, 1986; Orth-Gomer et al., 1988; Kaplan et al., 1988). By the end of the 
1980s, the weight of evidence linking social connectedness to health was likened to the 
degree of evidence linking smoking to ill-health at the time of the 1964 U.S. Surgeon 
General’s report (House et al., 1988).  
Developing alongside this epidemiological research have been attempts to explain – 
through recourse to psychological mechanisms – the pathways through which social 
relationships affect health. Broadly speaking, two theoretical models dominate this 
literature: the ‘stress-buffering’ and ‘main effect’ models of social support (Barrera, 1986; 
Cohen and Wills, 1984). The stress-buffering model conceives of a linear causal process 
between stressful events and health outcomes, with social support acting as a mediating 
factor. This model theorises an internalised psychological response – the individual’s 
appraisal of stressful events – as the point of influence for social support. Individual 
appraisal of support is understood to affect cognitive and emotional responses, which, in 
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turn, are causally linked to health outcomes through psychological and behavioural 
responses.  
By contrast, the main effect model considers social support to be effective independently 
of acutely stressful episodes.  According to this model, social support affects health 
outcomes through multiple processes: as the source of social influence, enabling access 
to services and information, and affective in terms of psychological states.  The main 
effect model may be considered to be closer to a sociological reading of social support in 
that it begins to incorporate factors such as social influence and the provision of support 
and information as social resources. 
Both the main effect and the stress-buffering models have been shown to be theoretically 
and empirically fallible, and the pathways through which social relationships affect health 
continue to be the subject of research across psychological sub-disciplines (Uchino, 
2006), as well as in contemporary social epidemiology (Kawachi, Subramanian, and Kim, 
2008).  To date, there remains no consensus as to the specific pathways through which 
social connections mediate individual health outcomes (Frohlich, 2014). 
2.4.3 Social support, social networks and social capital  
Beyond social epidemiological and psychological contributions, the concepts of social 
networks, social capital, and social support have been addressed widely within 
sociological research. This section outlines some of the more definitive approaches within 
this tradition, before returning to a more focused discussion of these concepts in terms of 
chronic illness.   
Social support has been conceptualised, typically, as the actions and functions performed 
for individuals by others (Thoits, 2011), and this has been the subject of significant 
research. Within this research, an enduring aim has been to delimit the experience of 
support into various empirically-based typologies. In this regard, the most widely invoked 
typology of social support continues to be that provided by House (1981) which identifies 
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social support as comprised of emotional, appraisal, informational, and instrumental 
assistance. According to Thoits, emotional support refers to demonstrations of love and 
care, esteem and value, encouragement and sympathy; informational support relates to 
the provision of facts or advice that may help a person solve problems; while instrumental 
support relates to the supply of behavioural or material assistance with practical tasks or 
problems (Thoits, 2011: 146).   
A distinct but related concern within social research has been to describe and map the 
structure and composition of individuals’ social networks. Historically speaking, this 
literature has developed out of an earlier tradition within British social anthropology (The 
Manchester school of social anthropology) (Barnes, 1954; Bott, 1957). Today, social 
network literature seeks to map the structure (inter-relationships, frequency of contact, 
types of relationships) of social networks, and relates this to the availability and quality of 
support. Archetypal studies include Antonucci and Akiyama’s (1987) Social networks in 
adult life, and Wellman’s (1990) Families in community settings. However, in the UK, the 
most influential studies have been those carried out by Clare Wenger in relation to the 
social networks of older people in urban and rural communities. In an approach similar to 
that adopted by House in relation to social support (1981), Wenger has established 
typologies of social networks based upon characteristics such as types of social 
relationship (filial, friendship etc.) and geographic proximity. Wenger’s (1995) typology of 
social networks among older people consists of five types of social network: local family 
dependent, locally integrated, local self-contained, wider community focused, and private 
restricted. Wenger argues that the composition of individuals’ social networks owes, 
largely, to three factors: the availability of local close kin; the level of involvement of family, 
friends and neighbours; and the level of interaction with the community and voluntary 
groups (Wenger, 1995).   
There are, therefore, two distinct but related traditions within social research: social 
support literature and social network literature. Some authors have been at pains to stress 
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the conceptual distinction between social support (understood as the practical, emotional 
and relational process of supportive acts) and social networks (the form, structure or 
pattern of social relationships) (Phillipson, 2001).  However, in practice, this distinction has 
never been particularly firm due to the shared conceptual and theoretical ground between 
both traditions. Further, any distinction between social support and social network 
literature has become less pronounced as both traditions have come to be subsumed 
within the unifying concept of social capital throughout the 1990s.   
The concept of social capital now represents the dominant theoretical and conceptual 
perspective concerning social networks and social support within the social sciences.  
Social capital has unified literature on social support and social networks under a single 
banner, and continues to inform (theoretically) contemporary research into social 
connectedness and health. As an indication of the synergy provided by social capital in 
this respect, Giddens’ statement that ‘social capital refers to trust networks that individuals 
can draw on for social support’ (Giddens, 2000: 78) highlights the accord between a social 
network perspective and social support. It should be noted, however, that social capital is 
not without its critics (see Fine 2008, 2010; Fine and Milonakis 2009  for trenchant 
commentary and critique regarding the emergence of social capital), and this thesis does 
not seek to adopt a social capital perspective.6 Despite this, social capital’s status as the 
dominant theoretical perspective in much sociological literature, as well as its prominence 
in policy and service design, means that it demands further attention.   
Social capital theory has developed following the contributions of three authors: Pierre 
Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam. For Bourdieu, social capital is taken to 
refer to: 
                                                          
6 The decision not to adopt a social capital perspective will be developed fully in the 
Theoretical review chapter of this thesis. 
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…the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession 
of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).   
Coleman provides a similar theory of social capital ‘paralleling the concepts of financial 
capital, physical capital, and human capital – but embodied in relations among persons.’ 
(Coleman, 1988: 118). According to Coleman, social capital ‘exists in the relations among 
persons. Just as physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activity, social 
capital does as well’ (Coleman, 1988: 101).  
Putnam provides a more encompassing definition, suggesting that: 
…social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the 
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000:19).  
Following these definitions, social capital has tended to be operationalised in one of two 
ways. Firstly, following Bourdieu and Coleman, social capital is conceived as individual-
level resources available to the individual by virtue of a social network. Alternatively, social 
capital is conceived, according to Putnam, as a collective or ‘ecological’ factor which 
includes (sometimes confusingly) ‘norms of reciprocity’ or trust. Under this guise, social 
capital is conceived to work at various levels of abstraction, beginning at the level of the 
immediate social network, but also at the level of community, cities and even at the level 
of nation states. Portes (2000) has made reference to this individual / collective distinction 
as the ‘two meanings of social capital’.7  
The two meanings of social capital are apparent in the various applications of social 
capital to health research. As an ‘ecological’ level factor, social capital has been adopted 
                                                          
7 Portes (2000) identifies this semantic distinction as being under-theorized and 
responsible for a good deal of the theoretical and practical inconsistencies apparent within 
social capital research. 
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enthusiastically within social epidemiology and public health literature.8 At the individual-
level, social capital is apparent as a theoretical motif in studies which seek to explore the 
role of social relationships and social networks in shaping health related outcomes and 
behaviour. In this regard, social capital has been applied to studies which seek to explore 
issues as diverse as: access to health care (Derose and Varda, 2009), the meaning of 
childlessness at end of life (Wenger, 2009), practices of intergenerational support 
(Silverstein, Conroy, and Gans, 2012), health aspirations among working class men 
(Dolan, 2007), and communities of online support (Drentea and Moren-Cross, 2005). 
Social capital is also employed as a means of focusing upon the particular characteristics 
of social relationships and social networks; social capital studies have highlighted the 
significance of sexuality (Cronin and King, 2012), gender (Hodgkin, 2008), and ethnicity 
(Fiori, Consedine, and Magai, 2008) in defining the relationship between social capital, 
social networks and health.  
2.4.4 Social resources and chronic illness 
Within the sociology of health and illness, the themes of social networks and social 
resources have received attention in the context of chronic illness. Research in this area 
has considered the role of social networks in the provision of social support, and also the 
impact of chronic illness upon social relationships. In this sense, the place of family and 
friends has been considered according to Bury’s distinction between meaning as 
consequence, and meaning as significance (Bury, 1988). Accordingly, the role of family 
and friends is understood both in terms of the practical and emotional assistance provided 
                                                          
8 It is of limited value to address further the epidemiology of social connectedness in 
relation to social capital. It is of interest, however, to note that many of the earlier social 
support epidemiologists now publish under the banner of social capital: for example, Lin 
and Dean (1984) (social support epidemiology) and Lin (2001) (social capital). This issue 
(and its implication for the efficacy of social capital will be taken up in the Theoretical 
review chapter).  
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by others, but also in terms of the impact of illness upon social relationships (which are 
understood as a key point of identity and selfhood) (Charmaz, 1991; Nettleton, 1995).  
Corbin and Strauss (1988) have identified the place of social networks and social 
resources as essential to the accomplishment of the three lines of illness work (illness 
work, everyday life work and biographical work). Corbin and Strauss described the 
concept of social resources as:  
A spouse or child to provide physical and emotional sustenance to the ill person 
and, in turn, someone to sustain the spouse so that he or she can continue to 
sustain the ill partner… Other resources include someone to drive an ill person to a 
medical facility for treatment; enough time and energy to perform complicated 
regimen, such as tube feeding three or four times a day; and the knowledge and skill 
to carry out procedures such as suctionings, bladder irrigations, and catheter 
insertions at home (Corbin and Strauss, 1988: 109). 
Here there are parallels with studies of social support in that the role of others is taken to 
include instrumental, emotional, and informational assistance. Corbin and Strauss deliver 
an account of the role of spouses, family members and friends in accomplishing the ‘work’ 
involved in living with chronic illness. In this sense, Corbin and Strauss’ contribution is 
among the foremost sociological studies to demonstrate the role of others in the informal 
management of illness.  
However, practices of support and cooperation during illness have also been identified as 
problematic for those concerned, and a number of studies have identified supportive 
relationships as a source of ambiguity and strain: 
Families can thus be both a source of practical and emotional support and a source 
of practical and emotional strain. Indeed, the ambiguities and strains of family life in 
general are exacerbated with the presence of chronic illness (Nettleton, 1995: 92).  
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Perhaps the defining characteristic of the sociological contribution (as opposed to the 
psychological and social epidemiological literature) has been to highlight the complex 
relationship between the family and social networks as a source of support; the potential 
for chronic illness to be experienced as uncertainty, suffering and ambiguity; and the place 
of family and friends in shaping the social and cultural meaning of illness. The sociological 
contribution is captured in Bury’s wider statement as to the meaning of chronic illness: 
The experience of chronic illness involves testing structures of support and risking 
meanings within the practical constraints of home and work. Relationships do not 
guarantee particular responses, indeed it is the response that shapes the 
relationships; meanings change as they are tested and altered as they are put at 
risk. Individuals and their families cannot be entirely sure what the event of such an 
illness means or will mean for the future; meanings are fashioned in the flux of 
change, as events unfold (Bury, 1988: 92).  
Social networks, therefore, are understood not simply as a resource for the management 
of illness at home, but are also fundamental in shaping meaning as significance.  Chronic 
illness is recognised as posing a threat to previously valued social roles and identities; yet 
family, friends and loved ones are central to the ways in which this meaning is fashioned 
and reformed.      
A more recent turn within sociological literature has been towards the role of individuals’ 
social networks in terms chronic illness self-management. In line with wider trends of 
social connectivity and health policy (noted 2.3.1), social networks are identified 
increasingly as a resource to aid self-management and patient outcomes more generally. 
This turn is articulated by Rosland and Piette: 
As a result of the growing gap between the need for self-care support and existing 
resources, family members are increasingly recognized as important allies in the 
care of chronically ill patients, and the last decade has seen a rapid growth of self-
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management programmes that include family members (Rosland and Piette, 2010: 
8).  
The involvement of informal social networks in self-management support accords with the 
twin principles of delivering more acceptable and efficacious care from a patient 
perspective, and increased economic efficiency in the management of long-term 
conditions. A similar perspective is contributed by Vassilev et al. (2010), who identify 
social networks as central to the ways in which people living with chronic illness self-
manage their conditions. The authors argue that self-care should not be understood as 
the isolated individual engaging in self-management, but must recognise instead the role 
of community and social networks. In this direction, Rogers et al. (2011) have called for 
the recognition of social networks and social resources:  
The translation and implementation of a self-care agenda in contemporary health 
and social context needs to acknowledge and incorporate the resources and 
networks operating in patients’ domestic and social environments and everyday 
lives (Rogers et al., 2011:1). 
In a review into the role of family members in self-management, Gallant, Spitze, and 
Prohaska (2007) note the potential for family members to both facilitate and hinder the 
efforts of individuals with chronic illness. In summarising findings, the authors identify 
various ways in which family members affect self-management in a positive sense: 
…direct help with medications, offering medication reminders, cooking healthy 
meals, following a similar diet, monitoring one’s diet, accommodating dietary needs, 
exercising with, playing an active role during doctor’s visits, providing transportation 
to doctor’s visits, sharing illness-related information, acting as a liaison with the 
doctor, talking about shared situations, offering understanding , and motivating older 
adults to follow their prescribed regimen (Gallant, Spitze, and Prohaska, 2007: 398). 
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However, in contrast, the authors also identify the various ways that family members 
might hinder self-management: 
Not cooking meals that followed dietary guidelines, following a diet with no 
restrictions, not accommodating dietary needs, tempting them with forbidden foods, 
discouraging physical activity, giving unwanted advice, engaging in depressing talk, 
and not understanding the reality of living with a chronic illness… being (overly) 
protective (Gallant, Spitze, and Prohaska, 2007: 398). 
Here again, there are parallels with earlier studies into social support among older people, 
and the above self-management practices might easily be incorporated into House’s 
(1981) typology of social support  (emotional, appraisal, informational, and instrumental 
assistance).  However, the above contributions demonstrate that social relationships are 
no simple panacea: social relationships may function in ambivalent, even pernicious ways. 
Gallant, Spitze, and Prohaska (2007) provide a useful descriptive account of self-
management support. However this contribution falls short of delivering a thoroughly 
sociological account and neglects the more existential concerns apparent in Bury’s 
meaning as significance (1988). As with earlier social support literature (and 
psychologically-informed literature), the treatment of social networks, support and chronic 
illness appears to lack the critical insight offered by a sociological perspective.  
2.5 Conclusion and initial research questions 
To date, no study has addressed directly the meaning of social resources from the 
perspective of people living with multimorbidity. Further, existing literature addressing the 
lay meaning and experience of multimorbidity is limited in scope. This review has situated 
this study within the context of literature concerning multimorbidity, and also social 
resources and health. Accordingly, it is possible to identify a number of areas towards 
which a study of the lay experience of social resources in multimorbidity will be able to 
contribute. 
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Social resources are recognised increasingly as a point of healthcare intervention, and as 
a means of mediating patient outcomes. This has been shown to be the case at the levels 
of health and social care policy, healthcare organisation, and in primary care practice. 
Further, social networks and social resources are also now seen to play an important role 
in chronic illness self-management: this is being attended to in emerging trials and 
interventions (Blickem et al., 2013). However, existing studies from a sociological 
perspective have highlighted the potential for social relationships to be experienced in 
ambivalent and potentially pernicious ways. As such, it is important to understand how 
people living with multimorbidity experience the receipt of social resources during illness, 
and to explore how such supportive practices are considered meaningful by those in 
receipt of support.  
Multimorbidity has been identified as one of the foremost challenges to contemporary 
healthcare systems. Extant epidemiological literature presents this challenge as one of 
prevalence, outcomes, and of utilisation costs. In this regard, various measures have 
been taken to meet the challenges of multimorbidity: the form and function of clinical 
guidelines have been critiqued, as have models of care oriented towards single diseases. 
However, research into the lay meaning and experience of multimorbidity remains limited, 
and further research is needed to address the ways in which illness – particularly 
concurrent illness – is experienced in a meaningful fashion by lay individuals.  
These themes inform two research questions: 
 How do people living with multimorbidity make sense of illness and understand 
their experience of illness as meaningful? 
 How do people living with multimorbidity experience social resources, and how is 
the receipt of support and assistance understood to be meaningful?  
These research questions give primacy to lay experience, and recognise the importance 
of subjective meaning structures in shaping the experience of illness. The following 
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chapter will detail methodological issues associated with such an approach, and will also 
outline the structure of this study, the specific methods of data collection used, and the 
process of analysis which has been applied.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology and study design 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the ways in which people living with multimorbidity 
make sense of the experience of concurrent conditions, and how the receipt of support 
and assistance is experienced as meaningful during illness. These issues have been 
articulated in two primary research questions: 
 How do people living with multimorbidity make sense of illness and understand 
their experience of illness as meaningful? 
 How do people living with multimorbidity experience social resources, and how is 
the receipt of support and assistance understood to be meaningful?  
The approach taken by this thesis in answering these questions has been informed by 
practical and technical factors. However, most influential have been philosophical 
considerations as to the nature of the social world, and the possibility of attaining 
knowledge of social phenomena.   
The following sections outline the philosophical foundations of this study, before 
progressing to detail study design and the research methods adopted. It is hoped that in 
providing this information, the reader will be better positioned to appraise the data 
chapters which follow. 
3.2 Philosophical foundations 
Broadly speaking, this thesis may be seen to take an interpretive approach towards social 
phenomena, coupled with an understanding of the social world as informed by ontological 
dualism.  The following section will outline this perspective.  
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The application of interpretivist positions within social research has a long and well 
established history (Bryman, 1988). Interpretive approaches may be defined, in part, 
through their distinction from naturalist and positivist epistemological approaches in social 
science. Positivism, simply stated, entails a belief that the methods and procedures 
associated with the natural sciences may also be applied to the study of social 
phenomena. Further, it might also be said that positivism considers only those 
phenomena observable and amenable to the senses as justifiable basis for knowledge. By 
contrast, an interpretive critique suggests that such a ‘scientific’ approach fails to take 
account of the myriad differences between humans (as social beings) and the objects of 
natural sciences (Bryman, 1988).    
A further distinctive feature of interpretivism is its historical association with idealist, rather 
than materialist philosophy. Put simply, idealism claims that the external world is a 
creation of the mind. This is not to say that our perceptions of the world are not real, 
simply that we (the subject) can have no direct access to the world (the object) in any 
unmediated way. Accordingly, any attempt towards direct one-to-one knowledge of the 
world as a ‘thing-in-itself’ is a materialist endeavour, and one which is quite misguided. By 
contrast, the idealist perspective holds that knowledge of the social world must 
necessarily involve a focus upon the world as it ‘appears’ to us in its phenomenal sense.  
Following these broad concerns – anti-positivism and idealism – interpretive approaches 
are summarised by Blaikie (2000) as follows: 
Interpretivists are concerned with understanding the social world people have 
produced and which they reproduce through their continuing activities. This 
everyday reality consists of the meanings and interpretations given by the social 
actors to their actions, other people’s actions, social situations, and natural and 
humanly created objects. In short, in order to negotiated their way around the world 
and make sense of it, social actors have to interpret their activities together, and it is 
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those meanings, embedded in language, that constitute their social reality (Blaikie, 
2000: 115). 
An interpretive approach, therefore, is one which affords primacy to lay meaning, 
language and individual understanding in explaining the social world. This approach is 
well established within social scientific perspectives on health and illness. The value and 
necessity of such an approach towards corporal issues is captured well by Johnson, 
Dandeker, and Ashworth (1984):  
Hunger, pain and anger in the human world cannot be described without 
investigating how individuals use language and symbols to construct what such 
states mean for them. For it is only by understanding the individual experience of 
subjective interpretation that we will understand why human beings behave in the 
way they do; why, for instance, thresholds of pain, attitudes to death and so on, 
differ so markedly from person to person, and from culture to culture (Johnson, 
Dandeker, and Ashworth, 1984: 75).  
Under the banner of interpretivism there exist numerous distinct perspectives upon how 
language, meaning, and understanding are conceptualised in relation to the individual and 
human action. In this regard, increasingly subtle ontological considerations become 
interconnected with epistemic concerns. This is to say that what we hold to be ‘out there’ 
in the social world must inform the modes by which we seek knowledge; as Archer 
suggests, ontology might be seen as both ‘gatekeeper and bouncer’ for methodology 
(Archer,1995: 22). In light of this, it is important to detail some of the literature which has 
informed my ontological perspective and which, therefore, has played a role in guiding 
analysis.  
My perspective is informed, in the first instance, by contributions from social 
phenomenology (Schutz), and to a lesser degree, from ethnomethodology (Garfinkel).  
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For Schutz, social phenomena are to be ‘treated as belonging to a world of objective 
mind, a world which is, to be sure, intelligible, but not under the form of scientific laws’ 
(Schutz, 1976: 3). Schutz promotes the conceptual apparatus (inherited from Husserl) of 
the lifeworld : a concept premised upon the belief that individual perspective is shaped by 
experience, as well as the individual’s positioning within natural, social and cultural fields. 
Accordingly, the lifeworld refers to ‘that every day province of reality which the wide-
awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense.’ 
(Schutz, 1970: 3). Schutz identifies the lifeworld in terms of the historically and 
experientially derived frames of reference (drawn from the natural world, the social, and 
the cultural fields) which shape individual perspective. Such frames of reference are to be 
understood, according to Schutz, as (pre-) biographically accumulated experiences which 
act as an interpretive or perceptual lens through which the social actor gives meaning to 
the world. These frames of reference are termed by Schutz (anticipating Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus) ‘habitual reference schema’. Therefore, an awareness of such natural, 
social and cultural reference schemes is central to the social phenomenological 
perspective.  
A related approach to the ‘taken-for-granted’ practices of everyday life may be observed in 
ethnomethodology and epitomised in the work of Garfinkel (1986).  Garfinkel (among 
others) sought to advance social phenomenology through an awareness of the role of 
linguistic structures and specific context in framing meaning. Within ethnomethodological 
approaches, there is an emphasis upon the relation between the external world and the 
subjective realm as bi-directional: in giving an account of an event or a disposition, the 
individual subject not only gives a phenomenological description, but also plays a role in 
creating and maintaining social phenomena through the use of language.   
In recent decades, a further wave of ‘post-interpretive’ approaches have taken up the 
insight offered by ethnomethodology, and have sought to elucidate further the role of 
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socio-cultural factors in relation to subjective meaning. Such approaches are, in part, a 
response to a critique of idealism which suggests that to focus upon individual 
representations of meaning will tend towards introspective or solipsistic accounts of the 
social – the social world as reduced to the individual’s knowledge of it. The following 
statement from Bourdieu may be read in these terms, and with regard to its implications 
for interpretive approaches: 
…it is good to recall, against certain mechanistic visions of action, that social agents 
construct social reality, individually and also collectively, we must be careful not to 
forget, as the interactionists and the ethnomethodologists often do, that they have 
not constructed the categories they put to work in this work of construction 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 10). 
This perspective affirms and advances the belief that cognitive structures may not be 
understood without reference to socio-cultural structures, and is representative of a wider 
trend within social theory whereby the antinomy of subject and object becomes 
problematic and even obstructive. For Bourdieu (as for others), any phenomenological 
account must be approached critically with a view to identifying the ways by which socio-
cultural conditions (and power) shape the perceptual frameworks through which the 
phenomenal world is interpreted.9 The implications of this perspective for the social 
sciences are spelt out by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992): 
A genuine science of human practice cannot be content with merely superimposing 
a phenomenology on a social topology. It must also elucidate the perceptual and 
evaluative schemata that agents invest in their everyday life. Where do these 
schemata (definitions of the situation, typifications, interpretive procedures) come 
                                                          
9 In Bourdieu’s case, this might be read as the influence of Marxist concerns as to the role 
of class, and a Webbarian concern for the dynamics of domination.  
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from, and how do they relate to the external structures of society? (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 2). 
Similar concerns may be observed in the ‘structuration’ theory of Giddens (1984), or in the 
‘morphogenic’ approach promoted by Archer (1995). In such perspectives, 
phenomenology alone is treated as insufficient, and there is a drive towards what has 
been termed ‘ontological dualism’. These approaches incorporate, to varying degrees, 
versions of ontological realism as a necessary adjunct to understanding individual action. 
Accordingly, the task of social research is to understand the interplay between these 
positions, the ideal (subjective) and the real (objective). These authors – Bourdieu and 
Archer in particular – have influenced my analytic perspective, and I would summarise my 
own position as that of a social phenomenologist seeking to detail the ‘every day province 
of reality’ (Schutz, 1970: 3) and to explore the role of socio-cultural structures beyond the 
individual’s experiential and perceptual horizon.  
3.3 Background to this study  
This study is linked to an existing epidemiological cohort study within the Keele 
University’s ARUK Primary Care Centre – the 2C Study. The 2C study is a prospective 
study of Osteoarthritis (OA) and Cardiovascular disease (CVD) co-morbidity within a 
primary care population. The 2C study sample population includes adults aged over 40 
years who have a computerised record of clinical diagnosis for both OA and CVD 
(hypertension, heart disease, and heart failure). Additional morbidities were not treated as 
a basis for exclusion; therefore additional morbidities were common within this study 
population. Within the 2C study population, a sub-group of participants consented to be 
contacted in relation to involvement in additional research. This study sampled from the 
subgroup of 2C participants who consented to further contact.   
Although this study sampled from 2C study participants, this study was not integrated 
within the 2C study in any way, and was a discrete and independent study. Researchers 
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involved in the 2C study were not involved in any aspect of research design, data 
collection, or analysis. One member of the 2C team (Dr James Prior) assisted in 
extracting the sample from the 2C study dataset. 
3.4 Main study design 
In light of the foregoing philosophical considerations, this study employed a qualitative 
methodology involving in-depth interviews. The application of qualitative interviewing as a 
method of data collection is well established within interpretive traditions of health research 
(Bowling, 2001; Green and Thorogood, 2014), and is consistent with a commitment to the primacy 
of individual meaning in explaining personal and  social worlds.   
In consideration of the (above) research questions, this study recruited both patient 
participants and patient participants’ social contacts (friends, family, work colleagues) to 
participate in qualitative interviews. Patient participants took part in (up to) two qualitative 
interviews over a three to six month period. Social contact participants took part in a single 
qualitative interview.   
In the time between first and second interviews, patient participants were contacted by 
post. This contact asked participants to reflect upon their recent health, and provided the 
opportunity for participants to engage in an additional qualitative interview (see appendix 
15). Further, at the time of the first interview, patient participants were given the 
opportunity to complete a ‘Social network diary’. It was envisaged that participants would 
record the people they were in contact with over a 10 day period, and that this record 
would aid interview analysis (see appendix 14).  
The design of this study and stages of data collection are detailed in following flow 
diagram (Figure 1) detailed below. 
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Figure 1 – Study Design Flow Diagram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview 1 
PATIENT PARTICIPANT 
Social Network 
Diary 
 
Qualitative Interview 2 
 
Social Contact Participant 
Following the completion of their 
interview, patient participants 
were asked to consider inviting an 
‘important’ social contact to be 
recruited into the study.  
Between baseline and follow-up interviews, 
patient participants received a monthly 
postal contact. Participants were encouraged 
to reflect upon their recent health, and to 
request a further qualitative interview if they 
wished to discuss these experiences.  
Social contact Interview 
 45 
 
3.5 Pilot study and Research User Group  
A small pilot study was conducted with four members of the Keele ARUK Primary Care 
Centre’s Research User Group (RUG). RUG members were invited on the basis that they 
were likely to share similar health profiles as the participants in the full study. RUG 
members all lived with multiple chronic illnesses (including OA), all were over the age of 
50, and both male and female RUG members contributed.   
Research User Group (RUG) members participated in pilot interviews which focused on 
issues of multimorbidity and the role of other people in their lives. This process proved to 
be valuable in helping to refine interview topic guides. For instance, during pilot interviews 
it became clear that all pilot participants lived with long-term conditions in addition to OA 
and CVD. It was also apparent that for these participants, the most important or disruptive 
episodes of illness were often unrelated to the conditions targeted by the research team 
(i.e. OA and CVD). This discovery influenced the interview schedule used in the initial 
interviews of the main study; rather than focusing solely upon OA and CVD (the sampling 
criteria) participant’s wider experiences of health and illness were incorporated into the 
interview schedule. I explained to participants that they had been sampled on the basis of 
two concurrent conditions, but I also made clear that I was interested in additional 
conditions or illness episodes, which affected their lives and shaped their relationships 
with other people. Interviews tended to begin with participants describing and explaining 
their health in biographical terms with illness being framed by wider life course factors (a 
process which often led to the identification of additional conditions). This biographical 
rendering of health and illness shaped the interpretation of multimorbidity put forward by 
this thesis (see Chapter Four). The emphasis on biography would likely have occurred 
regardless of the pilot interviews (having emerged within the data), however the pilot 
interviews meant that initial interviews were better attuned to the ways in which 
participants understood multimorbidity.  
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All four RUG members were also approached to complete a social network diary in which 
they were to record – over a one-week period – the people that they were in contact with. 
The results of this were mixed. One participant completed the diary with a high degree of 
detail. However, one participant completed the diary only retrospectively, while the 
remaining two participants did not complete the diary. 
One significant issue to arise from the pilot process was that RUG members did not 
immediately consider the issue of social networks to be relevant to health issues. One 
RUG member expressed the belief that questions about social networks were not 
acceptable in an interview which he understood to be about embodied health. This insight 
demonstrated that explaining the rationale behind the study – the link between social 
networks and health – in study literature and face-to-face would be important in ensuring 
the acceptability of the research to participants.  
In addition to the pilot study, the study protocol was presented to a meeting of RUG 
members (approximately 15 members). The aim of this session was to invite feedback as 
to the appropriateness of the study design, the study rationale, and study research 
questions. This was a valuable experience, and helped me to understand how best to 
present the study to lay individuals. The RUG consultation also provided feedback on 
study literature, which resulted in a number of minor changes being made (these changes 
involved improving the readability of study paperwork).  
The following sections detail specific and practical aspects of study design, the conduct of 
interviews, and procedures of analysis.   
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3.6 Sampling and recruitment 
 
Patient participants 
Patient participants were sampled using a purposive sampling frame. The purposive 
sampling frame was developed by the research team and was used to guide informatics 
staff in selecting and extracting 2C participant data from the 2C study.  Purposive 
sampling did not involve any personally identifying information. The following section will 
outline the criteria used to select research participants.  
The principal criterion for purposive sampling was that participants should all have 
received a clinical diagnosis for more than one chronic illness (at least OA and CVD). 2C 
study data were available for three groups of participants: those with hypertension and 
OA; coronary heart disease (CHD) and OA; and heart failure and OA. The research team 
decided to sample participants from each of these groups in equal proportions. The 
rationale for this being that lay experience of multimorbidity is likely to vary according to 
the clinical picture of each individual (Bayliss, 2003). In practice, during the course of their 
interviews, all participants reported additional long term conditions and episodes of illness, 
which meant that the diagnostic labels used to sample participants (derived from the 2C 
study) did not reflect their experience of illness particularly well. This being said, the fact 
remains that the sampling criteria were effective in so far as all participants recruited to 
the study were people living with multimorbidity. Participant’s self-reported chronic and 
episodic conditions are recorded in Appendix 1.    
A further purposive sampling criterion was sex. The decision to sample participants 
according to sex reflected the likelihood that gender would shape participants’ experience 
of illness and support (Arber and Cooper, 1999; Macintyre, Hunt and Sweeting, 1996). 
Each batch of participant invitations contained equal numbers of invitations for men and 
women. This strategy proved effective, and the final study sample contains broadly equal 
numbers of men and women.  
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Age was also used as a purposive sampling criterion. Age was an important consideration 
given the likelihood that age related biographical, social and cultural factors would play a 
role in individual’s experiences of health and illness (Wadsworth, 1997). Initial mail-outs 
included equal numbers of people from the following age bands: below 65 years of age, 
66-75 years of age, over 75 years of age. Subsequent mail-outs were weighted towards 
age groups with lower recruitment rates in an effort to achieve approximately equal 
numbers of participants in each age group. In the final sample, however, participants aged 
below 65 years of age were under-represented (only two participants were under 65). 
There were several reasons for this underrepresentation; the 2C study contained only a 
limited number of potential participants aged under 65 who also matched other purposive 
sampling criteria, and who had agreed to be contacted about future research participation. 
Further, it is reasonable to speculate that the low recruitment of participants under the age 
of 65 will have been influenced by the higher proportion of this age group in full or part-
time work, and therefore less inclined to engage in a research study which required a 
prolonged time commitment. As has been stated elsewhere in this thesis, it is important 
that future research engages with a patient population of younger people living with 
multimorbidity as this group is likely to face distinct physical, social and economic 
challenges.  
Beyond multimorbidity, sex, and age, opportunities to sample purposively were limited by 
the data available within the 2C study. It was not possible to sample on the basis of 
ethnicity or socio-economic demographics. Accordingly, the resulting study sample was 
homogenous in its ethnic composition – an issue considered in the discussion chapter of 
this thesis. With regard to socio-economic status, it was possible to approximate 
participants’ economic status through informal discussion (before and after participant 
interviews) as well as during the interviews themselves. Despite not being able to 
completely purposively sample participants, the research team were confident that the 
final study sample would include a participants from a range of different socio-economic 
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groups. Participants were recruited from six different general practices and the research 
team (who have extensive experience of the research and management of local 
healthcare systems) were confident that recruiting participants from these specific general 
practices would result in a socio-economically diverse sample – this proved to be the case 
(see Appendix 1). Given that socio-economic status is a principal determinant of health 
(Marmot and Wilkinson, 2005) it is a strength of this study that different socio-economic 
groups are represented.   
Recruitment followed a batch-mailing format; five batches of 20 study invitations were 
mailed out to a total of 100 potential participants. Batches of invites were spaced 
approximately one month apart.  The decision to mail in this format was designed to allow 
for a manageable amount of interviews per month, and also to guard against over-
recruitment. Recruitment rates and patterns are detailed in appendix 3. In addition to the 
15 fully consenting participants, five individuals responded stating their desire not to 
consent, four individuals consented to participate but could not be contacted, and two 
individuals consented but then withdrew once the study was explained in person.  
Baseline participants’ pseudonyms and details as to whether or not each took part in one 
or both interviews is detailed in Table 1 (below). Additional participant details (including 
socio-economic status, self-reported morbidities) are listed in appendix 1. In total 25 
interviews were conducted with patient participants, four of these interviews involved a 
spouse (who were also recruited to participate in the study).  
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Table 1: Baseline participants by interview  
Pseudonym Sex 
M/F 
Age 
Group 
First 
Interview 
Second 
Interview 
Reason for No 
Second 
Interview 
Mary F 65-74 Y Y N/a  
Ian M 65-74 Y Y N/a 
Bill M 75+ Y N Health 
Pamela F 65-74 Y Y N/a 
Rose F 75+ Y Y N/a 
George M 75+ Y N Health 
James M 65-74 Y N Health 
Theo M 65-74 Y Y N/a 
David M  65-74 Y Y N/a 
Elaine F 65-74 Y Y N/a 
Isla F 75+ Y Y N/a 
Mo F 55-64 Y N Bereavement 
Judith F 65-74 Y N Unable to 
contact 
Kirsty  F  65-74 Y Y N/a 
Dan M  65-74 Y Y N/a 
 
 
Social contact participants 
Patient participants’ social contacts were sampled through snowball sampling: a 
secondary non-probability sample accessed through the initial sample (Bryman, 2008).   
During discussions before and after interviews, patient participants were asked to 
consider people who were ‘important’ in their lives, and whether they would be 
comfortable in approaching one such person to be invited to participate in the study. 
Where patient participants were comfortable with this process, they were invited to 
distribute a ‘study pack’ (containing study information literature, researcher contact details, 
and consent form) to the social contact of their choice. Following this, it was left to the 
individual in receipt of this information (the social contact) to instigate contact with the 
researcher.   
The decision about whom to invite was led by the patient participant: the only guidance 
given by the researcher was for the patient participant to consider inviting someone 
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‘important’ in their life. It was envisaged that social contact participants would take part in 
separate interviews; however, in practice, patient participants often stated a preference for 
involving their social contact in a joint interview. In only one case did the patient 
participant and the social contact participant request separate interviews. In total, four 
social contact participants consented to participate in the study.  
3.7 In-depth interviews 
The decision to use in-depth interviews was made in consideration of the (above) 
philosophical underpinnings of this thesis. In-depth interviews – and qualitative research 
more generally – are considered widely as synonymous with interpretive and 
phenomenological approaches towards social research. The following quotation from 
Johnson (2002) may be read as an indication of the synergy between philosophy and 
method: 
[In-depth interviewing] begins with commonsense perceptions, explanations, and 
understandings of some lived cultural experience… and aims to explore the 
contextual boundaries of that experience or perception, to uncover what is usually 
hidden from ordinary view or reflection or to penetrate to more reflective 
understandings about the nature of that experience (Johnson, 2002: 106). 
Beyond a philosophical consistency, in-depth interviews were recognised as technically 
beneficial. In contrast to more structured methods of interviewing, in-depth interviews 
allow for complexity to be investigated in a more thorough manner, participants’ answers 
may be clarified to a greater extent, and a more relaxed research atmosphere often 
facilitates the investigation of sensitive topics such as illness (Bowling, 2001: 379).  
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3.8 Interviews and social network diaries  
In terms of the practicalities of interviewing, the types of questions asked of participants 
conformed, largely, to Patton’s (1990) typology: 
 Background questions which aim to understand the respondent’s previous 
experiences 
 Questions which elicited descriptions of experiences, behaviour, actions and 
activities 
 Opinion or value questions which inform about participants’ goals, intentions, 
desires and values 
 Questions about feelings with the intention of understanding emotional responses 
 Questions about knowledge and factual information 
Interviews were conducted at participants’ own homes, and usually lasted approximately 
1-2 hours. An interview topic guide was used at each interview. Two broad themes were 
addressed within this topic guide: firstly, the experience of living with more than one 
chronic condition, and secondly, the role of other people in participants’ lives (see 
appendix 11). The format of this topic guide developed and was refined as interviews 
progressed. The adaption of interview topic guides allowed for emergent themes to be 
investigated in greater depth and detail. The iterative development of interview topic 
guides is accepted widely as good-practice during in-depth qualitative interviewing 
(Bryman, 2008; Charmaz, 2006).  
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed following the approach suggested by 
Reissman (1993). An initial verbatim transcription was produced (by an outsourced 
company); this transcript was then checked (with any errors corrected) by a process of 
listening to the interview audio file and correcting any errors in transcription. All transcripts 
were fully anonymised – pseudonyms were applied to all people, places, institutions and 
any other personally identifying information.   
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Interviews with social contacts 
Social contacts were invited to take part in interviews about the role they played in the 
lives of patient participant. As has been stated, in all but one case, social contact 
participants took part in joint interviews with patient participants.  
An interview topic guide was developed for social contact participants (see appendix 12). 
However, the utility of this topic guide was diminished where joint interviews occurred. In 
these cases, I was able to blend the topic guides of both patient participant and social 
contact participant in a way which did not prove to be problematic.  In practice, joint 
interviews felt entirely comfortable and there did not appear to be any difficulties in 
interview dynamics – all participants seemed comfortable in discussing sensitive topics 
with both individuals present. This was likely the result of the sampling process, and the 
fact that in choosing who to invite, patient participants were likely to have chosen people 
with whom they were comfortable discussing health and issues of a personal or sensitive 
nature. Despite this, it is quite possible that the presence of a spouse may have shaped 
the course of joint interviews. However, given the relatively small sample size of 
participants this may have affected, attempting to detail further this influence would be 
problematic.  
Developing the social network diary 
The social network diary was developed following a review of relevant research methods 
literature, having attended a training course on social network analysis, and through 
discussion with the research supervision team.  
Social network data may be collected by various methods, the suitability of which depends 
on the type of social networks in question. In recent years, social network analysis has 
been revolutionised by the advent of digital social networks. Data available via platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter represent new and exciting vistas for researchers exploring 
connections between individuals and larger actors such as corporations or non-
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governmental organisations. However, this mode of social network analysis was neither 
practical nor theoretically consistent with the research questions set out in this study. This 
study focuses on the meaning of embodied interactions and the role of others in the 
provision of tangible support and assistance during illness. The real and imagined social 
networks of single individuals are the object of study, and this type of social network is 
termed an egocentric network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Three predominant methods for collecting egocentric network data exist. One approach is 
to observe and record interactions which occur in a given setting and timeframe. 
Observation has clear advantages in that the data produced are amenable to 
quantification and sophisticated quantitative analysis. However observation also requires 
significant resources in terms of the time (and finances) required to collect data. 
Consequently, observation was not considered for this study. A second, and more feasible 
approach to data collection, is to use a name generator (interview questions about social 
contacts) such as ‘tell me five people who are important in your life?’. Name generators 
are easy to administer and require little in the way of resources. However, name 
generators offer no objective record of interactions and have also been derided within the 
relevant literature for their reliance on ‘subjective’ or self-reported data. A third approach is 
to use a social contact diary. Social contact diaries ask participants to record the people 
they come into contact with over a designated period of time (Wasserman and Faust, 
2002). The research team discussed the benefits and limitations of these methods and 
decided that social contact diaries would be pragmatic (resource efficient) and offer high 
quality data as they record data on real interactions. This decision was informed by 
relevant literature. Fu, for example, says that: 
With all the characteristics of each contact person, each specific contact and each ego-
alter tie on a daily basis, the diary approach reveals every detail of an individual’s actual 
network. Over time, it can become the most comprehensive and penetrating research 
instrument for measuring personal networks (Fu, 2005: 184). 
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Finally, a further factor which informed the decision to employ a social contact diary was 
that similar qualitative diaries had been used successfully by the supervision team and 
colleagues in in previous studies (Ong and Jinks, 2006, 2009).  
Limitations and omission of the social network diary   
 
As has been stated, it was envisaged initially that patient participants would record – over 
a ten day period – the names of people with whom they came into contact. This record 
took the form of a ‘social network diary’ (see appendix 14). The rationale for this diary was 
that it would aid discussion about social contacts during participants’ interviews and would 
also provide additional data amenable to analysis. However, in practice, this instrument 
proved to be somewhat ineffectual, and was not widely adopted by participants. A number 
of participants explained their reasons for not engaging with this part of the study: some 
felt that the diary involved too great a time-commitment on their part, others considered 
the act of recording social contacts to be overly intrusive. In practice, only two participants 
completed the diary, and among these responses, data was partial and incomplete. As a 
result of these issues, the decision was made, through discussions with the study 
supervision team, that this component of the study should not feature in either the conduct 
of interviews, nor in the analysis of qualitative data. Including the two returned diaries 
would have delivered negligible analytic benefits. A more pressing principle was to 
maintain a consistent analytic approach across all participants.  
 
Feedback from participants indicated two reasons for the failure of the social contact 
diary. Firstly, some participants were confused about the purpose of the diary – its 
relevance to health research – and were unsure about how to complete the diary. 
Secondly, participants reported that they did not have the time or energy needed to 
complete the diary. These issues – participant confusion and the burden of completing 
diaries – are recognised in the relevant research methods literature. Fu (2005, 2007), 
 56 
 
among others, has considered the benefits and limitations of social contact diaries; diaries 
afford rich data, but completing diaries can be laborious, onerous, and are therefore only 
suitable for highly committed research participants. Indeed, these issues were considered 
by the research team prior to the implementation of the social contact diary, and efforts 
were made to simplify the diary’s format and to explain its purpose to participants. 
However, clearly, these efforts were not sufficient, and the social contact diary was not an 
acceptable component of the study for participants.   
The decision to discard the social network diary will have shaped this thesis in a number 
of ways. Firstly, not collecting systematic and quantifiable data about the composition and 
structure of participant’s social networks means that it is not possible to make causal 
inferences about the role of these factors in shaping participant’s experience of illness and 
support. Second, as a corollary of this, the study and this thesis are necessarily driven by 
qualitative data and emphasis is placed upon micro processes of social resource 
exchange. The consequences of omitting the social contact diary are, therefore, 
simultaneously strengths and limitations of this study: sacrificing structured and 
quantifiable data may be regarded as a limitation, however the in-depth qualitative data 
and theoretical analysis that developed as a result are strengths of this thesis.  
Monthly contact 
Monthly contact with participants was intended to have three outcomes. First, it was 
hoped that regular contact would keep participants engaged in the study during the three 
to six months between first and second interviews. Second, monthly contact enabled 
participants to inform the research team of any changes in their circumstances and health. 
Finally, monthly contact gave participants the option of completing additional telephone 
interviews if they wanted to discuss any changes in their health circumstances.  The 
decision to employ monthly contact was taken following the success of similar methods in 
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previous research involving the research supervision team (Morden, Jinks, Ong, 2011; 
Ong, Jinks, Morden, 2011). 
In practice, participants did not wish to undertake additional formal interviews. In 
retrospect, it is likely that asking participants to participate in two interviews, complete 
social contact diaries, recruit social contacts into the study, as well as engage in additional 
monthly updates resulted in ‘study fatigue’ on the part of participants. Participants were 
enthusiastic and engaged in parts of the study which involved direct contact with a 
researcher – interviews and the recruitment of social contacts. However, participants did 
not engage in components of the study which required self-direction – social contact 
diaries and volunteering for additional interviews.  One way to overcome this lack of 
engagement may have been to increase researcher contact with participants, to remind 
and to encourage participants. However, no provision was made for additional researcher-
participant contact within the NHS research ethics submission, and therefore, further 
contact was not possible on ethical grounds.  
Although participants did not volunteer for additional interviews, some did use the monthly 
contact to inform the study team about serious deteriorations in their health. Two 
participants used the monthly contact to indicate that they could not participate in a 
second interview due to ill health. Other participants used the monthly contact to report 
stable health, whilst three participants stated that their health had deteriorated but they did 
not wish to be contacted about these changes. Further, whilst the monthly contact did not 
result in additional data, informal discussions indicated that participants appreciated this 
contact as a sign they were still involved in the study. On a personal level, I also feel that 
keeping in contact with participants throughout the three to six months between first and 
second interviews aided rapport when it came to conducting the second interview.   
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3.9 Process of analysis  
My analytic approach has been informed by the procedure outlined in Charmaz’s (2006, 
2008) constructivist grounded theory. Adopting an analytic procedure such as this was 
helpful in providing structure and consistency in analysis. Further, this approach proved 
useful in the cross-validation of analysis.10   
Charmaz (2008) describes a constructivist grounded theory approach as one that: 
 Begins with an inductive approach  
 Involves simultaneous data collection and analysis 
 Consists of flexible guidelines 
 Emphasises the process of construction in analysis 
 Aims towards theories of the middle-range 
 
The following section details the techniques of analysis which are drawn from this 
perspective. 
3.9.1 Coding practices 
Process of coding  
Constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2006) involves of a number of iterative and 
recursive stages of coding; my approach towards coding was characterised by the 
following stages. 
The first stage of coding was initial coding. Initial coding is characterised by openness on 
the part of the researcher towards identifying practical and theoretical elements that are 
present in the data. The specific approach taken in this study was line-by-line coding 
whereby each line of transcript data is coded initially.  Line-by-line coding – although 
                                                          
10 This framework provided a consistent analytic practice, and aided the supervision team in their 
critique and validation of the various stages of coding.  
 59 
 
labour intensive – promoted an attentiveness to detail, and helped prevent coding from 
incorporating too many tacit assumptions about the data.  
The next stage of coding described by Charmaz is that of focused coding. Focused coding 
may be understood as increasingly directed and conceptually driven. Following Charmaz 
(2006), focused coding meant identifying and expanding the most theoretically significant 
and frequently occurring codes found in initial coding.   
Following focused coding, theoretical coding is a final formal coding stage identified by 
Charmaz (2006). Theoretical coding aims to analyse relationships between categories of 
codes generated through focused coding. In practice – as is recognised by Charmaz – the 
distinction between each coding stage was somewhat artificial, and coding was not a 
linear process. Rather, coding was a genuinely emergent process: concepts would 
emerge and develop, and initial coding would be revisited and re-coded in light of later 
theoretical coding.   
Coding practices were subjected to a number of stages of review within the study 
supervision team. Two PhD study supervisors analysed five full interview transcripts 
independently and developed their own independent coding frameworks; group meetings 
then addressed similarities and differences between resulting codes. This was an 
important stage for the refinement of codes and for developing more robust concepts.  
Memo writing and free-writing  
Memo writing has been identified by Charmaz (2006) as a key intermediary stage 
between data collection and theory construction. The aim of memo writing is to elaborate 
(in preliminary fashion) upon categories or codes within data. Specifically, memo writing 
aims to identify the properties of codes and to define relationships (and identifying gaps) 
between categories of data. In this study, memo writing was used most productively in the 
stages between initial coding and focused coding. Memo writing gave space for making 
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comparisons between data, between data and codes, and between codes and 
overarching concepts.  
Free-writing was also used extensively throughout all stages of coding and was 
particularly useful in attempting to resolve the tensions and complexities of concepts.  
Free-writing is a technique adapted from creative writing and I found the following 
guidelines to be useful: 
 Ideas should be committed to paper as quickly as possible 
 Writing only to and for oneself 
 Permitting oneself to write freely and badly 
 Writing should not attend to grammar, organisation, logic, evidence or audience 
 Writing should appear as if talking 
(Charmaz 2006)  
Free-writing aided analysis through the promotion of free thinking and I found that it 
elicited fresh ideas. Further, free-writing helped, in part, to free my thinking from prior 
knowledge and experiences and in this sense was a valuable tool in terms of critique and 
reflexivity.  
3.9.2 Computer aided qualitative analysis software  
Computer aided qualitative analysis software (CAQDAS) is a source of some contention 
within qualitative research literature, and the use of computer software in qualitative 
analysis is associated with both positive and limiting factors. This study employed QSR 
NVivo 9 in storing all data, coding, and other administrative functions. 
In terms of the benefits of employing CAQDAS, Green and Thorogood (2014) suggest that 
CAQDAS facilitates transparency in research through the production of clearer records of 
coding and theory construction. Further, there are also clear advantages in being able to 
systematise data storage and in the ability to search and recall data.  
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However, as noted by Gibbs (2007), the facility of code and attribute searching is only 
ever as good as the researcher’s coding and attribution of the data (Gibbs, 200: 140). In 
this regard, it is important to recognise that there is no software able to ‘do’ qualitative 
analysis; the quality of qualitative analysis is as contingent upon the sociological 
imagination of the researcher as it ever has been. Accordingly, the strengths and 
limitations of CAQDAS are surmised well by Bazeley and Richards –developers of NVivo 
– who suggest that the metaphor of craft remains relevant: ‘the excitement of this sort of 
research (CAQDAS) is that no matter how good the tools, the outcome depends on the 
researcher’s crafting of theory’ (Bazeley and Richards, 2000: 91). Throughout this study, 
CAQDAS has been invaluable in the storage and administration of data; however, 
CAQDAS has only ever been a tool, and has not assisted the creative process of analysis. 
3.10 Objectivity, reliability and validity in qualitative research 
Objectivity, reliability and validity articulate key epistemic principles within much health 
sciences research. Further, the degree to which objectivity, reliability and validity are 
achieved is often used as a yardstick for measuring quality in research. In qualitative 
research, however, the relevance of these terms is contested. The following section will 
address objectivity, reliability and validity, and how they have been conceptualised within 
this study.  
A common criticism levelled at qualitative research is that the knowledge produced 
through interviews may not be regarded as objective. However, such an argument fails to 
take account of the fact that the concept of objectivity is itself, rather more ambiguous 
than is generally assumed. For instance, MacIntyre (1988) has argued that ‘Objectivity is 
a moral concept before it is a methodological concept, and the activities of natural science 
turn out to be a species of moral activity’ (MacIntyre, 1988: 37). In this sense, the quest for 
objectivity within qualitative research is to be regarded as much an ethical exercise as it is 
a methodological one. However, the question as to whether or not such objective ‘value-
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free’ knowledge is possible is questionable. Following the influence of hermeneutics, and 
particularly that of Gadamer (1975), it is difficult to argue against the assertion that the 
production of knowledge is shaped by the prejudices inherent in all of us. In recognition of 
this, an important sentiment within qualitative research is that of reflexivity. A reflexive 
approach may be summarised as one which seeks to identify such prejudices, reflect 
upon them critically, and makes this process available to the reader.  Accordingly, Kvale 
and Brinkmen (2009) suggest that ‘Striving for sensitivity about one’s own prejudices, 
one’s subjectivity, involves a reflective objectivity’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 242). 
Such a ‘reflexive objectivity’ may be regarded as a conceptualisation of objectivity more 
relevant to interpretive approaches, and one with the potential to improve quality in 
qualitative research. The notion of reflexive objectivity was an important ethical and 
methodological intention within this study. It is for this reason that I have chosen to include 
Chapter Six (‘Theoretical review’); this chapter details a critique of social capital theory 
which emerged throughout the process of data analysis, a process which required me to 
recognise my own theoretical assumptions before seeking to move beyond them.  
Reliability is a further problematic term for qualitative researchers, particularly as reliability 
confers strong moral connotations in everyday language use. Reliability is usually invoked 
in the evaluation of the trustworthiness and consistency of study findings. There are 
several ways by which attending to reliability may strengthen a qualitative research: 
consistency in the transcription process, for example. However, if too great an emphasis 
is placed upon the reliability, there is a risk that richness in qualitative data will be 
compromised. In this study, aspects of sampling, recruitment, and data management were 
conducted in a highly consistent manner; in this sense, contributing towards the ‘reliability’ 
of study findings. However, to allow for creativity, innovation and variability, interviews 
were purposefully flexible and diverse in their structure and content.   
Validity in health research is usually associated with the concept of external validity, or the 
extent to which study results may be generalised to wider populations. As such, a 
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common criticism of qualitative research is that knowledge created through interviews 
may not be treated as valid because it is not possible to generalise beyond the subject. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) provide a useful typology of the structures of such validity 
claims, these include: the correspondence criteria, the coherence criteria, and the 
pragmatic criteria of truth. Without reiterating what has already been stated regarding 
epistemology, the correspondence criteria (whereby knowledge corresponds to an 
objective or material world) is problematic for an interpretive approach. By contrast, the 
coherence criterion considers truth claims with respect to the degree of internal 
consistence and logic within that truth claim, while the pragmatist tradition privileges the 
degree by which truth claims serve a real-world purpose and enable useful application 
(Rorty, 1978). Qualitative research more often engages – to varying degrees –with 
coherence and pragmatist truth criteria. Whittemore, Chase and Mandle (2001) provide a 
useful practical model along such lines, and distinguish between primary validity criteria – 
those necessary to all qualitative inquiry, but which are not sufficient in themselves – and 
secondary validity criteria – considered more flexible in their application. Primary criteria 
for qualitative validity are identified as authenticity, criticality and integrity. Secondary 
criteria are identified as explicitness, vividness, creativity, thoroughness, congruence, and 
sensitivity (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001: 529). This model is similar to that of 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), who advocate the model of the researcher as ‘craftsman’: 
attentive to questions of validity not simply as an external evaluative measure, but as a 
guiding principle throughout the whole research process. Considerations of qualitative 
validity, particularly by reference to the aforementioned qualitative-specific models, have 
been important to the conduct of this study; such measures of qualitative ‘validity’ 
contribute towards the integrity and coherence of this thesis.  
3.11 Reflexivity 
As a researcher, reflexivity involves reflecting upon one’s personal values and actions and 
assessing to what extent, and in what ways, these factors impinge upon and transform all 
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facets of the research process. Failing to recognise the role of one’s personal, social and 
cultural positioning risks the production of knowledge which simply reflects the situated 
purview of the researcher. Reflexivity in this study was an ongoing process rather than a 
post-hoc appraisal, and key reflexive moments occurred throughout data collection, during 
the analysis of data and theory construction. The following section details key moments of 
reflexivity and explains the consequences of reflexivity for this thesis.  
The most immediate instances of reflexivity occurred during data collection and relate to 
the interviewer-interviewee dynamic. In-depth interviews are not socio-culturally neutral 
events, and are likely to be the site where intra- and interpersonal socio-cultural factors 
play out. Therefore, as an interviewer, my appearance, manner and gestures will, to some 
extent, have shaped the data produced. From the perspective of participants, I will have 
appeared as an ostensibly healthy, relatively young, white man. As is described in 
Appendix 1, participants in this study were all older people living with multiple chronic 
conditions. The disparity between me and participants in terms of age, health and (in the 
case of female participants) sex will have been obvious and may have acted as barriers to 
trust and rapport. Indeed, I felt that two participants may have withheld certain details 
about their health.  One female participant was reluctant to talk about certain aspects of 
her health – she used the term ‘waterworks’ in reference to her urinary problems and was 
visibly uncomfortable when talking around this issue. Her use of euphemistic language 
suggests she was embarrassed, and it is certainly possible that this embarrassment will 
have been exacerbated by her interviewer being a younger male.  Another participant, this 
time male, appeared reluctant to talk openly when it came to the emotional impact of 
illness. This participant presented himself as a strong (both physically and mentally) and 
self-sufficient man. I sensed he was reluctant to confront emotionality because to do so 
would undermine the masculine ideals vital to his identity.  Again, it is possible that my 
sex, age, and health status influenced this situation. If this participant did feel that his 
identity, grounded in masculinity, was at risk, then these feelings may have been 
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pronounced by our contrasting age and health, and furthered by the fact we are both men. 
It is realistic to assume that an interviewer of similar age, health profile, sex (in the case of 
the female participant), and who shared common biographical traits with participants, 
would not have experienced these barriers to open communication, and may have 
produced different data. However, employing an alternative researcher was not possible, 
so I took steps to build relationships with participants which were professional, yet 
personable, and which encouraged rapport and trust. To this end, I spoke with participants 
at length about the research, non-research topics, and myself – my professional 
experience, my doctoral studies, and my personal life (where this was appropriate and 
conducive to a more productive researcher/participant relationship). In general, I felt these 
strategies were successful, and the vast majority of participants appeared to be 
comfortable talking about what were, at times, difficult and intimate experiences of illness 
and social support. Despite this, such open and trusting relationships were not possible 
with all participants, and it is likely that a small number (as identified above) remained 
wary and guarded when talking about the most intimate aspects of their personal and 
social worlds.  
A small number of participants appeared to regard me as a person of high social status – 
two participants were under the impression that I had a background in clinical medicine, 
whilst others indicated that they considered medical research to be an esteemed activity. 
As a consequence of this, I felt that some participants used their interviews to present 
themselves as morally virtuous – as ‘good patients’, for example – perhaps in order that I, 
as a person of perceived high social status, should recognise them as such. This morally 
performative dynamic does not invalidate the accounts given by participants as the 
interpretive approach does not rest upon, nor assume, the objectivity of participant data. 
However, it was important that my presence, and my apparent social status, did not 
determine the course or content of interviews, nor elicit accounts which were intended 
solely to achieve my recognition. Accordingly, I made efforts to counter participants’ 
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assumptions about my social and professional status and sought to establish myself as, at 
most, an equal partner in the research relationship. I explained to participants that I was a 
social researcher rather than a clinical researcher, I corrected participants whenever they 
referred to my supposed medical background, and I made various other self-deprecating 
statements and gestures to encourage parity of status. Overall, I considered these 
strategies successful as they resulted in interviewer-interviewee dynamics which were 
more equitable. Most participants were apparently unconcerned about my moral 
judgement or recognition. However, among those who were, this concern appeared to 
wane throughout the first interview and by the second interviews (which were, universally, 
more relaxed and open) participants no longer appeared to present themselves as 
virtuous in any contrived sense, though they continued to speak about illness and support 
in ways which highlighted the importance of morality in their personal and social worlds. 
To this end, all participants spoke about having fallen short of various moral virtues, a fact 
which suggests that my status, and the interviewer-interviewee dynamic, did not prevent 
participants from speaking openly, nor elicit moral narratives which were overly 
performative.  
Reflexivity was also important during data analysis and theory construction. As a principle 
of reflexive practice, I was forced to reflect critically upon the theoretical assumptions I 
brought to the research process and the role that these assumptions played in data 
analysis. This process of critical reflection significantly altered the course of this study, the 
theory upon which this thesis called, and the analysis and theory contributed by this 
thesis. These issues are explored in greater detail in Chapter Six (Theoretical Review), 
but the role of reflexivity in this process is worthy of brief exploration. During the initial 
stages of data collection and analysis, my approach to research was influenced heavily by 
social theory derived from social network analysis and theories of social capital. At this 
early stage, I was guilty, at times, of applying theoretical concepts without adequate 
critique, and allowing theory to lead analysis, rather than building theory which was 
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grounded in the data (a key principle of grounded theory). Upon reflection, it is likely that 
this naïve approach to data analysis resulted from my lack of research experience (I was 
a junior researcher with post-graduate training in social research methods and 
approximately 18 months experience as a professional qualitative researcher). 
Fortunately, the principles of reflexivity (and the procedures of data analysis cross-
validation carried out by the research supervision team) encouraged me to question my 
theoretical presumptions throughout data collection and analysis. This led to the 
realisation that social network analysis and social capital theory were useful only at a 
superficial level, and were not sufficiently sophisticated nor sensitive enough to explain 
the complexity apparent in participants’ experiences of illness and support. As a result of 
this realisation, I engaged in the wider theoretical literature and drew upon different 
theoretical concepts which illuminated and brought clarity to complex data. In this sense, 
reflexive practice was key to my development as a researcher, as well as the theoretical 
contribution made by this thesis.   
3.12 Ethical issues 
Ethical approval for the study was achieved from NRES North-West Cheshire Ethics 
Committee (11/NW/0825). Following an initial ethical review, a number of requests for 
further information were made by the committee; these issues related to minor amendments 
in the study information literature and consent forms (see appendix 16). 
A further ethical amendment was submitted to, and approved by the (above) ethics 
committee during data collection. This amendment related to the timing between 
participants’ first and second interviews. Initial ethical approval had committed researcher 
and participants to a fixed six month time gap between interviews; however, this inflexibility 
was not practically helpful. The ethical amendment enabled the second interview to take 
place between three and six months after the first interview (see appendix 18). This 
amendment was approved by ‘Chair’s action’.  
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All participants received a study pack (study information literature, consent form, pre-paid 
return envelope) by post. Upon receiving returned completed consent forms, I made 
telephone contact with participants and undertook efforts to explain the research further and 
encouraged participants to ask questions about the research and the study process (my 
intention being to ensure participants were in possession of the information they felt 
necessary in order to consent). Furthermore, at each interview I made similar efforts to 
explain the research, and to provide opportunities for participants to ask any questions; I 
also read through the consent literature at the beginning of each interview, and confirmed 
participants’ desire to consent.  
Beyond formal ethical process, ethical issues were confronted on a regular basis throughout 
data collection. My own conduct in such instances may be seen as informed by a principalist 
approach towards research ethics. In this respect, ethical conduct was informed by a 
respect for autonomy; beneficence; non-maleficence; and justice (Wiles, 2012). The most 
common invocation of such ethical principles occurred as participants became upset or 
distressed during interviews. The issue was not uncommon and occurred most often during 
discussions about the impact of illness upon personal relationships and in relation to the 
topics of interpersonal dependency. In these cases, I was very concerned to minimise any 
distress participants might experience and I often ended a line of discussion where I felt 
participants were confronting issues which were too difficult. Undoubtedly, in these 
instances, it is possible that potentially rich data was forfeited, however participants’ 
wellbeing took precedence over any such concerns.   
3.13 Data management and security 
All interview transcripts and interview audio files were stored on password protected 
secured servers. No data was transferred to personal computers. Field notes and hand 
written memos were stored in locked filing cabinets. 
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3.14 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined issues of methodology, study design and methods within this 
study. Central to these issues has been an explication of my epistemological and 
ontological perspective, and an open and frank description of the processes of data 
collection and analysis. This chapter may be read as an important stage of theoretical and 
methodological reflexivity; in detailing philosophical and methodological issues, I hope the 
reader will be better able to ‘interpret my interpretation’ of the data which follows 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). This thesis will now begin the process of presenting 
participant data and answering the research questions set out by this thesis.  
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Chapter Four: The lay meaning of multimorbidity  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores how people with living multimorbidity experience concurrent 
conditions as meaningful. The first part of this chapter will address the biomedical 
assumption that multimorbidity is defined by the presence of concurrent diseases. It will 
be argued that labels of disease status and concurrency often do not resonate with lay 
experience. It will then be argued that people living with multimorbidity make sense of 
illness according to distinct logics of meaning. Examples of such logic will be defined, with 
the influence of corporal and socio-cultural factors identified. In conclusion, it will be 
argued that the lay meaning of multimorbidity is often at odds with the biomedical concept 
of multimorbidity: understanding lay meaning requires an appreciation of the intersecting 
corporal, biographical, and socio-cultural logics within individual cases. These conclusions 
will be discussed in terms of their consequences for current perspectives on 
multimorbidity self-management, particularly the notion of illness prioritisation.   
4.2 What it means to live with multimorbidity 
According to the biomedical perspective, an individual with multimorbidity lives with more 
than one chronic condition or disease, and these conditions or diseases are present in a 
concurrent fashion. These assumptions are largely accepted within related literature, and 
yet, in discussing multimorbidity with participants in this study, these assumptions become 
problematic. The following two sections outline the ways in which participants questioned 
the nature of illness-status and concurrency. 
4.2.1 Multiple chronic illnesses but not ‘ill’ 
For some participants, the notion that they lived with multiple chronic conditions was 
questionable. David, for example, did not recognise himself as living with multiple 
conditions. As David spoke about his health, he detailed the ways in which illness affected 
everyday life; David’s mobility is limited and he experiences difficulties in completing tasks 
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such as domestic work without assistance. Further, David has also made significant 
changes to his diet following grave advice concerning diabetes management. In 
recognition of these issues, I was keen to understand whether or not David considered a 
particular condition or symptom to be a priority. However, in replying to this line of 
questioning, it soon became clear that David did not understand his health in these terms:  
I’ve got the diabetes, I’ve got the blood pressure, I’ve got arthritis in me knees, fair 
enough, but to me, I’m not ill. It’s just an inconvenience. It’s like if you break your 
arm, you, you’ve got one arm in a bloody sling, you’ve only got one arm to work 
with. You’re not ill, are you? If you know what I mean. 
David, 1st interview 
Despite living with a number of clinically diagnosed chronic conditions, David rejects the 
assertion that he is living with illness. Rather than considering his health in terms of 
clinically diagnosed conditions, David frames illness in terms of how it affects his life – 
David’s conditions are an ‘inconvenience’ rather than an illness per se. I sought to gain 
further insight into what illness meant to David, and how this knowledge related to his own 
health:  
Int: So perhaps give me an example of what, of when you would be ill... 
David: If I was ill I’d be, I’d be in pain… stomach, chest, you know, the bits that 
matter in the middle [points to abdomen]. That, that’s being ill to me… 
Int: Something inside you, kind of, that you can’t... 
David: Yeah. You’ve got no control over it. And as I say, my cousin’s wife, she was 
as right as nine pence one minute, and the next minute she’s bloody 
collapsed, and they fetched the paramedics out to her, she was in XX [Local 
hospital], and, removed her gallstones. That’s something you’ve got no 
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control over. You know, appendicitis, or if you’ve got bloody transplants, 
that’s being ill. 
Int: And not the kind of stuff that you just live with?  
David: No no. As I say, if you break your arm, you’re not, you’re not ill. It’s a bloody 
inconvenience. Well, it’s like my knees. They’re an inconvenience, but it’s 
something you’ve got to put up with. 
David, 1st interview 
In the above exchange, David reflects upon the concept of illness and identifies what he 
considers to be its defining features. For David, illness is something associated with 
internal – particularly abdominal – organs (suggested by David’s gesturing towards his 
abdomen). Illness is also something David associates with a lack of warning, acute onset, 
or an event which is difficult or impossible to control.  David identifies gallstones and 
appendicitis as examples of illness – these conditions characterised by acute abdominal 
pain. As a further example, David identifies ‘transplants’ as indicative or constitutive of 
illness – we might interpret this in terms of illness requiring complex and invasive clinical 
intervention.   
David, therefore, has a firm understanding of what it means to be an ‘ill person’, and he 
considers his own ill-health in to relation this.  David does not experience any of the 
issues he associates with illness: he does not experience uncontrolled symptoms, he has 
not required invasive surgery, nor has he been troubled by ‘the bits that matter in the 
middle’. As a result, David does not consider himself to be living with illness; instead, 
David defines his ill-health as ‘something you’ve got to put up with’. David’s understanding 
of the meaning of illness is clearly at odds with a biomedical model of multimorbidity. 
Specifically, David does not understand his health as delimited into discrete clinically 
diagnosed conditions. Rather, David makes sense of his illness in terms of the impact it 
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has upon daily life – how physical limitations restrict his ability to complete previously 
valued activities.   
Similar issues were raised elsewhere by Mo, a woman living with systematic lupus, OA, 
depression, and an addiction to Tramadol (Mo identified this addiction as relevant to her ill 
health). Mo was a nurse by profession and, informed by her experiences both as a patient 
and as a practicing HCP, brought a particular perspective to discussions.  Mo, perhaps 
more than any other participant, understood the biomedical principles of multimorbidity 
and recognised the importance of multimorbidity to clinical practice. However, despite this, 
Mo questioned the relevance of multimorbidity to her own experience of illness:  
I don’t look at myself as this sort of ill person with all these things going on. I think, 
even on the worst day, it was always because it was one particular thing that was 
the problem at the time. So anything else associated or not associated with that 
didn’t really come into... It’s like, if it was arthritis that was the problem then that was 
the problem. 
Mo, 1st interview 
In this quotation, Mo conveys two particularly strong messages. Firstly, Mo (much like 
David) questions the label of an ‘ill person’, and she does not recognise herself as having 
multiple conditions – ‘all these things going on’. Secondly, Mo questions the assumption 
that she experiences conditions in a concurrent way – ‘even on the worst day, it was one 
particular thing that was the problem at the time’. In reflecting upon this point, concurrency 
is often tacitly defined and operationalised (as was the case in this study) simply as the 
presence of multiple clinical diagnoses on an individual’s historic medical record. 
However, Mo emphasises that concurrence is not experienced in such an additive or 
cross-sectional way, nor in a manner whereby multiple symptoms or conditions are 
experienced as immediate. Rather, Mo’s experience of concurrency is as single conditions 
or symptoms being perceptible at a single point in time. Mo’s example illustrates that 
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concurrency is itself a problematic motif which is founded upon the biomedical assumption 
of disease rather than illness. In this regard, it should not be assumed that multiple 
conditions or diseases are experienced as immediately concurrent; understanding how 
and why illness, rather than wellness, comes to be foregrounded in individual experience 
should be a priority.  
4.2.2 Illness without diagnosis or explanation  
For several participants, the meaning of illness owed less to clinically diagnosed 
conditions, and was defined in larger part by illnesses and illness-episodes which were 
uncertain or ambiguous. A common example of such ambiguity came in relation to 
illnesses described as ‘borderline’. Mary, for example, spoke in these terms when 
describing a recent illness experience: 
I had a diabetic foot in October and nearly lost my toe; it went black. I don’t have – 
I’m borderline diabetes; I’m not classed as a diabetic.  
Mary, 2nd Interview 
In this example, Mary recounts an acute episode of illness – the near loss of her toe – and 
she identifies this experience as the result of diabetes. However, as Mary clearly states, 
she does not consider herself to be ‘classed as a diabetic’; rather, diabetes assumed the 
more ambiguous status of ‘borderline’. Similar sentiment was present in David’s claim 
that: ‘I’ve diagnosed borderline diabetic, as well now’. 
Elsewhere, participants also identified themselves as ‘borderline’ in relation to 
hypertension. Pamela, for example, recalled a recent conversation with her GP: 
My blood pressure had fallen again but only, probably just in the, sort of, zone he 
wanted, which was – oh, was it 70 over – no 100 – oh, I can’t remember. Something 
over 70… he said, “Well, it’s just still borderline”. 
Pamela, 2nd Interview 
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In this example hypertension, as with diabetes, is classed as ‘borderline’. The status of an 
illness as ‘borderline’ confers a sense of illness being simultaneously present and absent. 
Illness is present in the sense the individual has an awareness of risk, and there may also 
be a requisite action – changing of diet or taking more exercise – recommended by a 
HCP. However, the ambiguity around the status of ‘borderline’ also defines the illness as 
absent – as Mary states, ‘I’m not classed as a diabetic’. The above examples highlight 
that the experience of multimorbidity may be shaped by conditions which are not yet 
manifest. In this regard, conceiving of the lay meaning of multimorbidity must recognise 
conditions or symptoms which are without a clinical diagnosis.  
In addition to illnesses described as ‘borderline’, several participants spoke about their 
health in ways which highlighted a general dissonance between lay perspective and a 
biomedical perspective. During her second interview, Isla spoke about her recent ill health 
and described one feature of illness which she considered particularly important: 
Int:   Has there been anything else at all, health wise, that…? 
Isla: Well, of course I have, I have a chest problem, but– which just flares up now 
and again sometimes, but I mean I’ve had that for goodness knows – a lot of 
years.  So it’s not… it’s not a chronic, but it’s just that – sometimes I wheeze 
quite, quite a lot and other times it’s okay.   
Int: You’ve had that for some years? 
Isla: Just a weakness, yes, yes.  I had bronchitis – I caught bronchitis – well, I’ve 
lived – I’ve been here 13 years and it was when I was in XX [previous 
address], so it’s a long time ago.  I had to go to the chest – they sent me to the 
chest clinic.  I must’ve had a very bad cold and infection and I attended the 
chest clinic for quite a long time.  The only diagnosis they could come up with 
was bronchitis.  It wasn’t a sort of permanent thing, it was just something – I 
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mean even in this warm weather, well it isn’t warm at the moment, but in 
summertime I still have– you know, people would say to me, ‘Have you got a 
bad cold?’  I haven’t, it’s just the rustiness in my throat. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
Throughout her interviews, Isla detailed her experience of regular episodic chest 
infections for which she consults her GP and takes antibiotics. Isla’s understanding of this 
illness-issue is marked by a degree of uncertainty; Isla referred to this issue elsewhere as 
her ‘weakness’ or her ‘chest problem’ rather than any particular condition. In the above 
quotation, Isla identifies a similar episode as having been diagnosed as bronchitis; 
however, Isla does not consider this to be a chronic illness. Despite this ambiguity, or 
perhaps because of it, Isla designated this ‘weakness’ as among her more salient illness 
concerns. This example further emphasises that to focus upon clinically diagnosed 
conditions alone – or conditions which are chronic in nature – is somewhat reductive.  
For other participants, the relationship between clinical diagnoses and illness experience 
was yet more incongruous. Bill, for example, was particularly keen to discuss a recent 
illness-event which he considered especially disturbing (Bill’s wife Cath also contributes):  
Cath: Well, we don’t know what that was. It was just something… 
Bill: I felt, one evening… 
Cath: That settled on his stomach and he was really bad, and we rushed him into 
hospital. 
Bill: It was a Saturday evening, it was, and I says to Cath, I said…‘I feel a bit 
rough,’ like, so…Anyway, I went upstairs and lay on the bed a bit, and then I 
had to go in the bathroom, and I was really sick… 
Cath: Really sick… I thought he’d got a burst ulcer. 
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Bill: I come down here and I was sick again, and rang the out, out-of-hours 
doings and, it was, well, it was coffee granules, they… 
Cath: That’s what they call it. 
Bill: Still don’t know, that’s what they called it, even in, in the hospital in XX (local 
hospital), they called it coffee granules and, we still…I mean, if we ring, same 
as travel insurance, they want to know all these things, I suppose, and 
there’s nothing in the manuals, apparently, to describe what it is.  
Bill and Cath, 1st Interview 
In the above example, Bill and Cath discuss an acute episode of illness. The unexplained 
or ambiguous nature of this illness has had a lasting effect, and this episode continues to 
puzzle and worry Bill. For Bill, the remarkable feature of this event is that ‘there’s nothing 
in the manuals, apparently, to describe what it is’. In the absence of any clear clinical 
explanation, Bill and Cath are left with a vernacular explanation – ‘coffee granules’. The 
term ‘coffee granules’ is widely employed in reference to gastro-intestinal bleeding, and 
could reasonably be associated with – as Cath suggests – Bill’s history of stomach ulcers. 
However, Bill and Cath do not possess this knowledge, and this illness-episode has come 
to be defined through its ambiguity. This example is a further instance of the illness 
experience being shaped by an acute episode of illness; here again, it would seem 
insufficient to focus upon clinically diagnosed or chronic conditions alone.  
The above examples invite us to question the assumptions which underpin biomedical 
definitions of multimorbidity. Individuals living with multimorbidity may understand the 
meaning of conditions in a manner which is at odds with bio-medical standards. Where 
illness does not align neatly with clinical diagnoses – such as ‘borderline’ conditions, or 
conditions lacking a clinical diagnosis – the ambiguity surrounding the condition may 
become meaningful in itself. Further, the notion of concurrency may have little relevance 
to individual experience – having a medical record of concurrent illnesses does not mean 
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that illnesses are experienced in an immediately concurrent fashion. Finally, a singular 
focus upon chronic conditions seems problematic. In particular, the lay meaning of illness 
often does not conform to an additive model of chronic diseases (as is assumed by the 
biomedical definition of multimorbidity), and acute illness must also be recognised as 
contributing the meaning and experience of illness. 
4.3 Lay logics of meaning 
While the lay meaning of multimorbidity appears at odds with a biomedical perspective, it 
would be remiss to assume that it is irrational. Rather, interviewing participants about the 
meaning of multimorbidity highlighted rational and distinct lines of reasoning which 
allowed sense to be made of illness. The following sections detail a number of these 
distinct lines of reasoning as they appeared in participants’ accounts of multimorbidity. 
4.3.1 Normality and control 
Chronic illness has been described as an experience wherein previously taken-for-granted 
structures of everyday life, and the forms of knowledge which underpin these structures, 
are disrupted (Bury, 1982). For many participants in this study, the meaning of 
multimorbidity was defined by the degree to which illness and symptoms affected (or 
threatened to affect) these previously stable structures of life.  
 
Several participants spoke about their desire to ‘carry on as normal’ despite living with 
multiple conditions. In these cases, illness and disability were discussed in terms of how 
symptoms and physical limitations threatened images of normality. Where illness could 
not be accommodated into what participants considered normal, illness was propelled into 
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the foreground of experience.11  Bill spoke about the meaning of multimorbidity in these 
terms: 
I mean, it’s there, you know, these things… one, two or three, whatever you’ve got, 
arthritis, asthma, you know, you’ve just got to live with it, you know. It’s, it’s there, 
and until, same as I start coughing and doing, in between that, like, you just carry on 
as normal, you know, and just carrying on until you come to… you try to do 
something, getting out of a… stuff out of a cupboard or something, then you realise 
that you’ve got that condition. 
Bill, 1st Interview 
In Bill’s account of multimorbidity, normality is central in shaping meaning. Bill states that 
despite living with multiple conditions, he continues to live with illness in the background of 
everyday experience and he is able to ‘carry on as normal’. However, where illness and 
disability complicate or prevent the accomplishment of previously ‘normal’ daily activity 
(‘getting stuff out of a cupboard’), illness is foregrounded in experience and the possibility 
of normality is threatened. Elsewhere Bill recounted further examples of illness impacting 
his ability to carry on as normal:  
You know, I can, I’m living with these aches and pains, as it were, you know?  But, 
quite often now, while this weather’s been on, particularly… I’ve started coughing 
when I’m in bed, and I’ve had to get up. I may have gone to bed about 10, 12 o’clock 
I’ve had to get up because I’m coughing that much. 
Bill, 1st Interview 
Bill added: 
                                                          
11 The image of illness in the foreground and background is borrowed from Paterson 
(2001) and the ‘shifting perspectives’ model of chronic illness. The utility of this model is 
discussed further within the Discussion chapter of this thesis.  
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The night’s worse with this with asthma, it’s so long, you know, if you are coughing 
during the night…. It’s a long time till breakfast. 
Bill, 1st Interview 
In this passage, Bill considers the impact of OA in relation to asthma. With regards to OA, 
Bill states ‘I’m living with these aches and pains’. There is a sense by which Bill is able to 
incorporate the symptoms and limitations conferred by OA into his everyday practices: a 
‘normal life’ is possible (similar findings have been reported by Sanders, Donovan, and 
Dieppe, 2002). By contrast, Bill identifies asthma as the cause of long sleepless nights 
during which he experiences bouts of painful coughing. Bill experiences these episodes 
as highly disruptive, and his statement that ’It’s a long time till breakfast’ conveys the 
isolation and suffering which characterise these experiences.  For Bill, asthma is simply 
too disruptive to the practices of everyday life, and for this reason, asthma takes becomes 
Bill’s most salient obstacle to a normal life.   
The importance of maintaining normality and the previously assumed structures of 
everyday life was also apparent in David’s case. When asked whether he considered 
particular conditions to be ‘more important’, David replied:   
David: Yeah, my knees.  I mean I get up in the morning, it takes me quarter of an 
hour to get in the bathroom until I've got them going again.  Don't have a 
bath.  We have a walk-in shower because I can't - I couldn't get in the bath.  
Int: So that's most important, then, because … 
David: Well, if your legs don't walk, you don't go nowhere do you?  You know, 
you're knackered like. 
David, 1st Interview 
In the above example, David identifies the ability to walk as a fundamental necessity – ‘if 
your legs don't walk, you don't go nowhere do you?’’. At the time of his first interview, 
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David’s mobility was increasingly limited by OA in his knees; however, David was 
determined to maintain his ability to walk. Elsewhere in his interviews, David railed against 
the prospect of using a mobility scooter, and was equally appalled at the prospect of 
‘sitting in me chair all day’. David identifies his knees as his ‘most important’ health issue 
because OA, pain, and disability threaten his ability to walk, and as such, most 
immediately threaten the prospect of normality.  
For many participants, a corollary of normality was control.  Control may be understood as 
a synonym of normality, but participants also spoke of control in terms of the motivation 
for self-management, and in prospective terms, as shaping the meaning of illnesses in the 
future.  In one example, David spoke about the meaning of diabetes in terms which 
highlight the importance of control. Immediately prior to his first interview, David received 
a diagnosis of type 2 diabetes. However, by the time of his follow-up interview (4 months 
later) David spoke about this diagnosis as being relatively insignificant. I asked David why 
this was the case: 
Because I’m keeping it under control. I think I am, anyway. I’ve got to go back 
August, for another blood test, and, check-up. But if it stays as it is, or comes down, 
down again, I shall be quite happy with that. 
David, 2nd Interview 
Following the diagnosis of diabetes, David (with the aid of his daughter) made significant 
changes to his diet. David credits these changes, in addition to effective medication, with 
reducing the risk posed by diabetes. In the above quotation, David makes clear the link 
between his ability to exert control over diabetes with diabetes being less prominent or 
significant.    
Several participants identified medication as the primary means of regaining and 
maintaining control over illness and the body.  One participant, Ian (who lives with OA, 
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hypertension, and glaucoma) illustrated the relationship between medication, control and 
normality: 
As long as the medication is controlling the, the blood pressure, I should be fine. As 
long as I take the eye, the eye drops, I’m, I can’t focus with one eye, I have a 
problem with one eye, and that’s been the situation since I was a child really. So 
I’ve, I’ve basically only got one good eye. If I was to lose that, then I would have 
serious issues, but I’m told that as long as I continue taking the drops; as long as I 
attend, the eye clinic, regularly, for them to check the  eye pressures, then, you 
know, hopefully, everything’s under, under controlled, things are being monitored.  
Ian, 1st Interview 
In the above quote, Ian discusses hypertension and glaucoma, both of which he identifies 
as being under control. With these conditions under control, Ian does not consider them to 
pose an immediate threat to the normal practices of everyday life. However, Ian points out 
that he has only one well-functioning eye and as a consequence, Ian regards his eyesight 
as being particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability means that glaucoma is a concern, and 
the prospect of blindness is clearly troubling – ‘If I was to lose that, then I would have 
serious issues’.  However, Ian stresses that the efforts made to control and monitor his 
glaucoma – through medication and the intervention of specialist HCPs – are successful. 
For Ian, the risk posed by glaucoma is mediated by these efforts, and he is able to 
continue living what he considers to be a normal life, with glaucoma in the background of 
experience.  
For some participants, however, control over illness was not possible and in these cases 
illness precluded normality. One participant, James (who is living in remission from 
colorectal cancer), spoke about the difficulties he experienced following radical 
prostatectomy:  
 83 
 
I’m 18 months on and it’s still – I’ve got a nappy on, you know which, sickens me at 
times, you know. It does, it really does. 
James, 1st Interview 
James had expected to recover control over his bowels within six months of his operation; 
however, this was not the case and James identified incontinence as a difficult 
experience:  
You’re going out and you think, “Bloody hell, I’d better go and have a wash and 
change that,” because you, you think you can smell yourself, you know, it’s… it’s not 
very nice. 
 James, 1st Interview 
James experiences incontinence as an acute lack of control, both in terms of the physical 
consequences of incontinence, and also the shame or embarrassment inferred by James 
feeling ‘sick’ at the prospect of incontinence pads. This example emphasises clearly the 
importance of control over the body, and the barriers towards normality posed when 
control is not possible.   
The examples of James, Ian and David highlight that for people living with multimorbidity, 
the meaning of illness is often shaped according to the degree that normality is possible. 
Normality may be considered in terms similar to those identified by Bury (1982) as the 
previously taken-for-granted structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which 
underpin these structures. Where a particular condition or symptom threatens this 
normality, illness is propelled to the foreground of experience. The above examples also 
highlight the meaning of control as a means towards regaining normality or incorporating 
conditions into new formulations of normality (Sanders, Donovan, and Dieppe, 2002; 
Williams, 1984). Further, while some conditions disrupt normality, others – by virtue of 
medication, monitoring and management – are experienced as controlled and do not 
threaten normality in the same way.   
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4.3.2 Biography and normality 
For several participants in this study, illness and disability were not recent developments. 
For some, illness and disability had been a feature of life since early adulthood, childhood, 
and even from birth. In these cases, illness and disability were interpreted differently than 
was the case among participants for whom illness was a more recent development.  
David, for example, spoke about his attitude towards hypertension, self-management, and 
hypertensive medication in these terms. At the beginning of his second interview, David 
stated that hypertension was not a significant condition in terms of his general health:  
Int: What about the blood pressure, why is that less important at the moment? 
David: I’ve had it that bloody long I don’t bother about it, you know…. 
David, 2nd Interview 
Later in the same interview, I probed this issue further: 
Int: So you’ve had the blood pressure for a long time? 
David: I’ve had blood pressure for a long time; 10, 15 years I’ve had that. 
Int: So it’s..  it’s not that important for you? 
David: Well, I, I just don’t think about it, you know. Five, five mornings out of seven 
I’ll remember to take the tablets; probably twice a week I forget… You 
might think, and you get halfway to wherever you’re going, you think, ‘Shit, 
I’ve never had me tablet. Bugger it, they’ll do tomorrow,’ you know. 
David, 2nd Interview 
David reasons that because he has lived with this condition for a prolonged period of time, 
it has come to be less significant and he does not regard it as important – ‘I’ve had it that 
bloody long I don’t bother about it’. David’s example highlights that it is possible for 
 85 
 
conditions within multimorbidity to be incorporated into everyday life: the length of time a 
condition has been present is important in this regard.   
The incorporation of illness into reconstructed biographies was not limited to 
asymptomatic conditions, and also included participants whose disabilities conferred 
significant physical limitations. Theo, for example, exhibited a similar line of reasoning in 
relation to his congenital foot deformity (Theo termed this his ‘clubbed foot’). Throughout 
Theo’s interviews, it became clear that the congenital nature of this condition meant that it 
was understood differently from Theo’s other conditions: 
Theo:  The doctor offered me some painkillers and that and I said, 'No, thank you,' 
I said.  The only… what worries is spasmodic… results.  And once the fact 
that the painkiller goes away, if the pain come back so, so I don't want 
something that is going - another addictive thing, you know.  Every, every 
time you have a time you take a painkiller.  Because with my ankle, I'm not 
being funny now, I'm not looking for sympathy, but I have pain with it all the 
time.  Not now, but when I start walking, I can only walk so far before it 
aches. But that, that is nothing to do with my health.  That's just the way it 
was born. 
Int: Okay.  So you don't - that's interesting, though, you don't consider that a 
health problem? 
 Theo: No, no, because I've had that from birth.  If you had this, you, you'd be, 'Oh 
God, get, get off, get rid of it, get off.  Oh God, I'll be glad when it swells'  
you know, like a broken leg.  It's like being broken all the time, so I have to 
be careful with it.  But if I kick anything I'm in agony for three days and so I 
don't kick anything. 
Int: So why wouldn't you take - you wouldn't take any pain relief for that? 
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Theo: No, I never have taken pain relief, because it, it just - the pain comes back 
anyway, so … 
Theo, 1st Interview 
Theo states that were another person to live with his disability, then they would 
experience it as painful and limiting; Theo, however, distances himself from such a 
perspective, stating that this was ‘just the way it was born’. Theo reasons that because he 
has lived with this disability since birth, it is not a ‘health problem’ in the same way as his 
other conditions. Rather, this disability is normality for Theo – ‘nothing to do with my 
health’.  Whilst this disability does limit Theo (in terms of mobility) and is a near-constant 
source of pain, Theo does not consider it to be an ‘abnormality’ in pathological terms. In 
line with this reasoning, Theo does not believe that pain-killers are an appropriate 
response. 
A similar example is apparent in the case of Ian who also spoke about long-term disability 
in biographical terms: 
Ian: My other main problem would be…as a teenager I suffered from 
osteomyelitis and, or acute osteomyelitis, which meant that I was operated 
on my right ankle. They removed diseased bone. I was in plaster for 12 
months. And now as I’ve got older it’s turned arthritic. So the ankle, even 
though I, you know, I play regular golf… so when I exercise it stiffens. If I 
rest it up, when I wake up of a morning, get out of bed, it’s stiff. So, I’m 
limping around for a good, sort of, couple of hours until things, sort of… 
Int: Okay. On a day-to-day basis, which is, which or what are you most aware 
of? 
Ian: Erm, the blood pressure, obviously, because I’m taking medication on a 
daily basis. 
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Int: Over and above the issues you’ve got with your ankle would you say? 
Ian: Yeah, I mean, you just learn to live with that. I mean, it’s painful, it’s stiff, it 
aches, but, you know, you learn to live with it don’t you? 
Ian, 1st Interview 
As a result of osteomyelitis contracted as a teenager, Ian now lives with functional 
limitation in his ankle. Ian experiences difficulty in walking, and his ankle is the source of 
regular pain and stiffness – ‘I’m limping around for a good, sort of, couple of hours’. 
However, as the above quotation details, Ian considers hypertension to be a more 
immediate and prominent health concern. Ian explains that having to take daily medication 
causes him to become more aware of hypertension. By contrast, Ian explains that his 
disabled ankle, while being symptomatically more salient, is less prominent.  Ian’s 
statement that ‘you learn to live with it’ suggests that, over time, he has come to regard 
the pain and disability associated with his ankle as normal.  
The above examples demonstrate that where conditions have been present for a 
prolonged period of time, these conditions may be accorded less significance to the extent 
that they may not considered ‘health problems’ at all. It has also been demonstrated that 
this logic has implications in terms of attitudes towards self-management (medication, for 
example) – where conditions are understood to be normal (in biographical terms), medical 
intervention may be considered inappropriate. This has implications for the ways in which 
self-management is understood in multimorbidity; specifically, these findings run contrary 
to much that is assumed within the academic literature addressing illness prioritisation. 
The above examples reveal that it is possible for more symptomatic and disabling 
conditions to be accorded less significance where they have been successfully 
incorporated into the individual’s biography.  
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4.3.3 Ageing and normality 
Several participants made sense of multimorbidity according to what has been termed the 
‘social clock’ of illness (Bury and Holme 1991). Accordingly, participants spoke about 
multimorbidity and particular conditions by evoking a culturally constituted link between 
ageing and illness. One example was provided by David, who said of multimorbidity:   
I just think that it’s… it’s part of life’s rich tapestry, to be honest with you. That it’s 
inevitable that, with age, you’re going to have… you’re going have issues. 
David, 1st Interview 
For David, the prospect of multiple chronic illnesses is an inevitable part of the ageing 
process. Elsewhere Isla also drew upon expectations of ageing in framing her discussion 
of mobility and her recent decline in physical functioning:  
Int: You said that you’re aware that the walking has decreased a bit.  Is that in 
general or in the last six months? 
Isla: Oh no, that’s general, that’s pretty much – I think that the last 12 months 
perhaps has gone –deteriorated a little more, yes. But all I can say is that 
it’s something I have to accept.  Of course, my own body as well, my age of 
course doesn’t help because you’re obviously not agile anymore.  But I 
mean, as I say, I’m grateful that I am where I am. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla understands her declining levels of mobility to be a normal part of the ageing process 
and she considers herself fortunate that, given her age, she is able to walk even short 
distances.  Elsewhere in her interview, Isla spoke about the association between ageing 
and illness in terms which also indicate a condition-specific logic: 
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I have osteoarthritis in my back, which I take a – I do take a medication for that once 
a week but I mean you have it in your fingers and that, but that’s a natural thing that 
comes with your age. 
 Isla, 2nd Interview 
In the context of multimorbidity, it is interesting to note that while some conditions – OA 
and hypertension, for example – were regularly identified by participants as a normal part 
of the ageing process, other concurrent conditions were not. Cancer, for example, was not 
identified as ‘natural’ or as an inevitable part of growing old. In this regard, wider literature 
has identified specific illnesses as culturally associated with the ageing process: stroke 
and musculoskeletal conditions, for example (Pound, Gompertz, and Shah, 1998; 
Sanders, Donovan, and Dieppe, 2002). In the examples identified above, the logic of 
ageing was apparent in regard to the general presence of multiple conditions (David), but 
also in terms of specific conditions within multimorbidity (Isla). This would suggest that the 
association between ageing and illness works at the levels of the general accumulation of 
multiple chronic illnesses, and also specific conditions within multimorbidity.  
4.3.4 Lay biomedical knowledge  
Although this chapter makes the general argument that the lay meaning of multimorbidity 
differs from a biomedical perspective, it is also true that some participants employed 
aspects of biomedicine in making sense of multimorbidity.  
One participant, James, reflected upon what it meant to live with multiple conditions. In 
discussing the ways multimorbidity had affected his life, James gave insight into why he 
considered cancer to be distinct from his other conditions: 
Cancer is the… is the one that preys on you, really… because they can, you know, 
they can sneak back anytime, you know. So as long as I can keep that in, I can 
manage. Because, the other week when I went to, for my, sort of, annual check-up 
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with my GP, my blood pressure was 135/74, which, which is pretty good, I think. And 
he said so as well, so he said everything’s all right there, so that’s under control. 
James, 1st Interview 
James explains the meaning of cancer and hypertension, and does so through 
interpreting risk and prognosis. James understands cancer and hypertension according to 
a hierarchy of risk; he recognises the association between cancer and mortality and also 
the potential for reoccurrence. By contrast, hypertension is described by reference to his 
blood pressure being under control – technical blood pressure readings are given in 
evidence of this.  
For some participants, the meaning of particular conditions within multimorbidity was 
framed comparatively by an interpretation of risk. In such cases, risk and prognosis played 
a role in defining the meaning of particular illness relative to others.  Isla, for example, 
reflected upon her experience of living with OA and in doing so, drew upon her 
understanding of Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA): 
Isla: ...it’s  [OA] just something in the joints and it happens and you just live with 
it, I suppose. 
Int: So not a health problem in the same way? 
Isla: Not really, not really, no.  Unless you are suffering from rheumatoid arthritis 
and then that is an illness.   
Int: Okay, so is that different to osteoarthritis do you think? 
Isla: Yes, yes.  Well, rheumatoid arthritis of course, you know, you lose the –
your joints and everything.  It’s a terrible affliction.  As a matter of fact, I was 
reading some time ago that there are more deaths through rheumatoid 
arthritis than even cancer or heart disease. 
 91 
 
Int: My word, okay. 
Isla: That is really an illness, yes. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Elsewhere in her interviews, Isla described living with significant pain and disability 
as a result of OA. Despite this, as the above quotation makes plain, Isla considers 
OA to be less significant than other conditions. Isla makes comparisons to RA, and 
draws upon her misunderstanding of RA being associated with mortality. As a result 
of this comparison, Isla contends that her own illness is relatively insignificant.  
For most participants, hypertension was seen as being relatively unimportant (due to its 
asymptomatic character and the ability to control hypertension through medication). 
However, where participants discussed the meaning of hypertension, interpretations of 
relative risk were evident. A clear illustration of this may be seen in the example of Mo, 
who stated that hypertension was not something which was ‘on her radar’ because it was 
controlled by medication. However, Mo also suggested that were her blood pressure to 
increase, this would become a concern: 
Int: You just said that if that blood pressure was really high, then that suddenly 
would come onto your radar… 
Mo: Yeah, god yeah, I’d be thinking ‘strokes, heart attack’. 
Mo, 1st Interview 
Mo understands the meaning of hypertension in terms of her increased risk of stroke and 
heart attacks. A further example was provided by Isla, who spoke in similar terms when 
asked about the salience of hypertension:  
Int:  Is it [hypertension] something that you think about day to day? 
Isla: My blood pressure? 
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Int: Yeah. 
Isla: Yes, even – I wouldn’t say that I think about it, but if you don’t feel well, or 
sometimes you’ll get up and you’ll not feel on top hole, kind of thing, you do 
think about it, because something that you worry about more than anything 
at this age is strokes.  Of course, blood pressure – so you do think about it 
a bit like that.   
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla clearly infers the meaning of hypertension in terms of risk and the risk associated with 
her age. This form of reasoning – the association between hypertension and 
cardiovascular events – would seem to be a clear example of meaning informed by 
biomedical knowledge.   
The above examples highlight a particular logic of lay meaning, one which begins to 
incorporate knowledge as framed by a biomedicine. Risk factors, clinical prognostics, and 
pathophysiological associations were apparent in the ways in which some participants 
made sense of particular conditions within multimorbidity.   
4.3.5 Health care professionals   
Interactions with HCPs, and particularly GPs, were identified by several participants as 
conferring meaning upon illnesses and illness events within the experience of 
multimorbidity.  
Bill, for example, spoke about having consulted his GP in relation to breathlessness. Bill 
identified breathlessness as a significant and limiting factor in his everyday life. However, 
in apparent contradiction to this, Bill also claimed not to be worried by his breathlessness:   
I get breathless. But, they checked my heart out and they said it’s not that. Something 
here [points towards chest], but it’s gone no farther, so I’m not bothering them, I’m still 
going. They’ll send for me if they decide to do anything. 
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Bill, 1st Interview 
As a result of his interactions with HCPs, Bill does not consider his breathlessness to be a 
sign of anything more malign. There is a sense in which Bill trusts the clinical knowledge 
and judgement of HCPs – ‘They’ll send for me if they decide to do anything’. As a result, 
despite the limitations conferred by breathlessness, Bill understands this as something to 
be incorporated into everyday life rather than the subject of further medical intervention. 
For some, however, interactions with HCPs contributed towards the experience of suffering. 
One example was provided by Elaine who spoke of a recent consultation with her GP. 
Having lived with unattributed pain for some time, Elaine decided to consult her GP and 
seek resolution. I asked Elaine whether she was satisfied with this experience: 
Well, half and half really, because I probably wanted him to diagnose, was it sciatica, 
but he didn’t actually say that, but, I mean, perhaps he didn’t know, really, because 
like I say, when he put me on the couch and he said, ‘Can you move, put this leg up?’ 
Well, he said, ‘Well, some people can only do it like that,’ well I could put it right up 
like that. And he said that if I can do that it isn’t sciatica. So, I just thought, ‘Well, what 
is it then?’ Have I pulled a muscle?’ I don’t know, but as I say, it could be, couldn’t it, 
but he didn’t, sort of, diagnose anything. 
Elaine, 1st Interview  
During her interview, I gained a sense that Elaine revered her GP, and the fact that he was 
not able to explain her pain contributed to, and exacerbated, the sense of uncertainty and 
ambiguity which characterised her experience. Here again, the episode of illness becomes 
meaning (albeit in an unpredictable way) through interactions with HCPs.   
4.4 Discussion  
Multimorbidity is widely understood to mean that more than one chronic condition or 
disease is present within an individual at the same time.  However, this chapter has 
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problematized these assumptions, and has argued that people living with multimorbidity 
often do not a) recognise clinically diagnosed conditions as accurately  representing their 
health, and b) do not recognise concurrency in their experience of illness. These points 
formed the basis of a broader argument against imposing a biomedical model of 
multimorbidity onto the patient experience.   
Throughout data collection and analysis, the most striking feature of participants’ stories 
was the huge diversity of experience, and also the distinct lack of uniformity in the ways 
that illness was understood to be meaningful.  Similar issues have been identified in 
previous research as a lack of ‘pattern’ to patient experience of multimorbidity (Bayliss et 
al., 2003), and also in regards to the ‘shifting priorities’ held by individuals with multiple 
conditions (Morris et al., 2011). As has been stated in the literature review, these issues 
have formed the foundations of various models of illness prioritisation with illness priorities 
posited as informing self-management practices.  
However, it has been a conscious decision not to frame this chapter in terms of the illness 
priorities of participants. This decision was guided by data, and the fact that it was not 
possible to concur with the widely-held assumption that patient priorities mirrored their 
self-management practices. This was apparent initially as participants questioned the 
relevance of concurrency, and did not speak of the need to prioritise conditions at the 
expense of others. Further, it was also clear that for many participants, ill health was not 
something which was understood in in terms of delimited conditions. As such, the ways in 
which participants made sense of illness often confounded the logic of prioritisation. This 
might be illustrated by concrete examples. 
In cases where a particular illnesses or disability had been present for a prolonged period 
of time, participants spoke about illness and disability as not being foregrounded in 
everyday experience – although illness was present, it was not considered a priority as 
such. In these cases, illness and disability was incorporated into new modes of everyday 
practice (Loomis and Conco, 1991), whereby the biographically disruptive aspects of 
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illness were incorporated or reconciled into reconstructed biographies and reconfigured 
modes of normality (Williams, 1984; Sanderson et al., 2011). In such examples, 
individuals did engage in ‘illness work’, but it would be too simplistic to link such self-
management practices with any prioritised condition.  
In other examples, participants spoke of the disabling and disruptive features of illness as 
being a normal part of the ageing process, and as such, not a priority in the same way as 
an ‘unexpected’ illness might be. Similar findings are apparent in previous studies where 
the painful and disabling consequences of OA have been interpreted by lay individuals as 
a natural and inevitable part of growing old (Charles and Walters, 1998; Sanders, 
Donovan, and Dieppe, 2002). Participants in this study voiced similar opinions. In such 
cases a paradox is apparent: pain and disability cause significant disruption, and yet the 
root condition is not considered a priority in terms of medical intervention or self-
management. Here again, the logic and terminology of prioritisation should be questioned 
in that it fails to capture the reasoned logic by which people make sense of illness.  
The above comments are not critique against the reasonable claim that individual 
motivation plays a role in shaping self-management practices. Rather, it is the specific 
language (and underlying logic) of prioritisation which seems inadequate to explain the 
complex relationship between sense making and self-management.   
This chapter has suggested that different lines of lay reasoning contribute to the meaning 
of multimorbidity, and a number of these logics have been outlined. Across the 
participants in this study, these lines of reasoning were apparent to varying degrees. For 
some, the meaning of multimorbidity was understood singularly in corporal terms – such 
as the need to preserve mobility. For others, various different lines of reasoning ran 
parallel and combined to inform highly individuated and complex accounts of illness. In 
general, this diversity was a characteristic feature of participants’ accounts, and no two 
participants spoke about the meaning of multimorbidity in precisely the same way. 
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Perhaps frustratingly for readers, it was this diversity rather than any empirical 
commonalities which defined the stories of participants. However, recognising this 
diversity is important for our understanding of multimorbidity more generally. To 
understand the experience of multimorbidity is to recognise the potential for diversity, and 
the task of future research should be to discern how the various corporal, biographical, 
and socio-cultural logics of meaning intersect to inform individual cases.  
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Chapter Five: Social resources: three participant cases 
 
‘… sociology does not discover what no one ever knew before, in this differing from 
natural sciences. Rather, good social science produces a deeper understanding of 
things that many people are already pretty much aware of’ (Becker,1982: x) 
5.1 Introduction   
We all have social networks, and each person reading this thesis has known other people 
as friends, worked with others as colleagues, and most familiar of all, been part of a 
family. The above quotation, taken from Becker’s classic study of artistic labour and co-
operation – Art Worlds – reminds us that the objects of sociological enquiry are very often 
familiar to us. That the objects of our enquiry are familiar, however, does not mean they 
are banal. It is the sociologist’s task to produce deeper readings of familiar objects; not to 
disprove, or necessarily to advance upon previous readings, but to be read alongside 
other interpretations. Through this we begin to know what was previously only familiar. 
This chapter begins the process of delivering a sociological account of a most familiar 
subject – people living with illness and the ways they are supported by others. This 
chapter presents individual participant cases, and sketches out the social worlds of three 
individuals living with illness: Isla, Mary and Theo. These three participants are similar in 
many ways; each live with concurrent chronic illnesses, they are similar in age, and all live 
within a few miles of one another. However, among these participants there is also great 
diversity in terms of the quality and quantity of their social relationships, and also with 
regards to the ways in which social resources are realised within these relationships. 
The overall aims of this chapter are twofold: 
Firstly, in detailing each participant’s case, a number of themes germane to social 
networks and social resources will be identified. Of primary concern is to illustrate the 
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diverse nature of participants’ social networks and the various ways that social resources 
are experienced within these relationships.  
Secondly, it will be argued that to make sense of social networks and social resources, 
complexity and diversity must be embraced rather than being written out of our analysis. It 
is necessary to consider social resources as they are realised in social practice – how 
they are given and received in social exchange. In this regard, this chapter also lays 
conceptual groundwork for the data chapters which follow.   
5.2 Case studies 
The following case studies focus upon a single participant in turn, and details material 
circumstances, as well as the experiences of social networks and social resources. Each 
case is based upon the author’s own interpretation of two in-depth interviews (totalling 
approximately 3 hours per participant). Due to limitations of space, each case is 
significantly abridged.   
5.2.1 Isla 
Isla is 70 years old and lives with osteoarthritis, hypertension, a respiratory ‘weakness’, 
and chronic pain associated with a longstanding hip ailment.  In relation to other people in 
this study, Isla is among the more physically disabled of participants. At the beginning of 
her first interview, Isla explained how illness and disability have become an increasingly 
salient part of her life:  
Well the thing that I’m disabled with is that 25 years ago I had a hip replacement.  
Now this was extremely successful and I had no problems whatsoever in any line of 
my life.  I did every mortal thing I could think of; dancing, walking, you name it and I 
had no problems.  I didn’t even know I’d got a hip in.  But the surgeon who put it in, 
before he retired, had said to me that this hip would last me for as long as the good 
Lord left me on this earth but I would have problems with my bones.  Now I didn’t 
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know at that point what he was meaning really, but what has happened is that 
because the hip is so strong it has worn away the pelvic bone and automatically 
moved out of the socket and gone into the pelvic bone. So that’s what my main 
disablement is. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
As a result of this complication, Isla now lives with chronic and disabling pain. In addition, 
Isla’s mobility is also significantly impaired and she stated elsewhere in her interview, ‘I’m 
more or less housebound now’. Despite her physical disability, Isla works hard to leave 
the house – to attend Church and occasionally to visit shops – but this is only possible 
through prior planning and with the aid of a mobility scooter. As a result of her disability, 
Isla relies increasingly upon the support provided by friends and services (taxis and a 
cleaner) which she for pays using her disability living allowance (DLA). In recent years, 
Isla’s social world has become increasingly defined by her illness; an intelligent, funny, 
and gregarious character, she now spends the majority of her days confined to the two 
ground-floor rooms of her home.    
Isla lives alone in a small modern house which is part of a quiet cul-de-sac. During her 
first interview, I asked Isla how long she had lived in her current home, and she recounted 
her story thus: 
We came to XX [immediate town] in the fifties. Then my first home was in XX 
Avenue, which is just there. Then I moved just across to the main road on XX 
[immediate town] Road. Then my husband died there and then I bought a bungalow 
and then these were built and I rather fancied…  I’d no idea, when I moved into the 
one across the road, that this [disablement] was going to happen.  I was 60 when I 
moved across – in here and the reason I moved in them was the fact that I liked 
where they were because I was so used to the area. I liked the look of them and 
everything.  At the time, I suppose, my friends used to say, ‘well are you ready for 
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this?’  Because when they were built they were built by XX Housing Association as 
sheltered accommodation. So as I was only 60 – well I was reasonably fit and 
everything.  I had no thoughts of this going like it did. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
Isla arrived in the local area as a newlywed setting up home during the 1950s. Isla and 
her husband shared two homes and raised two children – both boys – one of whom died 
in the late 1970s. As Isla’s narrative details, she has outlived her husband by some 
decades. Following the death of her husband Isla lived briefly in a small bungalow, 
however for the past 15 years she has lived in two other houses within the same cul-de-
sac.   Despite Isla’s 60 year association with the local area, she has no local family. Isla’s 
remaining son lives approximately 150 miles away, and is married with two daughters.  
Although Isla has no local family, she is far from alone. Isla has a large number of close 
friends and acquaintances living nearby, and these people are a rich source of support, 
contributing enormously to her sense of wellbeing. Understanding these relationships is 
aided by an appreciation of Isla’s biography. In discussing her local relationships, Isla 
stated:   
The people that I’m friendly with here I’ve known for so long, you see. I mean I’ve 
been associated with them not only with the church but with other organisations that 
I belong to. So therefore you – I can go back, well goodness knows how many years 
and so – because they live in the area, of course, as well, you see. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
This statement indicates two important connections between Isla’s biography and her 
current social network. Firstly, throughout her time in the local area, Isla has always been 
involved in civic organisations, and this has influenced the quality and quantity of her 
relationships. Elsewhere, Isla identified her past involvement in the local church and the 
Townswoman’s Guild as providing the opportunity to meet new people. Further, these 
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enduring relationships are built upon the common interests and shared values afforded by 
joint membership of institutions such as the Church. Secondly, Isla identifies that she has 
lived in the same locality as her friends for approximately 60 years. This prolonged period 
of local attachment has played an important role in defining these friendships as durable 
and fulfilling relationships.  These features of Isla’s social network are intimately 
connected to her biography, and particularly, to her personal history of local engagement. 
As Isla’s illnesses have come to limit what she is able to do independently, her friends and 
neighbours have become increasingly significant. Isla identified one woman in particular 
as an important source of support: 
Isla: I have a friend across the way that comes in twice a day. She comes in – 
she’s not as old as me but I’ve known her for many, many years. She 
comes in every morning and so she’ll come in now at about 4.30pm – 
4.45pm and stay for an hour or an hour-and-a-half.  She’s moved in across 
the way.  She’s marvellous and she does an awful lot for me.   
Int: So when you say that she does an awful lot for you, what kind of things? 
Isla: All kinds of things really, all kinds of things you want. I mean I can’t get to 
the Post Office to get my money – she does all that. Most of my bills I pay 
direct debit, I don’t want her to have anything to do with anything like that, 
but there are certain things come that need paying and she does all that.  
She sees to all my – most of my recycling because that’s another problem 
– getting out to the bin you see. She does all that kind of thing. It’s amazing 
really what she does do.  So yes, I’d miss her terribly if she went. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
In considering the significance and meaning of this relationship, several aspects should be 
highlighted. 
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Firstly, this example highlights that some of the most meaningful and supportive 
relationships exist outside of the family. Elsewhere in her interviews, Isla described how 
this relationship began in the 1970s when both women lost their husbands within weeks of 
one another. In later years, Isla supported her friend through a marital separation. Isla 
identified these shared life events as important in shaping a friendship which is now 
among her most significant and supportive relationships. This example illustrates the need 
to recognise life course factors in shaping supportive relationships. Further, whilst kinship 
relations are often recognised as important supportive relationships, given that family 
structures continue to diversify in late modernity, it is important to recognise that family 
members may not always be the most regular or important providers of social resources.  
Secondly, the above example begins to illustrate the complexity of social resources. Isla 
identifies different types of support, including instrumental support (help with recycling) 
and assistance in managing her personal finances. It is interesting to note the apparent 
ambiguity in meaning around these different types of support. In relation to personal 
finances, Isla states: ‘I don’t want her to have anything to do with anything like that’. This 
statement indicates that, for Isla, there is a meaningful difference between personal 
finances and instrumental support. Recognising this issue, we might begin to question the 
relevance of classifying social resources according to typologies which privilege 
instrumental or functional meaning.12  
Thirdly, Isla intimates that even her most supportive relationships are, in some sense, 
contingent. In concluding her account, Isla states ‘i’d miss her terribly if she went’. This 
caveat conveys a sense that for all the qualities of this relationship, there is an uncertain 
or insecure aspect to it. Such kith relationships are clearly important, but should perhaps 
be recognised as more dynamic, or rather, less stable than kinship relations. The 
                                                          
12 As was detailed within the literature review, academic studies of social support often apply 
typologies premised upon the instrumental outcomes of support (e.g. House, 1981).  
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contingency of friendships was illustrated further as Isla discussed a valued relationship 
which had, in recent months, broken down:  
My friend that I’ve had for 50 years, funnily enough, we’ve done everything together 
since we lost our husbands of course. Holidays and everything – every mortal thing.  
But she’s just acquired herself a partner and so of course – well when I say that, 
he’s been in her life for many years. But it’s materialised and so therefore she’s in a 
way got out of my life, which has been a big blow. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
The loss of social relationships is rarely addressed in social networks literature, yet Isla’s 
example demonstrates clearly that the absence of others is a defining feature of her social 
network. Further, the loss of social relationships may shape those relationships which 
remain and endure. For example, Isla spoke about losing her friend and the ways in which 
this affected her relationship with her son. When asked how often she visits her son, Isla 
replied: 
Well actually, not an awful lot.  I don’t like – I wouldn’t like to live in their pockets or 
anything.  But I must admit, and I think it’s since this relationship with my friend has 
gone, that he has covered it more. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
Isla’s claim that her son has ‘covered it more’ refers to a recent change in their relational 
dynamic. With the friendship no longer a part of Isla’s life, her son now fulfils many of the 
qualities realised previously within her friendship. This observation has implications for 
how we understand social networks; specifically, the loss of others – through 
bereavement or relationship breakdown – should be recognised as shaping the 
significance and practice of extant relationships.  
The ways in which Isla maintains her relationships are varied. Despite the geographical 
distance separating Isla and her family, she is able to maintain these relationships through 
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various forms of digital communication. Isla is in regular phone contact with her son, and 
she also makes use emerging communication technologies (including Skype). Asked how 
this form of communication technology affects her relationships, Isla replied:  
Well, it brings it nearer home, doesn’t it really?  I suppose the – the Skype, of 
course, is useful because you can actually see the person you’re talking to.  You’re 
picking up the phone and – you know you’re talking to them and in your mind you 
can see them, we know, but it is a little step further, if that’s the word. 
Isla, Interview 1 
For Isla, Skype represents a valuable mode of communication, and she associates seeing 
her family (on screen) with geographic and relational proximity – ‘it brings it nearer home’. 
Isla explained further how she uses this technology: 
When they’re at home of course they have their computer on all the time, you know, 
with doing things.  So if I put my Skype – my computer on, you can bet your life that 
he will Skype me, because he can see I’ve come online, you see.  So I tend to put it 
on ‘thinking’ – well, I can see whether he’s online and I will occasionally Skype them. 
Isla, Interview 1  
Isla is positive about communication technology, however there is also a sense that Isla 
works to maintain a distal quality in these digital relationships. Isla states that ‘I tend to put 
it on ‘thinking’; this action indicates to others that Isla does not wish to be contacted, and 
that she is not seeking to make contact.13 This is an example of Isla managing her online 
relationships – Isla does not wish to be overly connected with her family, nor appear as 
though she is seeking contact with them. This feature of her online relationships is linked 
to Isla’s wider concern to maintain her independence and the independence of her family 
(discussed below). This aspect of relationship management highlights the ambivalence 
                                                          
13 ‘Thinking’ mode identifies the user as ‘online’, and allows the user to observe the status 
of other users without instigating conversation.  
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with which communication technology may be experienced. Isla values online 
communication and recognises the positive effect it has upon her relationships. However, 
this technology also represents a new territory upon which Isla works to maintain and 
demonstrate her independence.   
Although Isla’s local network of friends are her most immediate source of support, she 
also identified family as important. Isla was keen to demonstrate the supportive nature of 
her familial relationships, and informed me that her son had recently adapted his home 
(fitting a stair-lift), allowing her to visit in comfort. However, Isla’s enthusiasm for this 
supportive aspect to familial relationships was often equivocal. For example, in discussing 
the ways in which her son works to maintain contact, Isla cautioned:  
But I think it’s good for your family if you can be independent.  I mean my son will 
say to me – I mean I remember when he was very busy, when he was working he 
used to travel all over the world and that, and I tended to wait until he rang me.  I 
would say to him sometimes, if I hadn’t heard from him for a bit, “Oh just a minute, I 
don’t recognise your voice”.  [Laughs] He would say, “Mother, it works both ways, 
you’ve got a phone as well”.  So, you see, I tended to – if I didn’t ring him then I 
wasn’t bothering him. 
Isla, 1st Interview 
Isla’s relationships with her family are characterised by her determination to retain 
independence, and to maintain the freedom of others. As the above quotation makes 
clear, Isla considers her independence to be virtuous, while receiving support is 
understood in a negative light. This dichotomy – between dependence and independence 
– informed, to a large extent, how Isla made sense of supportive relationships. At one 
point, when talking about the support she received from her son, Isla began to cry: 
Isla:  I like to try and be independent, to live my own life like I always have.  But 
she went [friend] – my husband died and she’s [friend] 76 and of course XX 
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[deceased son] was here then.  And when XX [deceased son] died I didn’t 
want him [living son] to have all the responsibility. 
 [Long pause] 
Int: So you’d rather work hard yourself and…. 
Isla: Yeah, yeah.  He used to get on the phone to me and say, ‘Why didn’t you 
tell me?  Why didn’t you let me know?’  Because... but I never did, never 
did.   
Isla, 1st Interview 
The ideal of independence informs Isla’s attitude towards support, and means that she will 
often struggle alone rather making others aware of her situation. Isla’s example highlights 
the fact that the receipt of social resources may be a form of moral practice which is, in 
turn, intimately tied to individual notions of self.  
In summarising Isla’s case, it is possible to highlight a number of themes in relation to 
social networks, social resources and health.  
Firstly, the relationship between Isla’s social connections and her social resources is best 
understood in the context of her biography. Understanding Isla’s 60-year association with 
her local area is important to understanding the meaning and function of her current social 
relationships. Secondly observing that the majority of Isla’s supportive relationships are 
with non-family members, we must recognise that supportive relationships are often 
diverse and unconventional. Further, the ways in which these relationships are sustained, 
and support exchanged, may be through digital rather than embodied interaction. Finally, 
Isla’s case has begun to highlight the morality of support and assistance. The meaning of 
social resources is not captured by reference to their function or utility alone. For Isla, the 
moral ideals of independence and dependence were a primary source of meaning which 
shaped the significance of her supportive relationships.   
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5.2.2 Mary 
Mary is 70 years old and lives with hypertension, osteoarthritis, type 2 diabetes, and has a 
history of mental illness; she lives alone in the house that has been her home for nearly 
20 years. Mary’s biography is particularly complex, and has been shaped by the 
intersections of mental illness and social deprivation (poverty and low educational status). 
At the beginning of her first interview, I asked Mary about her early life and she began to 
tell her story, alluding to some of the challenges she has faced:   
Well, I’ve been an adopted child.  I was adopted at six weeks.  I’d had an idyllic – to 
some people I’d had an idyllic childhood.  To me own children, even, I’d had an 
idyllic childhood.  Ever since my adult years, I can’t blame me husband, there were 
other reasons as well, there were other boyfriends as well, but none of it worked out.  
It had gone completely opposite; from an idyllic childhood, completely opposite once 
I’d grown up. 
Mary, 1st Interview  
Mary’s early adult years were particularly difficult and she experienced a number of 
disruptive life events (stemming from her ongoing struggles with mental illness). Mary 
married at a young age and had two children, a boy and a girl. However, Mary’s marriage 
was a deeply unhappy experience and, following an acrimonious divorce, she was left to 
raise her children alone. Mary experienced parenthood as particularly difficult, and within 
a short period of time her ex-husband was awarded custody of both children. At this point 
in her story, Mary recounted an event which continues to shape her life today. Mary told 
me how, approximately 20 years ago, she experienced a violent incident involving her 
daughter and her ex-husband’s partner. This episode occurred following Mary’s 
impromptu decision to visit her daughter: 
Instead of knocking - he’d got custody, I’d only got access - instead of knocking, I 
opened the back door. She went ballistic, this girl [ex-husband’s partner], and 
knocked me against the glass panel. Of course, I ran after her, and all I could see, 
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boxes, boxes everywhere. They were obviously moving to this private house... Of 
course, I followed her [ex-husband’s partner] she ran upstairs to the bedrooms, and 
I followed her in every one of them slapping her. 
Mary, 1st Interview  
This incident resulted in Mary being arrested and prosecuted for assault. Mary received a 
non-custodial criminal conviction. In addition, in lieu of a custodial sentence, Mary was 
required to attend what she termed ‘psychiatric outpatient services’; a service with which 
she continues to be involved to this day. In the years following Mary’s arrest, her children 
were taken into institutional care and subsequently placed with foster families: 
The fostering service split them up and one went in one home and one went in 
another.  They were together initially, and then my boy ended up in the children’s 
home at XX [town 5 miles away]. 
Mary, 1st Interview 
Throughout this period, Mary maintained contact with her children. However, this contact 
was irregular, and Mary was often required to act surreptitiously in order to contact her 
children. Mary gave an example of the ways in which she sought to maintain her 
relationship with her daughter:  
She used to be a Saturday girl at XX supermarket, which was in XX (local town), 
and I used to meet up with her…I would never go there, but my mother used to 
make arrangements for me to meet her, because she was only eight when she went 
into care. And the man next door, there was an old man there, used to, she used to 
ring him, I wasn’t on the phone then, and I used to get me bike out. He used to 
shout me and say, ‘Mary, your, your daughter’s at your mother’s,’ and I used to get 
me bike out of the shed and go and see her. 
Mary, 1st Interview 
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Today, Mary’s children are both adults. Mary’s daughter lives nearby, while her son lives 
approximately 200 miles away. Mary is still in contact with her children, however these 
relationships are marked by the difficulties and disruption which characterised their 
childhood. 
Interviewing Mary about these relationships was difficult. Mary spoke knowledgably about 
her childrens’ lives, their families, and their relationship with one another. However, Mary 
would also contradict herself when discussing the quality of these relationships and the 
frequency of their contact.  For example, Mary initially claimed to visit her son regularly 
and she recalled past visits to her son’s home with meticulous detail. However, throughout 
her interviews, it transpired that Mary had not seen her son in over a year, and that any 
form of contact – telephone or otherwise – was a rare occurrence.   
In contrast, Mary’s relationship with her daughter was based, seemingly, upon more 
frequent and regular contact. However, Mary described this relationship as difficult – ‘I go 
and see her, but I have to do all the running really, very poor contact’.  Mary’s relationship 
with her daughter sounded, at times, as though it was under significant strain. Later in her 
interviews, I broached this subject, and asked Mary whether she considered her daughter 
to be a reliable source of support:  
If I said... well, she knows, I mean I don’t bother her. I don’t – say I was to phone her 
for the weekly shop, for anything like that, she knows I’d phone her, I’m really 
desperate, I can’t manage with…  
Mary, 2nd Interview 
Mary struggled to define the parameters of this relationship, and to what extent support 
might be available. However, Mary clearly felt uncomfortable about the prospect of asking 
for support, and she stated that she would only ask in emergencies, when she is ‘really 
desperate’. This perspective was further emphasised by Mary’s statement that:  
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I don’t put her to the test, you see, because every…because she will tell you, ‘I can’t 
do it mum. I, I have to work’. 
Mary, 2nd Interview 
Later in her interviews, I sought to clarify whether this relationship offered support on a 
more regular or ‘day-to-day’ basis: 
Int: So you wouldn’t ask her [daughter] for the day-to-day stuff? 
Mary: Oh, no, no... Well, she reckons – and I’ve no, no reason to doubt her – 
there’s a device on her desk, she works from home, there’s a device on her 
desk and XX [employer] know when she’s left her desk. It’s not as easy as 
what you think. 
Int: No, no. I can imagine… 
Mary: Because when she said she was working from home I thought, “Ooh, this is 
all right”, you know? 
Int:  So, in terms of, like...  the day-to-day stuff, who would you, who would you 
ask if you needed a hand doing something?   
Mary: Well, there’s nobody really. I’m under the Active for Age team.  
Mary, 2nd Interview 
This was a difficult issue for Mary to confront, however she affirms that she is unable to 
ask her daughter for support or assistance. Instead, Mary cites a third sector organisation 
– the ‘Active for Age team’ (which I understand to refer to the ‘Active Ageing’ programme, 
a local Age UK exercise and falls prevention service). That Mary should identify this 
service as her primary source of social support illustrates that her children do not 
represent supportive relationships in any significant sense.   
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In terms of her wider social network, Mary spoke about a weekly mental health peer 
support group. This group was Mary’s most stable and regular form of social contact. 
Mary described this group:  
It’s supposed to be a drop-in group. It’s a mental health support group... you go 
there to unwind and that’s the idea of it. Funds stopped it, you see. The cuts in funds 
stopped it and we’ve kept it going on a voluntary basis. 
Mary, 1st Interview 
Mary talked about her role as an organiser within this group, and it was clear from her 
enthusiasm that she valued her responsibilities. However, the nature of Mary’s 
relationships with people in this group remained somewhat unclear. Mary spoke about 
people at this group as friends, and yet, she would also employ language adopted from 
professionalised social care:  
Int:  You spoke about the group last time and you said that there were a couple 
of pals there, a couple of friends there that you socialised with? 
Mary: Oh yeah, I socialise with all of them now, yeah. They all come and we’ve 
got very– while we’re there we support each other, you know, it’s very 
good.  One of the clients has just had her hip done, so that was a – I 
wanted to know how she’d got on. 
Mary, 1st Interview 
In this quotation, Mary describes relationships in social terms, and yet she also refers to a 
fellow group member as a ‘client’. The use of such terminology may simply be a reflection 
of the formal context of these relationships (within the context of a mental health service). 
However, this language may also be an indication that these relationships are not 
particularly close or intimate. Mary certainly experiences these relationships as supportive 
within the context of group meetings, however recalling the fact that Mary has nobody to 
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provide routine support, we might also assume that these relationships do not extend 
beyond the bounded setting of those meetings.   
In contrast to most other participants, Mary did not regard her locality – her ‘community’ – 
in positive terms. Rather, Mary spoke about her fear of the area and her distrust of local 
people. During her first interview, Mary recounted a conversation she had with a 
healthcare professional (HCP) following an operation. Here, the HCP was attempting to 
understand Mary’s domestic situation in an effort to support her return home: 
Mary:  He said, ‘Haven’t you got any neighbours or anything that could help you?’  
I said, ‘Oh, they’re not appropriate’. They’re not XX [researcher].  There are 
only the ladies that are 88, they’re the only ones that are appropriate, that 
you would have a daily conversation with. They’re not appropriate.   
Int: What do you mean by, ‘They’re not appropriate?’ 
Mary:  Well, I never knew what cannabis was until they come there.   
Mary, 2nd Interview 
Mary suspects that her neighbours are cannabis users and she considers this abhorrent. 
In recounting her conversation with the HCP, Mary depicts her relationship with her 
neighbours as fractious. Elsewhere in her interviews, Mary spoke of neighbours being 
aggressive towards her, and she recalled experiences of vandalism and violence against 
her property. In general terms, these issues serve as a reminder that the concept of 
‘community’ and ‘neighbourhood’ should be understood critically. While there is a good 
deal of enthusiasm in health and social care policy with regards to the potential for 
community as a positive factor (DH, 2010), Mary’s case highlights that community may be 
characterised by mistrust, fear and even violence.  
In summarising Mary’s case, there are a number of issues raised with regards to the 
meaning of social networks and social resources.  
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Firstly, we see in Mary an individual who is objectively well connected – she has contact 
with her daughter and with friends from her peer support group. However, Mary also 
identified herself as lonely and socially isolated. We might assume that Mary’s 
relationships with her children afford her a degree of support and assistance, but this is 
not the case. These observations emphasise the need to focus upon the qualitative 
features of supportive relationships, and in particular, their biographical context.  
Secondly, Mary’s example highlights that the role of locality and ‘community’ must be 
understood critically. Mary experiences her locality as a source of stress and anxiety 
rather than as a source of social resources. We might usefully consider the meaning of 
‘community’ as the abstraction of the individual’s local relationships. In Mary’s case, the 
experience of ‘community’ is one of fear and anxiety.  
Thirdly, Mary’s story underscores the complexity of social resources, and in particular, the 
nuances of meaning involved in the exchange of social resources. Taking the example of 
Mary’s peer-support friendships, we know these friendships do not offer support beyond 
the boundaries of the weekly group meeting. But why is this? There are clearly nuances 
as to what forms of support are considered available and acceptable, these issues being 
shaped both by the qualities of individual relationships and by the institutional frameworks 
within which relationships are realised. These issues will be addressed in further detail 
throughout chapters Seven and Eight.  
5.2.3 Theo 
Theo lives with hypertension, osteoarthritis, and a congenital foot deformity (which Theo 
calls his ‘clubbed foot’). In addition to his chronic illnesses, Theo has experienced a 
number of ‘mild’ strokes, and in the past 12 months has also suffered heart failure.  
At the time of his first interview, Theo was recovering from an operation to fit an artificial 
pacemaker. During his interviews, Theo stated that in the wake of his heart failure he had 
confronted the possibility of dying.  Fortunately, at the time of his first interview, Theo’s 
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health was improving and by the time of his second interview (4 months later) Theo’s 
health was such that he was almost unrecognisable from our first meeting.  
In recent years, as Theo’s health has deteriorated, his wife (Anne) has undertaken an 
increasing amount of labour in caring for Theo and managing their lives. Theo 
summarised this as Anne having ‘taken the reins a bit’. As with the previous cases, it is 
helpful to consider Theo’s social network and social resources in the context of his 
biography. I interviewed Theo and Anne together, and I asked them to tell me how they 
had come to live in their current home. Anne began to recount their story: 
We bought this house when it was just a concrete slab actually.  They hadn’t built it 
– we’d bought the house. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview 
Theo and Anne have lived in the same home for 38 years. During their time together, 
Theo and Anne have raised two sons who are now both adults. Theo’s sons live some 
distance away (approximately 50 and 200 miles away). Anne reflected upon this feature of 
their lives: 
We haven’t got any family in XX (immediate town); absolutely no family whatsoever. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview 
As a younger man, Theo spent much of his working life as a contracted engineer 
overseas, and this experience continues to shape his and Anne’s social network. 
Throughout his professional life, Theo was not a regular presence at home. Consequently, 
Anne became increasingly involved in local civic organisations, and this resulted in her 
forming a large and durable local social network.  
We’ve built up – I have more [friends] than Theo because Theo’s worked away and 
so he hasn’t had the grounding. But I’ve been in XX [immediate town] so – my 
friends in XX [immediate town] I know them and I do more with them than I do with 
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my family because they’re here.  Do you know what I mean?  I have got brothers 
and sisters but they’re not here. They’re on the phone and I can ring them any time.  
That phone call just now was from a 92-year-old lady and she was ringing up 
because she knew Theo had gone to the hospital yesterday and she was ringing up 
to ask how he was, you see. The little friends I had from the Welsh chapel. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview 
Anne’s comments affirm the importance of locality; she stresses her ‘grounding’ in the 
local area, and stresses the importance of friendships formed through years of 
involvement in her local church. I sought to discover more about Theo’s attitude towards 
friendship, Theo contrasted himself to Anne: 
Theo:  She’s very gregarious I think is the word and so she has quite a lot of friends. 
Int: Is that different to you?   
Theo: More or less yeah. I had two friends; one of them’s gone, and the other one’s 
across the road there. 
Theo, 1st Interview 
Theo states that he has just one local friend, and intimates that he is not as gregarious as 
his wife. However, despite this fact, it would be a mistake to consider Theo to be socially 
disconnected or isolated. Rather, to understand Theo’s social network requires that we 
consider Anne’s social contacts, and the extent to which Theo is connected to others 
through Anne.  Anne summed up this feature of their situation concisely:  
I have a bigger circle of friends in XX [immediate town] than Theo has, but now he’s 
got them as well. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview 
This example highlights the need to consider individual’s social connectedness beyond 
their immediate social contacts. Reminiscent of Granovetter’s (1973) argument for the 
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‘strength of weak ties’ (wherein social resources may be available to an individual through 
third parties), Theo is able to call on Anne’s friends for support should he need it.  
Focusing solely upon an individual’s immediate social contacts may be an unhelpfully 
reductive way to conceptualise the supportive practices of relationships.   
In discussing the availability and provision of support, Theo was unequivocal in identifying 
Anne as the most important person in his life. I asked Theo to expand upon this point:  
Int: So in terms of getting help from other people, is it mostly between the two 
of you then? 
Theo: Yeah, yeah.  Because we have our own means of transport.  I mean we’ve 
got the car there so if I wanted to go to the hospital now, a stroke, or if she 
wanted to go to the hospital, we’re in the car and gone before anybody 
knows about it.  So we are – we depend on each other a great deal 
because – well there’s no kids here and there’s no other people and then 
we tell the neighbours or what have you.  But basically we depend on each 
other.   
Int: So it’s not really something that’s ever cropped up that you need to go to 
other people, be that neighbours or local friends or…. 
Theo: No, no.  Only if - one day like the gas was playing up and that’s why we’ve 
got that monitor up there - we were feeling a bit dizzy and that.  But that’s 
the only time – if something happened to the two of us we’d call neighbours 
in, but basically I look after her and she looks after me.   
Theo, 1st Interview 
Despite the fact that Theo and Anne have a large and durable local social network, they 
do not consider other people as a source of support per se. Rather, Theo and Anne rely 
upon one another rather than upon other people. This relational dynamic and was 
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highlighted elsewhere in Theo’s interviews through reference to their relationship as that 
of a team: 
Then you grow up as a team, don’t you?  You come together.  I mean she knows 
what’s wrong with me and I know what’s wrong with her or what’s good or what’s 
bad.  I feel – well that’s it, there are no secrets basically. 
Theo, 1st Interview 
To describe Theo and Anne’s relationship as ‘close’ would be insufficient – this is a 
relationship in which the boundaries between two individual subjects is blurred. Theo and 
Anne’s relationship is such that, in terms of social resources, their wider social network is 
rendered superfluous. Neither looks beyond one another for support or assistance. Theo’s 
example is testament to the fact that focusing upon the quantity of social contacts, or the 
objective structure of an individual’s social network, will lead only to a partial reading of 
supportive relationships. Rather, understanding supportive practices requires an 
appreciation of the nuances of specific relationships – their history over the life course, 
and the institutional frameworks (in this instance marriage) which contribute to their 
meaning.  
Theo’s illness is very complex, and his case illustrates that particular health concerns may 
also be associated with specific supportive requirements. Theo lives with numerous 
chronic conditions, he has a congenital disability which limits his mobility, and he also 
suffers the after effects of a number of acute illnesses. This complexity means that Theo 
faces regular and distinct challenges – his supportive needs reflect this. Anne spoke at 
length about how she supported Theo, and in doing so, she associated particular illnesses 
with specific types of support. For example, Anne discussed the issue of accompanying 
Theo to GP appointments:  
Int: You said that you go together to the GP.  Is that something you’ve always 
done? 
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Anne: Only since he’s had the stroke.  Well he never used to go to the doctors.  
He never used to do – he’d tell me that there’s no need to.  They found out 
that he had blood pressure when he was working because you had a 
medical, didn’t you?.  [Yeah].  Then he had to go every six months or 
whatever to the GP.  I never went with him then.  It’s only since he had the 
first stroke that whenever he’s had an appointment - even when he had the 
chest infection I went in with him. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview 
Anne makes a clear association between stroke, and the need for her to accompany Theo 
to medical appointments. In discussing this further, Anne clarified why she considered this 
necessary: 
I asked him if I can go and he said, ‘yes, come in with me’. He forgets dates and 
he’ll forget his name and various things. 
Anne, Theo’s 1st Interview  
As a result of a number of ‘mild strokes’, Theo now experiences certain mild cognitive 
difficulties; Anne identifies this limitation as requiring a particular supportive response on 
her part (attending GP appointments with Theo). In abstracting out from this particular 
example, it is sensible to assume that the forms of support required by people living with 
multimorbidity will vary according to their particular combinations of illness and disability. 
Reflecting upon Theo’s case, we are reminded as to the heterogeneity of participants in 
this study. Despite having a number of illnesses in common, each participant also lives 
with additional chronic and episodic conditions which present a unique set of challenges. 
In thinking about the experience of social resources during multimorbidity, variety and 
difference (in terms of supportive requirements) are characteristic, and in this instance, 
corporal and cognitive needs inform the type of support needed and the way in which it is 
experienced.  
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In summarising Theo’s case, there are a number of observations which have implications 
for how we consider social networks and social resources. Specifically, in seeking to 
understand how an individual is socially connected, we must recognise that the immediate 
social network is only a partial picture. Theo has very few immediate social contacts of his 
own, however by virtue of Anne’s social network he is very well connected. Accordingly, it 
is important to consider social connectedness in a way which is not reductive (for 
example, by depicting social connectivity in singularly quantitative terms, or in terms of 
social network structure alone).   
Theo’s case also emphasises that a single relationship within an individual’s social 
network may be responsible for the vast majority of care and assistance. Despite the fact 
that Theo and Anne are well connected to others, they rely upon one another for support. 
This affirms the importance of understanding particular relational dynamics within 
supportive practices.  
Finally, Theo’s case has highlighted the importance of corporal and cognitive issues in the 
experience of support and assistance. Anne was able to identify Theo’s experience of 
stroke as requiring a specific supportive response on her part. While supportive 
exchanges represent complex social practices, it is important to recognise the role of 
immediate corporal and cognitive needs in shaping these process.  
5.4 Discussion 
Identifying emergent themes from the preceding case studies is a difficult task. What is 
clear is that there is huge diversity among participants’ experiences of social networks and 
social resources. Further, it is also apparent that in each case, material and embodied 
circumstances vary significantly. As a result of this diversity, establishing themes based 
upon empirical commonalities is problematic.  However, in reflecting upon this complexity 
and diversity, there are a number of important issues raised in terms of how social 
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networks are conceptualised, and also in relation to how we understand the exchange of 
social resources.  
In terms of conceptualising social networks, this chapter has problematized the notion that 
social networks may be classified in normative terms. What is meant by this is that 
seeking to classify participants’ social relations and sense of connectedness according to 
categories or typologies is of limited value. To illustrate this point, we might consider the 
above cases in relation to some common approaches towards the classification of social 
networks.  
One approach to classifying social networks is according to the geographic proximity of 
social contacts.14 Within the cases identified, Isla and Mary have contrasting social 
networks in this regard. Isla’s son lives over 150 miles away, whereas Mary’s daughter 
lives just five miles away. A naïve logic might reason that Isla – given the large distance 
separating her from her family – might have less opportunity for support and assistance, 
whereas Mary – by virtue of her daughter living nearby – would be more likely to 
experience regular support. However, as this chapter has detailed, this does not reflect 
the ways in which these relationships are experienced. To understanding the ways in 
which Mary and Isla’s children support them, we must consider these relationships 
through an historic lens. Isla spoke about her son in terms suggestive of a strong and 
durable relationship. Isla has full confidence that her son will assist and support her in 
whatever way she might need. By contrast, Mary has little contact with her son, and is 
unable to rely upon her daughter for support or assistance. Mary believes her daughter 
will assist her in an emergency, however she does not put her ‘to the test’. To understand 
these issues requires that we examine the history of these relationships, and in particular, 
the difficult and challenging circumstances faced by Mary’s children during their childhood. 
                                                          
14 This is a common descriptive measure within social network and social capital literature 
(see Wenger 1992, 1995, 1997). 
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In light of factors such as this, the logic of geographical classification seems somewhat 
redundant.  
Another way in which social networks are often conceptualised is according to their 
‘objective’ characteristics, for example, classifying individuals as possessing a ‘large 
social network’ or ‘small social network’. However, the case studies in this chapter 
highlight the arbitrary nature of such an approach.  Theo (by virtue of his wife’s social 
contacts) is among the most socially connected participants in this study, he is in regular 
contact with a large and diverse array of people. However, we know that Theo’s 
experience of support owes little to the objective size of his social network: his wider 
social contacts are essentially superfluous. Rather, understanding Theo’s social resources 
requires a close reading of one particular relationship, his relationship with his wife. In a 
similar fashion, Isla’s social network might also be characterised as objectively large. 
However, Isla’s experience of support differs again. For Isla, local friendships are of 
primary importance, providing her with an extraordinary amount of support and 
assistance. To grasp the meaning and function of these friendships requires that we 
consider Isla’s social network in a biographical context. Isla’s experience of social 
connectedness is shaped by her 60-year association with the local area and her history of 
involvement in civic organisations. Here again, attempting to understand these issues by 
reference to an objective social network characteristic seems a crude logic, and also risks 
obscuring important nuances in process.  
The above examples underscore the fact that, confronted with diversity and complexity, it 
is not necessarily helpful to classify participants’ experiences according to arbitrary 
variables such as network size, or geographic proximity.  This criticism would also be 
applicable to an approach which sought to explain the same complexity by reference to 
‘what friends do’, ‘what family does’, or ‘the role of neighbours’. Such approaches are 
problematic because they seek to explain social phenomena using ‘realised categories’ 
(Bourdieu; 1996) as explanatory variables, that is, categories assumed to describe social 
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reality, but which are also constitutive of social reality. To move beyond an understanding 
of social networks and social resources in reductionist terms requires an appreciation of 
these social phenomena in terms of social practice (Bourdieu, 1990; Ortner, 1984, 2005). 
What this requires, practically speaking, is identifying aspects of supportive processes 
which are seemingly complex or ambiguous, and exploring these factors critically. From 
this perspective, complexity and diversity should not be seen as being problematic in 
analytic terms, or as something to be overcome through closer classification. Rather, 
interrogating this complexity is a constructive enterprise, and the first step towards 
delivering an account of social resources as social practice. Turning again to the three 
case studies in this chapter, we might consider what features of these accounts appear, 
upon first reading, problematic. 
The first issue, as has already been identified, regards the dynamics of social 
relationships in shaping acts of support. This chapter has made the observation that social 
relationships affect supportive processes, and that important relational dynamics defy 
simple classification: Mary’s daughter does not support her, Theo’s wife is the only person 
supporting him, whereas Isla’s neighbour will visit her twice a day, every day. However, if 
classifying these relationships according to objective or normative (realised categories) 
characteristics is not productive, how should we consider social networks? The cases in 
this chapter provided useful insight in this direction. Specifically, social networks should 
not be considered an immediate or synchronic phenomena per se, rather they are 
biographically constituted and diachronic. This is a claim which challenges the concept of 
the social network in objectivist terms. Participants did not discuss their social networks in 
a manner conveying the immediacy of social relationships, rather other people were 
discussed in terms of their interlacing biographies, and the ways in which relationships 
developed over the life course. Further, in further testament against objectivist thinking, 
the cases in this chapter suggest that we consider social contacts who are not 
immediately connected (friends-of-friends), as well as appreciating the role of those 
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people absent through bereavement or loss (for example, Isla’s estranged friend). In 
recognising these issues, we are reminded that a ‘social network’ is simply a metaphor, 
used by researchers to evoke a sense of interconnectedness among people. This 
metaphor, however, also evokes less helpful notions of social relationships as objectively 
structured, and relationships as immediate and ahistorical. Perhaps a more appropriate 
way to imagine social networks is according to the convoy model of social relationships 
(Antonucci and Akiyama, 1991, 1995). The convoy model stresses the ways in which 
social networks are experienced – in both form and function – as linked to the life course. 
According to Antonucci (2009) the convoy model ‘strongly emphasizes the life-span 
cumulative aspects of development and the life course situational context’ (Antonucci, 
2009: 327). Although this concept of social connectedness is but another metaphor, it is a 
useful one. The convoy model emphasises that individuals live their lives accompanied by 
a cohort of other people including friends, family, and neighbours. The types of people 
within an individual’s cohort, as well as their significance and roles within relationships, 
are understood to change as the individual moves through the various stages of life. A 
particular strength of the convoy model is its sensitivity towards temporality and 
biography. Further, the convoy model recognises that people of differing ages are, 
structurally speaking, positioned differently within social, cultural, and economic fields. 
Most importantly of all, the convoy model resonates with the ways in which participants’ in 
this study interpreted and experienced the social relationships in relation to support and 
assistance.  
Beyond social networks, an area of further complexity has been identified as the meaning 
attributed to supportive acts. This was evident as each participant discussed support in 
equivocal or ambivalent terms, and was most apparent where participants framed 
discussion through the moral dichotomy of dependence and independence. Isla, for 
example, identified independence as a virtuous characteristic and spoke about the 
prospect of asking her son for support in negative terms – ‘I think it’s good for your family 
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if you can be independent’. Mary alluded to similar issues and identified herself as being 
‘as independent as I can be’. Theo referred to his relationship with Anne by reference to 
dependency, and he was keen to highlight the reciprocal nature of their relationship – ‘I 
look after her and she looks after me’.  For supportive relationships to be discussed in 
these terms suggests an important link between support, morality, and identity. This issue 
requires thorough treatment and is beyond the scope of the immediate discussion. The 
issue of support, morality and identity will be revisited in Chapter Eight.  
A further issue to be highlighted by the above cases concerns the meaning of particular 
forms of support. Previous attempts to classify social resources and social support have 
recognised diversity in supportive practices – emotional, appraisal, informational, 
instrumental support, for example (House, 1981). However, such typologies perpetuate 
the idea that supportive practices may be understood in terms of the function they fulfil. 
The case studies presented in this chapter suggest that social resources may not be 
understood in instrumental terms alone. Isla, for example, spoke about the various 
different forms of support provided by her neighbour and her experience of support in 
managing personal finances was particularly telling. Isla spoke about this issue with some 
enthusiasm and detailed an example where her neighbour assisted her by drawing her 
pension. However, Isla stated clearly that she did not want the same neighbour to be 
involved in other aspects of her personal finances – ‘I don’t want her to have anything to 
do with that’. This example illustrates the potential for support to be experienced as 
meaningful in subtle and complex ways. In this sense, the receipt of support is shaped by 
aspects particular to context, the form of support which is exchanged, and the relationship 
within which support occurs. What this means, in practice, is that the meaning of a 
supportive act cannot be understood by reference to its function or outcome alone. 
Rather, the meaning of supportive acts includes social and/or cultural logics of meaning. 
This issue – the meaning or ‘value’ of social resources – will be taken up in chapter 
Seven.  
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The aforementioned issues (morality and value in the exchange of social resources) will 
be addressed in subsequent data chapters (chapters Seven and Eight). However, before 
these issues may be addressed in full, several conceptual challenges must be outlined 
and addressed. Specifically, the ways in which morality and value are treated within extant 
empirical and theoretical literature requires critique, before an appropriate analytic 
framework may be put forward. The following chapter deals with these issues, and 
outlines the analytic framework which will be applied in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight.   
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Chapter Six: Theoretical review 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter represents a pause in the progression of this thesis and will not present 
participant data. Rather, this chapter presents a discussion of several conceptual and 
theoretical issues encountered throughout data collection and analysis. The previous 
chapter (Chapter Five) has gone some way towards describing the complexities inherent 
in supportive practices during multimorbidity. In doing so, Chapter Five identified two 
themes (value and morality) which, it has been suggested, are complex and confound 
normative explanations. This chapter is intended to outline the mode of reasoning through 
which these issues were confronted during analysis, and to introduce a conceptual 
framework which will be applied in subsequent results chapters.   
This chapter is structured into two parts. The first part of this chapter addresses 
deficiencies and limitations within dominant conceptual apparatuses. Specifically, the 
conceptual lineage of social capital will be outlined, with the detrimental influence of 
individualist social exchange theory and Rational Choice Theory (RCT) made clear. In the 
second part of this chapter, an alternative body of theoretical literature will be presented. 
This parallel theoretical stream – gift exchange literature – will be outlined in terms of its 
foremost tenets, and with regard to the particular issues of value and morality. It will be 
concluded that by incorporating insight from gift exchange literature, our understanding of 
supportive practices may be improved.  
6.2 Social capital’s conceptual lineage  
The literature review of this thesis has outlined the development of social capital theory 
throughout the 1990s, and has identified the influence of three contemporaneous authors:  
James Coleman, Robert Putnam, and Pierre Bourdieu. Within social science and health 
literature, it is the work of Coleman and Putnam which is privileged, with Bourdieu’s 
broader social theory largely ignored (Moore 2005, 2006; Fine, 2010; Fine and Milonakis 
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2009).15 As such, in terms of critiquing contemporary perspectives, it is the work of 
Coleman and Putnam which is of primary concern to this thesis. To understand the 
contribution of these authors, it is helpful to recognise a number of important theoretical 
antecedents. Recognising these antecedents is helpful in explaining the weaknesses and 
limitations typical in latter social capital perspectives. The following section locates the 
social capital theories of Coleman and Putnam against wider historical developments in 
social theory, before proceeding to detail alternative perspectives.   
6.2.1 The network perspective  
Social capital is principally a product of 1990s social theory; however, its theoretical 
taproots are to be found in 1960s American sociology and a time when Parsonian 
functionalism prevailed. Against the dominant perspective of the day – structural 
functionalism – emerged critiques which questioned the ‘oversocialized conception of man 
in modern sociology’ (Wrong, 1961). Such perspectives argued against approaches 
which, in their view, depicted social actors as overly-suborned to the values and norms of 
stable and integrated social systems.16 Anglo-American sociological thought developed in 
accordance with this critique – against forms of sociological holism, and in favour of 
theoretical perspectives which privileged the role of the individual as self-aware, 
deliberative, and skilled in the practices of everyday life.  
One such development in post-Parsonian social theory was a perspective which has been 
termed the ‘network approach’ (Crossley, 2010). Proponents of the network approach 
accepted the critique of ‘oversocialized’ functionalism (Wrong, 1961), and yet, were 
uncomfortable with the most immediate alternative – individualism qua neoclassical 
economics (Scott, 1995). A key proponent of the network approach was Mark 
                                                          
15 Moore (2005, 2006) has described citation patters within health literature. Using 
biobliometric methods Moore has demonstrated that Coleman ranks highest (in terms of a 
citation count), followed by Putnam, with Bourdieu not featuring in the 10 most cited social 
capital references.  
16 Archer (1995) provides a useful synopsis of this moment in the history of social theory.  
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Granovetter, whose work – including the strength of weak ties (1973) and the concept of 
embeddedness (1985) – continues to influence contemporary research and scholarship. 
Granovetter is exemplary of the network approach in his attempt to transcend both 
functionalist and individualist positions. To do this, Granovetter employed the concept of 
the social network as a structuring feature of everyday life:  
What I came to argue is that one has to thread one’s way between these under and 
over-socialized views by seeing that all economic activity is in fact embedded in 
complex, ongoing networks of social and economic relationships, and the trust that 
makes such activity possible, but also the malfeasance that can bring it to a halt, 
can only be explained by a close analysis of how people function in such networks 
(Granovetter, 1990: 14).  
The notion of individuals as networked individuals gained recognition and support in 
subsequent years, facilitated by a theoretical landscape wherein economic sociology – 
exemplified by Becker (1976) – and behavioural sociology – championed by Homans 
(1974) – held sway. Lin, Dayton, and Greenwald (1978), following Granovetter, were 
among the first to conceptualise social resources as a form of personal capital provided by 
social networks. Influenced by Granovetter and Homans, these authors conceived of 
individuals as embedded within networks of personal and professional relationships which 
were understood to afford various social resources. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that early formulations of social resources bear striking affinities with latter developments 
in social capital theory: 
The concept of social resources encompasses two components: social relations and 
the resources embedded in positions reached through such relations. The concept 
contrasts and complements the concept of personal resources… While personal 
resources involve the individual’s wealth, status, and power, social resources are 
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embedded in the positions of contacts an individual reaches through his social 
network (Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel, 1981: 395). 
Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel (1981) were concerned – as was Granovetter (1973) – with 
understanding how individuals attain occupational status and professional achievement. In 
this context, social resources were taken to include both the material (wealth) and 
symbolic (prestige) resources afforded by the individual’s membership of a social 
network.17 Elsewhere, Lin (1982) provided the definition of social resources as ‘material or 
symbolic goods’, and so affirmed the notion of social relationships as a form of personal 
capital in both materialist and idealist terms.18  
Lin and Granovetter have been influential in advancing the study of social relationships 
according to the network perspective; in this direction, the network perspective has been 
productive in addressing some of the weaknesses inherent in both individualist and 
collectivist positions. Clearly, the network perspective is not a novel theoretical position; 
the concepts of social networks and community have been considered within parallel 
schools of social theory (symbolic interactionism, for example). However, authors such as 
Granovetter and Lin have influenced the ways in which social networks are 
conceptualised as a structuring feature of everyday life (this being the enduring influence 
of the network perspective). In this respect, the legacy of the network approach has been 
to consider social relationships in instrumental terms. This is apparent in the way that 
social networks are presented as facilitating (or limiting) the accomplishment of a 
particular social action or behaviour of interest. Indeed, the very notion of social resources 
and social relationships as a form of personal capital pre-supposes the context of goal-
oriented action. Whilst this is an important aspect of social relationships (and one which 
this thesis would not wish to discount), it is the position of this thesis that focusing upon 
                                                          
17 Lin’s formulation of symbolic goods – prestige and status – are analogous with material goods 
and as a form of personal capital. 
18 Lin would later become a key figure in social capital theory; see, for example Social Capital: A 
Theory of Social Structure and Action (Lin, 2001) 
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the role of social relationships in the accomplishment of goal-oriented action is reductive, 
and limits our understanding of co-operation and collaboration during the illness 
experience. This point will be revisited, and consequences made clear, throughout this 
chapter. 
6.2.2 Individualist social exchange 
A further body of literature which has influenced contemporary perspectives is social 
exchange theory.19 Social exchange theory, much like the network perspective, emerged 
during the 1950s and 1960s in reaction to ‘overly-socialized’ modes of social theory. In 
particular, social exchange theory may be recognised as a transatlantic riposte to Lévi-
Strauss‘ The elementary structures of kinship (1969). Lévi-Strauss had detailed a theory 
of general exchange (based upon the exchange of women within pre-capitalist societies) 
in what remains an epitome of structuralist anthropology. At the forefront of the 
individualist response was Homans (1950, 1974), whose work is now synonymous with 
social exchange theory.   
Homans extended the logic of exchange beyond tangible objects to include all forms of 
social activity. Homans’ most characteristic contribution, however, was to critique the role 
of culture in exchange, and to proffer a theory based upon utilitarian logic. Ekeh (1974) 
summarises the central tenets of Homans’ social exchange theory as follows: 
1) Social exchange occurs within face-to-face relations 
2) Social exchange may be understood as restricted exchange, limited to two 
individuals 
3) Social exchange privileges ‘human motivation’ based upon psychological and 
economic needs 
4) The items or actions exchanged are considered in terms of utilitarian value  
                                                          
19 Coleman (1988) has described social exchange theory as ‘pathbreaking’ in relation to 
his own model of social capital.  
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 (Ekeh, 1974)  
In contrast to Lévi-Strauss, Homans’ social exchange theory was markedly individualist, 
and stressed the role of utilitarian action and ‘human motivation’. Ekeh (1974) provides an 
excellent review of Homans’ contribution in relation to the Structuralist position:  
In no other social exchange theorist is there such an explicit combination of 
psychology and economics. Homans stands as an ‘individualist-orientated’, or, in his 
own words, an ‘individual self-interest theorist’ par excellence… Lévi-Strauss’ 
position retains the French collectivist orientation, while Homans advocates the 
individualistic orientation in social exchange (Ekeh, 1974: 87).  
Following Homans, social exchange theory developed through the work of Blau (1964), 
who sought to refine and advance a social exchange theory which further incorporated 
marginal economic theory and psychological behaviourism. The results were a reading of 
human agency and social action wherein psychological and economic reasoning 
prevailed: 
Blau’s social exchange theory is eminently individualistic – indeed it is nearer 
Spencerian and Frazerian individualism in its emphasis on economic self-interest as 
the motive for social action than Homans’ conditioned behavioural individualism 
(Ekeh, 1974: 167).  
For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to recognise social exchange theory as a 
perspective that is polemically opposed to Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism; social exchange 
theory is influential in its promotion of methodological individualism. Further, social 
exchange theory has played an influential role in advancing micro-economic and 
psychological models of agency in social exchange; the individual’s attachment to society, 
their membership of social groups, and socio-cultural factors are largely dismissed.  This 
mode of social theory has influenced social capital, and continues to influence approaches 
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which conceptualise social relationships and social resources as a form of personal 
capital: this claim will be supported in the following section.  
Both the network perspective and social exchange theory developed with a degree of 
independence. However, throughout the late 1980s and1990s various attempts were 
made to synthesise both approaches into a unitary social theory. The rationale for this 
was the apparent synergy between network perspectives upon social structure, and the 
models individualism advanced by social exchange theory. This synergy was noted by 
Cook and Whitmeyer (1992), who highlighted complementarities between both positions: 
Much convergence exists between exchange theory and network approaches to 
social structure… Exchange theory and network analysis both conceptualize social 
structure as a configuration of social relations and positions… Exchange theory and 
network analysis are based on similar conceptions of the actor (Cook and 
Whitmeyer, 1992: 110). 
In the above quotation, the authors identify that both approaches share a common 
conceptualisation of social structure as the immediate social relationships between actors; 
further, both envisage social networks as working to constrain and/or provide possibilities 
for social action. Both approaches treat the individual in a similar fashion; social exchange 
theory privileges individual and psychological models of behaviour, and this position is 
accommodated within network perspectives. It is towards social capital that this 
discussion will now turn.   
6.2.3 Social capital  
Social capital, as developed by Coleman and Putnam, may be seen as the theoretical 
progeny of social exchange theory and the network perspective.20 Social capital depicts 
social structure in a fashion markedly similar to the network perspective: networks of 
                                                          
20 Each author’s respective definition of social capital has been provided in the literature review of 
this thesis.  
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social or institutional relationships constrain, or provide opportunity for social action. The 
network perspective is apparent in the ubiquitous application of social network terminology 
in social capital texts. The influence of social exchange theory is less conspicuous; 
however, due to the fact that social exchange theory concerns fundamental aspects of 
human agency and social action, its influence is arguably more problematic.  
Coleman – the most cited social capitalist within health literature (Moore, 2005. 2006) – 
has identified social exchange theory as ‘pathbreaking’ in the development of his own 
social theory (Coleman, 1988). In this respect, social exchange theory laid important 
conceptual groundwork for social capital in considering interaction, co-operation and 
social exchange according to individualist modes of agency and social action. Theories of 
social capital address these issues from a similar position, and the most influential 
exponents of social capital (Coleman and Putnam) demonstrate clear propensities 
towards methodological individualism and micro-economic theory. For Coleman, as for 
Homans and Blau, individuals are understood to be rational and deliberative social actors, 
with social action proceeding according to the individual’s pursuit of marginal benefit. In 
this regard, Coleman’s social capital theory is staunchly individualist: 
I will use the conception of rationalism employed in economics, the conception that 
forms that basis of the rational actor in economic theory. This conception is based 
on the notion of different actions (or, in some cases, different goods) having a 
particular utility for the actor and is accompanied by the principle of action which can 
be expressed by saying that they actor chooses the action which will maximise 
utility’ (Coleman, 1990: 14). 
A similar rationalist individualist perspective is apparent in Putnam’s social capital theory 
(Putnam, 2000). Putnam is cited regularly as demonstrating communitarian sensibilities; 
however, he shares a foundational social theory similar to that of Coleman. For Putnam, 
‘systems of reciprocity’ form the cornerstone of social action and co-operation. This 
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concept – systems of reciprocities – appears at first glance to be intrinsically collective. 
However Putnam’s reading of reciprocity is influenced heavily by Taylor (a key theorist in 
RCT and game theory). In explaining his theory of social capital, Putnam cites Taylor at 
length: 
Each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usually characterized by a 
combination of what one might call short-term altruism and long-term self-interest: I 
help you out now in the (possibly vague, uncertain, and uncalculating) expectation 
that you will help me out in the future. Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts 
each of which is short-run altruistic (benefiting others at the cost of the altruist), but 
which together typically make every participant better off (Taylor, quoted in Putnam 
2000:134).   
For Putnam, the self-interested individual, whilst less pronounced than in the social capital 
of Coleman, remains at the heart of explaining actions such as co-operation and 
collaboration within social networks. The limitations of this assumption will be addressed 
shortly; however, a further consequence of this position should be highlighted.  
The RCT foundations of social capital theory influence, detrimentally, the ways in which 
social networks are conceptualised. Specifically, for social capitalists (as with earlier 
network perspectives), social relationships are considered in a reductive manner 
according to their role in the accomplishment of goal-oriented action. Coleman, for 
example, assumes this position in considering social relationships as a form of personal 
capital:  
We begin with a theory of rational action, in which each actor has control over 
certain resources and interests in certain resources and events… social capital 
constitutes a particular kind of resource available to an actor (Coleman, 1988: 98). 
As a consequence, social capital has a tendency towards treating social relationships and 
concomitant acts of support, assistance and co-operation in functional or utilitarian terms. 
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Here, parallels with earlier network approaches (Granovetter, 1973; Lin, Dayton and 
Greenwald, 1978) are clear, as the complexities of social exchange are reduced to a 
utilitarian reading of social relationships:   
Social capital is defined by its function… Like other forms of capital, social capital is 
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence 
would not be possible (Coleman, 1988: 93).  
Such an approach to the study of social relationships is problematic for a number of 
reasons (Fine 2008, 2010). Most limiting with regard to this thesis, however, is that a 
utilitarian approach neglects both the affective (emotional) and socio-cultural (meaningful) 
dimensions of social relationships. It is the position of this thesis, that such a blinkered 
reading of relationships is detrimental to our understanding of support and assistance 
during illness. 
These limitations are not unexpected, however, and may be explained by reference to the 
established critique of RCT and methodological individualism. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the following statement from Archer (2012) summarises this critique, which may 
also be read as a critique of social capital. Archer takes aim at the prototypical vision of 
the individual qua RCT, Homo economicus: 
Homo economicus, the model most explicit in mainstream economics and Rational 
Choice Theory… contributes nothing to the ‘common good’, unless by accident, and 
is unmoved by ‘his’ social relations… Homo economicus is an impoverished notion 
of the human being, which cannot cope with our capacity to transcend instrumental 
rationality and to devote ourselves to concerns that are not a means to anything 
beyond them, but are commitments that are constitutive of who we are – be they our 
children, Church, career, community or cause. These relations are the basis of our 
personal identities and none of them can be reduced to instrumental means-ends 
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relationships, assumed to leave us ‘better off’ relative to some notion of future ‘utility’ 
(Archer, 2012: 2). 
Extending this insight, this thesis takes the position that social capital (or any approach 
which applies latently similar concepts of agency and/or social action) is insufficient with 
regard to the complexities of co-operation, collaboration and support during illness. As 
suggested by Archer (2012), the study of such phenomena must begin by recognising that 
individuals often transcend instrumental rationality and devote themselves to actions and 
causes that confound, even contradict, instrumental logic. Further, as is intimated by 
Archer (2012), the way we understand individuals in relation to their social network should 
proceed by placing the formation of Self at the core of our analysis. Actions of support and 
assistance (particularly those which occur during the experience of illness) are likely to 
involve affective, social and cultural complexities which shape fundamentally the relation 
between individual and the Self. In recognition of these observations, alternative modes of 
social exchange and social resources must be considered. 
6.3 Gift exchange: an alternative approach   
In seeking to understand the exchange of social resources during illness, this thesis 
considers alternative traditions of social exchange. One body of literature which is 
particularly illuminating is the social anthropology of gift exchange. The field of gift 
exchange consists of a rich and diverse array of contributions; however, for the purposes 
of this chapter, a select few sources are sufficient to address the limitations identified in 
the above discussion.  
6.3.1 Mauss’ gift  
Perhaps the seminal text in gift exchange literature is Mauss’ (1922 / 2011) essay The 
Gift. Mauss was concerned with documenting the cultural intricacies of exchange in 
‘traditional’ or pre-capitalist cultures. Mauss provided a comparative analysis of gift 
exchange in Polynesia, the Pacific Northwest, and Melanesia. In doing so, Mauss detailed 
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the exchange of objects and actions between individuals, within communities, and through 
ritual practices. To summarise, Mauss described the ways that such exchanges were 
shaped by rich and stratified socio-cultural frames of meaning. In this sense, Mauss’ 
fundamental contribution was to demonstrate that gift exchange may not be considered 
analogous to commodity exchange. Rather, Mauss illustrated that practices of gift 
exchange followed distinct logics of reason; these logics being ascertained through non-
utilitarian and collectivist modes of analysis. In this sense, Mauss’ preliminary statement 
may be seen to be emblematic of his broader social theory:   
In systems of the past we do not find simple exchange of goods, wealth and 
produce through markets established among individuals. For it is groups, and not 
individuals, which carry out exchange, make contracts, and are bound by obligations 
(Mauss, 2011: 3). 
Mauss’ study of exchange is, in comparison to contemporary social exchange theories, 
markedly collectivist. In this respect, Mauss (and gift exchange theorists generally) 
provide a theoretical outlook which is polemically opposed to social exchange theory. 
Since publication, The Gift (1922 / 2011) has generated countless secondary analyses 
and critiques. However, for the purpose of this thesis, Mauss aids the analysis of social 
resource exchange in two ways.   
Firstly, Mauss highlighted the role played by morality in exchange, and made the famous 
observation that gift exchange was governed by codes of moral obligation, 
admonishment, and sanction: 
…although presentations and counter presentations take place under a voluntary 
guise they are in essence strictly obligatory, and their sanction is private or open 
warfare (Mauss, 2011: 3). 
Similar observations have been made subsequently within individualist social exchange 
(contemporary perspectives rely upon the concept of reciprocity). However, Mauss’ 
 138 
 
analysis is consistent with a Durkheimian perspective according to which morality is 
considered a social fact extraneous and irreducible to the individual (Zigon, 2008).21  
Mauss identified three forms of moral obligation: the obligation to give, the obligation to 
receive, and the obligation to repay. In this regard, Mauss encourages us to consider 
moral action which, in the first instance, appears at odds with instrumental rationalism (the 
obligation to receive, for example, is absent in analyses which rely upon RCT). Further, 
Mauss – following Durkheim – makes the fundamental assertion that morality must be 
considered in terms of the individual’s attachment to society (Durkheim, 1961). In this 
sense, Mauss promotes an understanding of social exchange which is sensitive towards 
aspects of morality that are socially and culturally constituted (rather than morality in its 
individualist contractarian guise, such as reciprocity).  It should be pointed out that the 
Maussian perspective does not escape critique, and Mauss may be subjected to the 
criticisms directed at collectivist social theory more generally (Archer, 1995; Zigion 2008). 
Despite this, however, Mauss serves as a useful counterpoint to the individualist reading 
of morality.   
A second insight provided by Mauss concerns the meaning, or value, of objects and 
actions exchanged as gifts. Mauss observed that gift exchange could not be explained by 
reference to the economic worth of the objects exchanged: 
What they exchange is not exclusively goods and wealth, real and personal 
property, and things of economic value. The exchange rather courtesies, 
entertainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances, and feasts 
(Mauss, 2011: 3). 
For Mauss, the value of such objects could only be appreciated (and the practices of 
exchange understood) once their social and cultural meaning was recognised. In 
                                                          
21 Durkheim was Mauss’ uncle, academic patron, and collaborator.  
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exploring such cultural logics of value, Mauss prefigured latter social theorists in adopting 
the semiotic terminology of signification: 
Each of these precious things… has a productive capacity within itself. Each, as well 
as being a sign and surety of life, is also a sign of surety of wealth, a magico-
religious guarantee or rank and prosperity (Mauss, 2011: 43). 
In this sense, Mauss delivers an analysis of exchange which begins to incorporate 
symbolic and semiotic logics of value. Of immediate relevance, however, is the fact that 
Mauss’ value is pluralist. Accordingly, the meaning of objects and actions are understood 
by incorporating economic value alongside logics of meaning which are socially and 
culturally constituted: rank, status, vitality, for example.   
Clearly, the empirical subject matter of Mauss’ fieldwork is somewhat remote from that of 
this thesis. However, Mauss’ insight remains productive given the predominance of 
individualist modes of exchange (including social capital and approaches which consider 
social networks in instrumental terms). It has been suggested (above) that individualist 
modes of social exchange demonstrate a predilection for utilitarian, functional and 
economic reasoning. The Maussian perspective reminds us that such approaches will 
only ever deliver a partial reading of social exchange. For the purposes of this thesis, 
Mauss acts as a polemical counterweight to individualist social exchange perspectives. 
The following two sections outline further the contribution made by gift exchange, and will 
detail the ways that morality and value are addressed in the data chapters which follow 
(Chapters Seven and Eight).  
6.4 Moral economy 
The concept of a moral economy is common in gift exchange theory (Carrier, 1995) and 
follows Mauss’ observation that social exchange occurs under a range of moral precepts: 
the obligations to give, to receive, and to repay. To speak of morality in terms of 
obligations is, perhaps, somewhat outmoded; the treatment of morality in the social 
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sciences has developed (since Mauss) according to wider trends in social theory. 
Addressing morality remains vital, however, as it represents an indissoluble aspect of 
social action and is tied intimately to the formation of Self (Sayer, 2011).  
Morality has long held a place in the analysis of social exchange. However, in recent 
decades, approaches to morality have been dominated by the ‘moral mechanism’ of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is recognised widely as a fundamental constituent of social 
relationships; indeed, reciprocity is likely to be as close to a culturally universal cultural 
motif as it is possible to find (Neusner and Chilton, 2008). However, the mode of 
reciprocity that has come to bear in recent years is marked indelibly by the shortcomings 
of individualist social exchange. As such, whist reciprocity should be recognised as an 
important feature of our moral evaluations, from an analytic perspective, reciprocity must 
be examined critically.  
Emblematic of the individualist mode of reciprocity is that advanced by social capital 
theory. In this regard, there is no clearer expression of individualist morality than 
reciprocity according to Putnam (2000): 
The touchstone of social capital is the principle of generalized reciprocity – I’ll do this 
for you now, without expecting anything immediately in return and perhaps without 
even knowing you, confident that down the road you or someone else will return the 
favour (Putnam, 2000: 134). 
Putnam’s reciprocity captures two aspects of moral action which require consideration. 
Firstly, in Putnam’s scheme there is a sense that reciprocity binds individual social actors 
to specific acts of co-operation; reciprocity functions as a form of micro-social-contract 
between definite individuals. In this mode, individuals are morally compelled to reciprocate 
a specific act in relation to a particular individual. Secondly, the notion of ‘generalised 
reciprocity’ assumes that individuals experience a similar contractarian ethic to non-
specified persons, or to a wider community of persons. Accordingly, the act of 
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reciprocation need not be tied to specific antecedent acts or particular individuals, but 
occurs under the influence of a norm of deferred reciprocation from others.  
At first reading, Putnam’s conceptualisation of reciprocity seems sensible, even appealing. 
However, given what has been argued (above) as to the limitations of social capital theory 
– specifically, the limitations of RCT – it is unsurprising that morality qua reciprocity should 
involve a number of unwelcome assumptions. These assumptions are detrimental in (at 
least) three respects.  
Firstly, whilst couched in communitarian language, Putnam’s reciprocity retains the tacit 
assumption that people are motivated to act morally according to the prospect of marginal 
gains. Putnam states clearly that people who engage in ethical action do so because they 
calculate some form of immediate or deferred benefit (someone else will do something for 
them). This is an insufficient reading of individual motivation, and is susceptible to the 
same critique which has been levelled against models of human agency premised upon 
RCT (such as social capital). Secondly, by focusing solely upon instrumental or goal-
oriented action, this mode of reciprocity is limited in its conceptualisation of what may 
constitute moral action. This contractarian form of reciprocity tends to neglect forms of 
action which are meaningful or hermeneutically oriented: it is weaker for this. Finally, the 
above formulation of morality fails to address the fundamental link between ethical action 
and the formation of Self; this is perhaps its most significant shortcoming.  
To highlight these issues as characteristic of individualist exchange, we might contrast 
Putnam’s reciprocity with Iris Murdoch’s sentiment that ‘our [moral] actions are like ships 
which we may watch set out to sea, and not know when or with what cargo they will return 
to port’ (Murdoch, 1962: 152). Murdoch’s reciprocity consists in the absence of rationally 
calculating individuals, and recognises the meaning of benevolence and co-operation as 
linked to faith and abandon. Such a perspective stands in stark contrast to Putnam’s, and 
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makes plain the impoverished nature of morality when viewed through an individualist 
rationalist lens.  
These limitations are characteristic of individualist readings of morality, and have real 
implications for the conduct of health research. In reviewing the application of reciprocity 
in health research, Abbot and Freeth (2008) lament the confused and uncritical use of the 
term. The authors note that the concepts of reciprocity, generalised reciprocity, and 
altruism are widely deployed with little meaningful distinction. Further, it is also noted that 
the so called ‘norm of reciprocity’ is often elided with other norms more closely associated 
with social control and institutional roles.22  Within health literature, the logic of social 
capital (and RCT generally) endures in the assumption that people act in an ethical or 
moral way because it is in their interest to do so. While this logic may be appropriate for 
certain subjects of sociological inquiry – professional status attainment, for example (Lin, 
Vaughn, and Ensel, 1981) – it is patently insufficient to capture the depth of moral crises 
and suffering which have been identified  as a part of the experience of illness (Frank, 
1995; Kleinman, 1988).  
This thesis argues that people act ethically during the receipt of social resources due to 
moral precepts that are concerned more with the fundamental human condition than they 
are with instrumental action. A form of reciprocity will be among these precepts; however, 
questions as to why people ‘do good’ or do ‘the right thing’ during the receipt of social 
resources cannot be answered by reciprocity alone. This thesis will approach reciprocity 
as a component of a larger and more complex moral imperative. In doing so, morality will 
be treated in terms which appreciate meaningful (in addition to instrumental) reason 
(Sayer, 2011), as well as recognising the fundamental associations between morality, 
social action, and Self (Taylor, 1992).  
                                                          
22 These norms may also be ‘moral norms’, but they are not a norm of reciprocity.   
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6.5 Value  
Each of these precious things… has a productive capacity within itself. Each, as well 
as being a sign and surety of life, is also a sign of surety of wealth, a magico-
religious guarantee or rank and prosperity (Mauss, 2011: 43). 
In reiterating the above passage from Mauss, we are reminded that objects and actions 
exchanged outside of commodity exchange do not conform to economic logic. Rather, as 
Mauss observed, to understand social exchange it is necessary to appreciate the 
relational and socio-cultural significance of that which is exchanged. This insight is also 
relevant to the exchange of supportive acts, and it is useful to consider the value of social 
resources in a similar fashion. Incorporating insight from alternative theories of value has 
the potential to further our understanding of social resource exchange. For the purpose of 
this thesis, one useful contribution is that of Baudrillard’s (1981) typology of value.  
To contextualise this typology briefly, during this point in Baudrillard’s output he was 
engaged in an attempt to ally Marx’s writings on political economy with French cultural 
theory (particularly the cultural semiotics of Barthes). In a somewhat neglected volume of 
essays – Towards a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign – Baudrillard blends 
aspects of political economy with his burgeoning interests in post-structuralism. 
Throughout this volume of essays, Baudrillard takes up Mauss’ observations concerning 
value in gift exchange, and applies this reasoning to the exchange of objects, actions, 
gestures, and signs within advanced capitalist societies. In doing so, Baudrillard applies a 
sophisticated theory of culture, and addresses issues which are particular to capitalist 
societies.  
Baudrillard contends that in modern capitalist societies, objects of exchange are subject to 
four distinct logics of value. Accordingly, the meaning of exchange may be understood as 
the intersections of use-value, exchange-value, symbolic-value, and sign-value. Stated 
simply, use-value pertains to a functional logic, whilst exchange-value relates to normative 
economic logic. In this regard Baudrillard drew upon Marx’s writings on commodity 
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exchange. 23 Sign-value and symbolic-value are the incorporation of Maussian principles 
of semiotic and symbolic logics of value. For Baudrillard, symbolic-value and sign-value 
are necessary to explain dynamics of exchange where use-value and exchange-value are 
erroneous or irrelevant. 
This thesis adopts a modified version of Baudrillard’s (1981) typology in analysing the 
meaning of supportive exchanges. The following two sections will detail further symbolic 
and semiotic logics of value.  
6.5.2 Symbolic-value 
Symbolic-value is an enduring theme within gift exchange and refers to the inalienability of 
gifts. Mauss made the observation that ‘objects are never completely separated from the 
men who exchange them’ (Mauss, 2011:31). Later gift exchange theorists have developed 
this observation, and have identified parallel and contrasting aspects of gifts and 
commodities. In this regard a defining feature of commodity exchange is the interjection of 
                                                          
23 Baudrillard recognised Marx’s definition of use-value as: ‘The use-values of 
commodities provide the material for a study of their own, the science of 
commodities. Use-value realizes itself only in use or in consumption’ (Marx, 1976: 7). 
Similarly, exchange value was appropriated by Baudrillard as it had been presented by 
Marx: ‘Exchange-value appears first of all as quantitative relationship, the proportion in 
which use-values of one kind are exchanged for use-values of another kind, a relationship 
which constantly changes in accordance with time and place.’ (Marx, 1976: 7).The 
relationship between use- and exchange-value being the fascination of both authors: ‘The 
commodity is immediate unity of use-value and exchange-value, thus of two opposed 
entities. Thus it is an immediate contradiction. This contradiction must enter upon a 
development just as soon as it is no longer considered as hitherto in an analytic manner 
(at one time from the viewpoint of use-value and at another from the viewpoint of 
exchange-value) but is really related to other commodities as a totality’ (Marx, 1976: 40). 
However, where Baudrillard and Marx part company is in terms of their conceptualisation 
of ‘needs’. Marx was somewhat dismissive of the concept of human need in exchange: 
‘The commodity is first an external object, a thing which satisfies through its qualities 
human needs of one kind or another. The nature of these needs is irrelevant’ (Marx, 1976: 
7). However, for Baudrillard, human needs – or rather the ideological genesis of needs – 
formed the basis of a critical political economy infused with post-structuralist critique. 
Hence, Baudrillard termed this project a critique of the political economy of the sign.  
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money.  In commodity exchange, money serves to alienate the object of exchange from 
the seller, allowing the object to be appropriated by the buyer. Gift exchange, by contrast, 
is defined (in part) by the absence of direct remuneration (monetary or otherwise); for this 
reason, gift exchange has been termed ‘symbolic exchange’ (Baudrillard, 1981). During 
symbolic exchange, because money does not interject, the object of exchange is 
inalienable from the giver. The phenomenological outcome of this inalienability is that gifts 
are symbolic of the giver or the relationship between giver and receiver. It is this meaning 
which is attributed to symbolic-value.  
To develop this logic clearly a further example is useful. As a commodity, objects and 
actions become alienated from those persons involved in exchange: the social 
relationship does not inhere in the commodity itself. As Carrier (1991) suggests: 
In commodity relationships people think of objects as abstract bundles of utilities 
and values that are precisely not unique...The buyer of a thousand barrels of Brent 
crude oil, an ounce of gold, a Baby Ruth candy bar, is satisfied with any item that 
meets the requisite criteria, because each is freely substitutable within its class 
(Carrier, 1991: 127).  
The value of the commodity is, relatively speaking, unaffected by the relationship within 
which it is exchanged; commodities are interchangeable, fungible, and (in theory at least) 
their value is equivalent to any other identical commodity. By contrast, objects exchanged 
as gifts are defined by the relationships within which they are exchanged; the identities of 
giver and receiver are paramount in defining this meaning. Baudrillard (1981) provides a 
colourful illustration of symbolic-value in the context of a wedding ring exchanged between 
two lovers. Wedding rings are, to varying degrees, subject to all forms of value – their use-
value may be relatively insignificant, while their exchange-value great (in monetary terms).  
However, understanding the meaning of the ring requires that we appreciate its symbolic-
value: 
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This is a unique object, symbol of the relationship between the couple. One would 
neither think of changing it (barring mishap) nor of wearing several… Fashion plays 
as negligible a role at the strictly symbolic level as at the level of pure instrumentality 
(Baudrillard, 1981: 66). 
The wedding ring is symbolic of the relationship between the couple. This symbolic quality 
is, in part, a socio-cultural referent (signifying betrothal to others). However, to those 
involved in exchange, the meaning of the ring concerns, primarily, the relationship within 
which it is exchanged.  It is this symbolic-value which distinguishes the ring given in 
symbolic exchange from the ring exchanged as commodity: the ring, as an object, 
becomes unique.   
In relating this insight to a reading of social resources, it is useful to incorporate the logic 
of symbolic-value into analysis. What this means, practically speaking, is attending to the 
social relationships within which social resources are exchanged, and considering the 
ways in which relationships give meaning to acts of support. These issues will be 
developed further in Chapter Seven through the analysis of participant data.  
6.5.3 Semiotic-value 
In addition to symbolic-value, Baudrillard posits that objects of symbolic exchange are 
subject to sign-value. For Baudrillard, sign-value refers to a logic of signification, and 
concerns the meaning of an object, act or gesture within a given cultural field.24 To 
illustrate sign-value, Baudrillard gives the example of a painting sold at auction. 
Baudrillard suggests that the painting may be subject to all value forms (exchange-value 
being paramount in the auction house). However, if, when the painting is sold, it achieves 
a price which makes it the most expensive painting in the world, then the painting 
assumes a particular sign-value. Once the painting becomes the most expensive painting 
                                                          
24 Baudrillard does not cite Barthes directly, but his interpretation of sign-value bears a 
close likeness to that of Barthes’ social semiotics as in Mythologies (1972).  
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in the world, it then signifies meanings such as prestige, status, and wealth. Whilst these 
values may be secondary to the painting’s exchange-value, Baudrillard contends that they 
must be appreciated if the value of the painting and the dynamics of exchange are to be 
understood.  
This insight – that actions, gestures, and objects signify meaning in cultural terms – is 
widely accepted within various social scientific perspectives. One such perspective is that 
of cultural anthropology. Geertz (1975), in particular, has argued productively that 
interpretive approaches must recognise the role of cultural semiotics in shaping individual 
meaning and social processes.25 Such an approach requires that the analysis of 
phenomenological descriptions, acts, and gestures, be theorised in terms of their cultural 
significance (that is to say: what these phenomena signify within given ‘webs of [cultural] 
significance’). In relating this insight to the exchange of social resources, it is important to 
consider how acts of support and assistance might be interpreted as culturally significant. 
Culturally constituted meaning may, of course, be experienced negatively: whilst 
Baudrillard discussed prestige, wealth and status, support may also signify failure, 
deviance or other unfavourable states.  In this sense, identifying the form and content of 
semiotic-values is important because these meaningful significations are likely to play a 
central role in shaping the individual’s experience of supportive practices. These issues 
will be developed further with participant data in Chapter Eight. 
In summarising symbolic-value and semiotic-value, these concepts may be understood as 
the meaning of a social exchange once use-value and exchange-value are bracketed-out 
of consideration. Symbolic-value refers to the inalienable quality conferred upon 
                                                          
25 Geertz’s interpretive semiotics builds upon Weber’s conceptualisation of meaningful 
action. As Geertz states: ‘The concept of culture I espouse… is essentially a semiotic one. 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not 
an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is 
explication I am after, construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical’ (Geertz, 
1975: 5) 
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supportive acts by the social relationship within which they exchanged. Semiotic-value 
refers to significance in cultural terms. These logics of value will be incorporated alongside 
the use- and exchange-value in the following chapter. 
6.6 Implications for this thesis 
The preceding chapter (Chapter Five) identified two issues – value and morality – which, it 
was suggested, are not sufficiently conceptualised within theory assumed in health 
research. In tracing the conceptual lineage of social capital, it has been argued that 
approaches to the study of social networks and social resources (as a form of personal 
capital) often suffer from an impoverished conceptualisation of human agency, and an 
understanding of social action which privileges instrumental or goal-oriented action.  
Against this, this chapter has presented an alternative approach to social exchange: gift 
exchange. It has been argued that gift exchange contributes more sophisticated readings 
of value and morality; the ways that these factors are to be addressed has been outlined 
in a preliminary fashion. This thesis will return now to participant data, and will expand 
upon the concepts introduced in this chapter.   
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Chapter Seven: The value forms of social resources 
 
… labour in so far as its results are use-values is distinct from labour in so far as its 
results are exchange-values (Marx, 1859: 8). 
Each of these precious things… has a productive capacity within itself. Each, as well 
as being a sign and surety of life, is also a sign of surety of wealth, a magico-
religious guarantee or rank and prosperity (Mauss,2011: 43). 
… objects are never completely separated from the men who exchange them 
(Mauss, 2011: 31). 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter takes up the question as to how social resources are experienced as 
meaningful social actions, and how this meaning affects and shapes the social practice of 
giving and receiving support during illness. As has already been identified, there is a 
tendency within existing literature to conceptualise social resources in a somewhat one-
dimensional manner, according to the function they fulfil (House, 1981; Van der Gaag and 
Snijders, 2005, 2008 ; Webber and Huxley, 2007). Chapter Five detailed three participant 
cases, and suggested that an instrumental or utilitarian perspective fails to appreciate 
important aspects of the experience of support. In the chapter immediately preceding this 
(Chapter Six), it was argued that these limitations are in fact the result of latent theoretical 
assumptions (concerning individualist social exchange, and utilitarian readings of social 
networks); this chapter applies a pluralist reading of value to deliver a more perceptive 
reading of meaning.  
The above quotations encapsulate the conceptual framework that will follow. Both Marx 
and Mauss were concerned with the ways in which objects and actions came to be 
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realised as valuable in the form of commodities and gifts.26 For Marx, the notions of use-
value and exchange-value were central to understanding the meaning of labour as a 
commodity in the capitalist mode of production. Mauss’ project, by contrast, concerned 
‘traditional’ societies and the meaning of objects and actions exchanged as gifts. This 
chapter adopts concepts emanating from these authors, and in particular, the writings of 
Baudrillard (1981) who incorporates aspects of both positions.  Accordingly, this chapter 
explores the ways in which supportive actions may be understood by the following modes 
of value:  
 Use-value 
 Semiotic-value 
 Symbolic-value    
 Exchange-value 
In the sections which follow, participant data will be presented and each logic of value will 
be addressed in turn. Finally, this chapter will conclude by illustrating how these four value 
forms coalesce and intersect during supportive practices in what will be termed an 
interpretive economy of meaning. 
 
                                                          
26 I use the terms ‘value’ and ‘meaning’ interchangeably. Graeber (2001) provides an 
excellent synthesis of the various ways in which ‘value’ has been conceptualised across 
the social sciences. Accordingly, value is addressed in different ways: in economics, value 
is treated generally in normative pecuniary terms; sociology has traditionally approached 
value in terms of the value(s) concerning what is good, proper or desirable in human life; 
finally, value in a linguistic sense which, following Saussure (1966) might simply be 
termed the ‘meaningful difference’ between sound images and their referent concepts – 
this is, principally, the way in which value has been considered in subsequent structuralist 
anthropology and cultural theory (Sahlins (1985) and Barthes (1972), for example). The 
need for pluralist conceptualisations of value has been highlighted recently by Skeggs 
(2014): ‘If we can only see from within the blinkers of capital’s logic we will never 
understand or recognize the values that live beyond value. Our own analysis will trap us 
into that which we are expected to reveal. We therefore, as sociologists, have a duty to 
look beyond and search for the gaps, the un-captured and better ways of being and doing’ 
(Skeggs, 2014: 16): it is in this spirit that this thesis applies a pluralist reading of value.  
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7.2 Use-value 
So far, this thesis has addressed use-value only briefly, and it has done so purely in 
conceptual terms by situating use-value in relation to the works of Marx, Mauss, and 
Baudrillard. For the purpose of analysis, however, thinking about use-value proceeds from 
a more pragmatic position.  What is meant by use-value is a particular logic of meaning 
whereby the meaning of an action is understood in terms of its instrumentality, its 
functionality, and its utility.  Considering acts of support and assistance in this way is 
common; however, it is important to identify whether or not such a logic is actually 
relevant to the experiences of participants in this study in terms of living with illness.27  
And this is indeed the case. Where participants discussed their experiences of support 
and assistance, the most immediately recognisable logic of meaning was that of utility.   
Bill, for example, spoke about the difficulties he encountered as a result of his OA, and in 
doing so, referenced the supportive actions of his family:  
My right shoulder …I’ve had a rotational cuff operation in the shoulder, which made 
a hell of an improvement, because it got so bad, you know, I couldn’t... I had to be 
helped to put a jacket on, you know, this motion [simulates arm movement].  I mean 
even that was agony. So you know somebody would put the sleeve in or, you know, 
I did it with great difficulty myself. 
 Bill, 1st Interview 
In the above quotation, Bill describes the supportive actions of others; Bill does this within 
a mini-narrative that is defined by a task – putting his jacket on. Bill identifies the 
consequences of his illness as making this task difficult; prior to an operation, Bill had 
limited range of movement in his shoulder, and he experienced very significant pain when 
                                                          
27 Use-value is common (albeit tacitly) in existing analyses and interpretations of social 
support and assistance. As has been identified throughout this thesis, approaches which 
address supportive practices in terms of their instrumental purpose and/or outcomes may 
be said to privilege utilitarian or instrumental reasoning (Van der Gaag and Snijders, 2005, 
2008; Webber and Huxley, 2007, for example).  
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completing activities such as getting dressed. In this instance, the primary meaning of the 
supportive act is the accomplishment of the task at hand with less pain and discomfort. In 
this sense, the actions of others are readily discernable in instrumental and utilitarian 
terms.   
Similar descriptions of support were apparent across all participants’ interviews. Most 
common were examples whereby friends and family provided incidental support and 
assistance.  Pamela’s example is representative of how many participants spoke about 
support: 
When we had the conservatory built I had to get rid of one of the borders... and so 
Cath [female neighbour]  came over with her mother who’s from XX [Town], her 
mother Elaine was staying with her so I’ve got to know her as well so they came 
over and helped me dig up my borders and pot things up. 
Pamela, 1st Interview 
The above quotation is taken from a wider discussion in which Pamela detailed her desire 
to continue gardening despite experiencing pain, fatigue, and limited mobility (through 
OA). In this example – as in the above example provided by Bill – the role of other people 
is presented as part of a task-oriented mini-narrative. In this instance, the task in question 
involves a degree of physical exertion which Pamela is unable to accomplish without 
assistance. Due to the fact that this mini-narrative is task-oriented, it is unsurprising that 
the role of other people should be presented in terms of their useful function – ‘they came 
over and helped me dig up my borders’. Given that Pamela identified the act of gardening 
as a valued activity, it would be reasonable to assume that receiving support in this way 
might also be experienced as leisurely, sociable, and self-actualising. However, in the 
above quotation – framed as it is within a task-oriented narrative – we see the principle 
meaning of this act as its utility.   
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The theme of utility was common to many participants’ discussions of social resources; 
however, utility was not interpreted in a universal way. Rather, participants considered 
utility in relative terms, and in a way which highlighted the connection between illness, 
individual needs, and the utility of others’ actions. Theo and Anne provide a clear 
illustration of this point. At the time of his second interview, Theo required little or no 
assistance in terms of physical support. However, due to a number of ‘mild’ strokes, Theo 
continued to live with cognitive challenges. As a result, when talking about the forms of 
support Theo required, Anne identified support in terms of the completion of tasks which 
involved cognitive abilities – in this example, attending medical appointments. 
Anne: ...he's had two strokes he tends to forget.  So I go in with him. 
Theo: Only on the dates and stuff. 
Anne:  And then the doctor will say ... He'll [Theo] say, 'I don't know.  It was just on 
the calendar I've got to come to see you.'  So, you know so it's that sort of 
thing, isn't it.  Yeah.  So I go in with him, but if I was to go and see the 
doctor I would just go in by myself.   
Int:  You say... you're [Theo] looking forward, as you said, to that independence, 
but you still want help - not help, but a bit of support when you go to the 
doctors? 
Theo: Yeah, yeah.  That's it, yeah. Because I get flummoxed.    
Theo and Anne, Theo’s 2nd Interview 
Theo’s illnesses do not affect his ability to complete everyday physical activities (as in the 
above examples of Bill and Pamela). Instead, Theo’s illnesses present particular 
challenges which mean that he requires support in completing tasks involving memory or 
calculation. In the above example, Theo is supported in accomplishing one such task. 
This form of support is identified by Theo as necessary and useful: ‘Because I get 
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flummoxed’. The utility of this form of support is relative to Theo’s illness and concomitant 
needs. The relative nature of utility is emphasised in Anne’s statement that ‘if I was to go 
and see the doctor I would just go in by myself’. This example illustrates that the meaning 
of utility is particular to individual cases; whilst utility may not be entirely relative, 
understanding how people appraise the utility of an action requires that we consider their 
particular illnesses, needs, and their ability to complete desired tasks independently of 
others.   
For some participants, considerations of utility were apparent when deciding who to 
approach for support and assistance (support seeking).  This was more often the case 
where participants described particular supportive needs, or complex supportive acts.  
Some participants described circumstances whereby the specificity of their needs resulted 
in ‘useful’ support being difficult to attain: as the complexity of support increased, fewer 
family and friends possessed the qualities or abilities necessary to support in a useful 
way. In these circumstances, some participants actively evaluated whether or not 
somebody would be able to provide support in a useful way. This is apparent in James’ 
experience of support during OA. During this experience, James needed emotional 
support and somebody to talk to about the physical and existential challenges posed by 
OA.I asked James whether there were particular people within his social network that he 
was able to rely upon for this form of support:  
I’ve got a mate of 70, he’s as fit... no arthritis, nothing. He’s only just started losing a 
bit of hair!  It’s not even white, it’s still jet black, and when you… when I go out 
walking with him you know and he’s bloody striding ahead up these hills I think ‘you 
jammy bastard!’  [Laughs].  So obviously he wouldn’t know what you were talking 
about. I think he… you know, people have to go… for them to be any use they’ve 
got to have had a similar experience so to… which I suppose is logical. Until you 
can usefully share an experience you've got to have actually had it. 
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James, 1st Interview 
James reflects upon his friend’s ability to ‘usefully share’ the experience of illness and in 
doing so, James evaluates the capacity of his friend to show empathy and to talk 
knowledgably about illness. James states that because this friend has not experienced 
OA, he lacks the qualities needed to provide this form of support. James phrases this 
appraisal in terms of utility: ‘for them to be any use they’ve got to have had a similar 
experience’. James’ appraisal as to the utility of his friend informs his attitude towards 
seeking support: ‘he wouldn’t know what you were talking about’.  This example 
emphasises further that utility is a distinct line of meaning, and one which shapes 
decision-making during illness. Furthermore, James’ example highlights that more 
complex and non-physical forms of support (emotional support, for example) are also 
interpreted in terms of the accomplishment of a supportive action. It is within this task-
oriented framework – the amelioration of emotional, psychological and existential 
concerns – that James considers whether or not his friend will be ‘any use’.   
The theme of utility was common to all participants’ discussions of social resources. 
Examples of supportive acts were referenced widely in terms of their place in the 
accomplishment of a desired task or activity. Accordingly, social resources were 
conceived within a framework of instrumental action and interpreted as meaningful 
according to a logic of utility. The above examples indicate the relativity of utility – as 
something linked to an individual’s particular illness, their capabilities, and their desired 
activities. It has also been suggested that the evaluation of utility plays a role in informing 
who to approach for support. In summary, whilst this thesis argues for an understanding of 
supportive acts as meaningful in multi-faceted ways, the above examples underscore the 
fact that utility remains an important and enduring aspect of meaning.  
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7.3 Semiotic-value 
As has been outlined within Chapter Six (Theoretical review), a semiotic approach is one 
which seeks to understand the significance of gestures, objects, and actions within a 
given culture. As such, this form of meaning is distinct from other values which have their 
seat in the individual (an affective or psychological response) or in particular social 
relationships. Semiotic-value is drawn from collectively recognised or culturally defined 
meanings. This section incorporates Mauss’ insight into the cultural significance of gift 
exchange, and seeks to identify the signified meaning – the semiotic-value – of particular 
social resources 
As an illustration of semiotic-value, we might consider first the example provided by David. 
During his first interview, David identified a friend (Eric) he considered to be particularly 
supportive; David gave several examples of the ways in which his friend supported him 
during illness. However, throughout the interview (as was the case in most interviews) I 
was keen to understand whether there were any forms of support David felt unable to ask 
for: 
Int: Is there anything you feel you, you couldn't ask for?    
David: His missus. [laughs]  She's bloody gorgeous. No, no, I could ask for anything.  
Anything at all.  If I said to Eric, 'Can you lend me 500 quid?' he'd go and get 
me 500 quid, you know.  No problem, like. 
David, 2nd Interview 
In the above example, David states that he feels able to ask for ‘Anything at all’, and 
supports this statement with a hypothetical example involving money. The use of money 
in this instance is not coincidental; money functions as a rhetorical device, as something 
which might otherwise be considered unacceptable.  To understand this meaning, we 
must consider the meaning of money not simply in economic terms, but in terms its 
cultural significance. In David’s example, the meaning of money might be interpreted as 
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drawing upon a culturally recognised system of normative wage/labour relationships. 
Within this example, no labour is exchanged between David and his friend, and so the 
exchange of money appears to be in some sense remarkable. David, whether tacitly or 
not, recognises this meaning and plays upon it in demonstrating that this relationship 
transcends the conventions of economic exchange. Instead, this relationship involves 
qualities which enable David to take money without providing anything in return 
(illustrating these qualities being the purpose of his statement). Alternatively, we might 
point to the fact that David chooses a particularly large sum of money to evidence his 
point. The figure of £500 functions in a way that £50 would not. The large sum of money 
plays upon a collective recognition as to the economic value of £500, and serves to 
illustrate that a high degree of trust exists between both men. Whether or not we choose 
to accept either of these particular readings, it is a point of fact that David’s statement 
would not function were it not for the cultural significance of money. David invites us to 
recognise this significance, and in doing so, demonstrates that he is able to ask ‘Anything 
at all’ of his friend.  
Among other participants’ interviews, the cultural significance of social resources was 
evident where supportive acts were presented as gendered actions. Mo, for example, 
described the role of certain people in within her social network:  
My son-in-law’s next door as well.  He’s a plumber so any – and he’s quite handy so 
any sort of big jobs or anything then he’s, he’s sort of pretty good with that.  And my 
daughter’s sort of quite good, you know, if we have a bit of a flare up and… you 
know, I say to her ‘Oh, do me a favour’ and she’ll sort of, you know, hoover up and 
polish and … do the bits and bobs like that. 
Mo, 1st Interview  
In the above quotation, Mo makes a distinction between ‘big jobs’ and ‘bits and bobs’. Mo 
identifies ‘big jobs’ with her son-in-law, and ‘bits and bobs’ with her daughter; in doing so, 
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Mo provides a gendered account of support. Mo’s choice of phrasing suggests that she 
considers ‘big jobs’ to be more significant, demanding or important than ‘bits and bobs’.28 
We might easily interpret this as Mo according male labour with greater importance than 
female labour. Elsewhere, Rose also identified certain supportive acts with female family 
members:  
Jenny, who he lives with, she comes on a Saturday afternoon and cleans all through 
and does all through for me. And then Alice will come during the week and she’ll run 
the Hoover round. But I can’t do a lot of things now, which annoys me 
Rose, 1st Interview 
In considering the meaning of these supportive acts, we might think primary of utility; 
Rose emphasises utility in stating that she is unable to complete these actions without the 
help of others.  However, Rose’s account also makes plain the association between 
domestic labour and female family members. In this sense, the meaning of these 
supportive acts must be understood both in terms of utility and also, in cultural terms, as 
gendered actions. 
A more lucid illustration of social resources as gendered actions was provided by Bill and 
Cath. The following interview excerpt is taken from a discussion about the role of 
neighbours in providing support: 
Bill: There’s a lad just across the way, he’s a mechanic and, and he goes to 
anybody, you know, he’ll, he helps anybody, doesn’t he? 
Cath: Who, Chris? 
Bill: Chris. 
                                                          
28 I understood ‘bits and bobs’ to mean domestic labour within the home.  
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Cath: Oh, yes, he’s a car mechanic… 
Bill:  Chris and David… 
Cath: …and then the fellow next…and then David, the fellow next door… 
Bill: …comes if you’ve any problems with the television. 
Cath: …say if you want anything electrical doing or fix-it jobs, he just comes 
across. 
Bill and Cath, Bill’s 1st Interview 
Bill and Cath identify ‘fix-it jobs’ (tasks involving skill and technical expertise) as the 
preserve of male neighbours.  As they continued this discussion, Bill and Cath proceeded 
to identify the forms of support provided by their granddaughter (Ellen): 
Bill: Granddaughter, Ellen, she does our, comes and… 
Cath: She comes and helps and does a little bit for me, you know, when she can… 
Bill: Cleaning. 
Cath: …because she’s working and she’s going to… 
Bill: She’s going in for nursing. 
Cath: …college and for nursing… but she does come and give me a bit of a hand. 
Bill and Cath, Bill’s 1st Interview 
Here again, domestic labour is associated with female family members. Bill and Cath also 
make a connection between this form of support and their granddaughter’s desire to 
become a nurse. In this instance I felt that Bill and Cath were inferring that their 
granddaughter has an aptitude for this form of work.   
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The above examples are representative of many other cases wherein acts of support and 
assistance were discussed in terms of normative gender roles. Accordingly, domestic 
work was associated widely with female labour, while manual, technical and mechanical 
tasks were associated with male labour. It is important to recognise that there is nothing 
‘natural’ about this division of labour, nor is it simply a reflection of an empirical reality: 
gendered divisions are constituted by reality, but they are also constitutive of it. For the 
above participants, the acts of support and assistance described may have been 
understood primarily in terms of their utility.  However, in seeking to understand the 
meaning of social resources in a more holistic way, we must also recognise the culturally 
constituted meaning of these actions as gendered activities. 
A further instance of semiotic-value was apparent as participants spoke about the 
meaning of intimate and personal care. Although this form of support was not widely 
experienced by participants in this study (only two participants reported having received 
this form of support), many identified personal care as a particularly meaningful activity. 
David, for example, spoke at length about his daughter’s willingness to assist him in 
whatever way he might need (including domestic work, the provision of transport, and 
even co-habitation). However, when asked whether he would ever feel uncomfortable 
asking for support, David replied: 
Oh, if I get ... if somebody had to come and help me shower, I wouldn’t be happy 
with her doing it, you know. 
David, 2nd Interview 
David was quick to identify personal care as something he considered problematic. 
Despite the strength of their relationship, David considers personal care to be 
inappropriate or unacceptable. Elsewhere, Isla raised similar concerns when talking about 
her best friend and neighbour. Isla identified this friend as the most important person in 
her life, she reflected: ‘It’s amazing really what she does’.  However, as with David 
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(above) Isla was adamant that some forms of support were not appropriate within this 
relationship: 
Int:  Is there anything you’d be embarrassed to ask for or…? 
Isla:  I don’t think she could do anything personal.  I don’t think she could do 
anything like that. 
Int:  You wouldn’t want her to? 
Isla: No, oh no.  I think that would be a problem from that angle.  But she’ll do 
anything else, but I think if I needed help that way I don’t think she could do 
that.   
Isla, 1st Interview 
Isla’s comments reveal the powerfully emotive meaning of personal care: even within her 
closest supportive relationship, Isla considers this form of support to be embarrassing and 
unacceptable.   
The above examples are representative of several participants’ comments regarding 
personal care. As in the (above) consideration of gender, we must be mindful against 
dismissing such responses as ‘natural’. Rather, the meaning of personal care should be 
recognised as, in part, culturally constituted. Accordingly, the meaning of personal care 
may be understood by reference to cultural norms concerning the body, bodily control, 
and privacy. One approach to the issues of bodily control and shame has been to refer to 
Elias’ theory of the ‘civilizing process’ whereby the body becomes socialised, rationalised, 
and individualised (Elias, 2000). From such a perspective, the body does not have a 
neutral relationship with culture or society. Rather, the meaning and practices of bodily 
functions come to be shaped by social, cultural and political forces (Shilling, 1993). Under 
such conditions, control over the body and self-discipline become paramount, and the 
‘correct’ functioning of the body is tied to individual and collective representations of self 
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and identity (Gilleard and Higgs, 2013).  Accordingly, what it means to be a ‘dignified 
individual’ concerns control over the body and ensuring the privacy of intimate moments. 
In the examples of David and Isla, we might interpret personal care as significant in these 
terms; personal care in this sense signifies a personal failure or the transgression of 
cultural norms, invoking shame and embarrassment.   
A further semiotic-value was apparent as participants identified support and assistance as 
signifying dependence and independence. Ian is exemplary of many participants in this 
regard. When asked about the role of other people in his life, Ian responded by stressing 
his own capabilities: 
‘In general things, they don’t have to do anything for me, you know? And, in fact, I 
feel better doing it myself, you know… If I want to get on with something, you know, 
I do it.’   
Ian, 2nd Interview 
Ian expresses a sense of fulfilment at being able to act independently and without the 
support of others; in this sense, Ian is typical of most participants in representing 
independence as a positive characteristic. However, accompanying such positive 
representations of independence were negative attitudes towards the receipt of care. Isla, 
for example, spoke about the prospect of asking for support:   
I’m the sort of person that doesn’t do that kind of thing [ask for support].  Too 
independent I suppose. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla, like many participants, considered independence to be a virtuous characteristic. In 
the above quotation, Isla identifies herself positively as ‘the sort of person who doesn’t do 
that kind of thing’. Although implicit, I gained a sense throughout her interviews that Isla 
 163 
 
considered support-seeking to be a sign of personal failure.  In a similar fashion, Mary 
also distinguished herself as an independent person: 
I wouldn’t like to be a person who was always on the phone, “I can’t do this and I 
can’t do that”, I’ve never done that. 
Mary, 1st Interview 
Mary presents herself positively as an independent person and contrasts herself to 
another hypothetical persona – the ‘person who was always on the phone’. Mary invokes 
the voice of this other person in saying ‘I can’t do this and I can’t do that’. The tone of 
Mary’s response suggested that to ask for support may be seen as being demanding or 
burdensome. Further, there was also a sense that having to ask for support may be 
avoided through working hard to maintain independence.  In the examples of David, Isla 
and Mary we gain insight into the cultural meaning of independence and dependency. 
Across participants’ accounts, independence was presented as virtuous whist receiving 
support was associated with dependency and seen as an aberrant act.  These themes did 
not adhere to any particular type of support; rather the meaning of independence and 
dependence were presented as undesirable in most acts of support.29    
In summarising the logic of semiotic-value, it is important to note that some forms of 
meaning are irreducible to individual psychology, or to co-constructed meanings particular 
to certain social relationships. In this regard, social resources have a semiotic-value 
where they signify meaning within a cultural system. The above examples illustrate how 
this form of meaning might coalesce with other value forms; money, for example, has both 
a cultural and an economic value. Participants’ discussions of social resources revealed a 
number of semiotic-values. Specifically: social resources as gendered activities, intimate 
care as a personal failure and the cause of shame and embarrassment, and the meaning 
                                                          
29 The themes of independence and dependence will be addressed further in the following 
chapter.  
 164 
 
of dependence as a form of aberrant act. These meanings were not immutable and were 
discussed with some diversity among participants. In general, however, the cultural 
significance of particular acts of support is an important consideration in comprehending 
social resources as meaningful social actions.   
7.4 Symbolic-value 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in symbolic exchange (as opposed to commodity 
exchange), the object or action exchanged is experienced as inalienable. This 
inalienability results in the exchange deriving meaning from the identity of the giver and 
the relationship within which exchange takes place. In supportive acts we can think of 
symbolic-value in similar terms. Symbolic-value does not pertain to any innate quality of 
the supportive act, nor does it refer directly to its cultural significance. Rather, symbolic-
value recognises that social resources may, like gifts, be experienced as inalienable – the 
giver gives-of-themselves, and the meaning of this action is shaped by the relationship 
within which it is exchanged.  
As an illustration of symbolic-value in practice, we might consider David’s experience of 
caring for others. David spoke about his experience of caring for a long-term friend 
(David’s friend lived alone and required care as a result of blindness and Alzheimer’s 
disease). David supported his friend by maintaining her home and garden, by preparing 
meals and ensuring her safety generally. These forms of support might typically be 
understood in terms of their utility; however, as David spoke about this experience, it 
became clear that these supportive acts had assumed another meaning:  
David:  She started with Alzheimer’s, so then I was having to do her shopping and 
pay her bills and one thing and another, not that I minded, but you’re tied. 
You know, if you go on holiday you’ve got to arrange for somebody to go 
and do the shopping for her. You’ve got to make sure her dinners are going 
to be there when, when they should be and you’re doing a lot of running 
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about for nothing, really. So, if anybody wants any help I’ll come and, I’ll 
give them the best I can, but it won’t be on a long-term basis.  
Int:  Is that because of that experience you’ve had then? 
David:  Yeah, it makes life very difficult for you, especially when they’re no relation 
to you, you know. If my daughter was in a situation where she wanted help, 
then that’s a different ballgame. 
David, 2nd Interview 
As a care giver, David was required to devote an increasing amount of time and energy 
towards the care and safety of his friend. In the above quotation, David reflects upon this 
by stating ‘not that I minded, but you’re tied’. In this sense, David emphasises the degree 
to which he felt responsible for his friend, and suggests that this responsibility began to 
impinge upon his life. The demands of this care-giving role became such that David felt 
his own freedom curtailed. David suggests that were a similar situation to occur again, he 
would not allow himself to become committed on a ‘long-term basis’. In concluding his 
comments, however, David informs us that ‘If my daughter was in a situation where she 
wanted help, then that’s a different ballgame’.  
The meaning of support in this example may not be understood by recourse to the 
concepts of use-value or semiotic-value alone: what is required is the concept of 
symbolic-value. Recalling parallels with gift exchange, symbolic-value refers to the 
meaning of the exchanged object in terms of the giver, and the relationship between giver 
and receiver. In this example, David expresses the sense by which he was required to 
give-of-himself; he commits to the responsibilities of care and relinquishes personal 
freedom. Further, symbolic-value requires us to consider this meaning as relative to 
particular relationships.30 This is apparent in David’s assertion that should the same 
                                                          
30 Recalling Baudrillard’s analysis of the wedding ring: ‘This is a unique object, symbol of 
the relationship between the couple. One would neither think of changing it (barring 
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situation occur involving his daughter, he would be happier to provide such care and 
support. Symbolic-value in this example captures the sense by which Ian gives-of-himself, 
and also the relativity of this meaning to particular social relationships.  
Elsewhere, participants evoked symbolic-value in conveying the significance of supportive 
actions which might otherwise be considered somewhat mundane. Judith, for example, 
spoke about the transport provided by a friend (Liz). Across all participants, transport was 
the most commonly cited form of social resource received, and was usually discussed in 
terms of utility. For Judith, however, this supportive act was experienced not simply as 
useful, but as symbolically valuable: 
When my husband was working, Liz was always there for me although she lives out 
at XX [15 miles away] someone is there to have… when I first left work I was going 
to the doctor’s every week, he made me go every week, I had an appointment every 
week so if David [husband] wasn’t here… I’ve seen that woman [friend] come at 8 
o’clock in the morning from XX [15 miles away] in her nighty with a coat over it just 
to take me to the doctor’s and she’s sat in the car park while I’ve gone in, brought 
me home then gone back home and got a shower or whatever she does then, you 
know, because she’s had to come out at half past seven you see because of the 
traffic.  I couldn’t wish for a better friend. 
Judith, 1st Interview 
In the above excerpt, Judith seeks to demonstrate the significance of this supportive act, 
and she does so in a manner which highlights the ways that her friend has given an 
inalienable part of herself. Judith’s commentary is laden with references to the sacrifice 
                                                          
mishap) nor of wearing several’(Baudrillard, 1981: 66). The meaning of the ring is 
particular to the relationship within which it is exchanged; similarly, the meaning of 
supportive acts are particular to the relationships within which they are given and 
received.  
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and difficulties her friend has experienced in providing her with this support: her friend was 
required to travel some distance (15 miles) to support her; there are multiple references to 
‘every week’ (conveying the regular and long-term nature of support); the imagery of her 
friend waiting in a car-park whilst still wearing her night clothes; and the wider disruption of 
her friend’s daily routine. In providing us with this commentary, Judith emphasises the 
meaning of this resource in terms of what her friend has given-of-herself: her time, energy, 
and freedom. For Judith, the provision of transport is neither mundane nor simply 
utilitarian; to understand why this is the case, we require an appreciation of the symbolic-
value of this supportive act.   
Symbolic-value was also apparent where particular social relationships enabled otherwise 
problematic forms of support to be exchanged – this was most apparent in relation to 
personal care. As has already been identified, personal care was cited widely in negative 
terms as something which could not be exchanged between family and friends. However, 
where participants spoke of personal care being acceptable, it was often specific social 
relationships which made this possible. One example was provided by Judith: 
I mean I’ve got my husband here, like he has to help me, I can’t get in the bath any 
more...  So he has to help me you see.  I can step, he’ll help me to get over the bath 
because it is painful to do that and he’s put me a thing on the wall to hang on to and 
he has to help, he has to wash me down at the back because I can’t reach me back, 
you know.  He helps me like that then he helps me out.  If I need my hair washing…I 
have my hair done once a week but if I need it washing in between he’ll do it for me. 
Judith, 1st Interview  
In the above quotation, Judith describes intimate care in neutral terms; she does not 
consider such care to be in any way embarrassing or shameful. During her interview, I 
interpreted Judith’s relationship with her husband as playing an important role in this 
supportive act, and the fact that this form of care was acceptable was attributable, largely, 
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to the relationship within which it was exchanged. Elsewhere, Mo also identified the 
importance of particular social relationships in defining the meaning of personal care:  
I’d probably feel comfortable with, with my daughter, because I was there at both – 
she’s got two children, I was there at the births and things.  So there’s… it’s a 
different sort of bond that you have with your daughters.  So any sort of personal 
things I’d, you know, if it ever came to that, it wouldn’t bother me my daughter sort of 
helping in that way.  It probably would with my son … I think he’d … he’d be more 
than willing to do it, but I wouldn’t like him to. 
Mo, 1st Interview 
Mo identifies the meaning of personal care as relative to particular relationships; this form 
of care would be acceptable when provided by her daughter, but unacceptable when 
provided by her son. Mo emphasises particular qualities in her relationship with her 
daughter, stating ‘it’s a different sort of bond that you have with your daughters’.  Clearly, 
this dynamic may associated with the gendered nature of familial relationships. However, 
Mo also emphasises the fact that she has shared in the experience of her daughter giving 
birth and suggests that sharing such intimate experiences has ameliorated any anxiety 
and stigma which might usually be attached to intimate care. In this sense, the symbolic-
value conferred by this relationship moderates the meaning of intimate care away from a 
stigmatised act, rather it comes to be regarded as an act of intimate co-operation which is 
acceptable to Mo.  
For some participants, however, symbolic-value was experienced as problematic and 
meant that even relatively minor acts of support were deemed inappropriate. Mo, for 
example, spoke about the prospect of asking her best-friend for support:  
If I asked… she’d help, you know. But, she’s got a family as well that she’s… you 
know, very involved in.  So, I’ve not had to ask her for any help… because I’ve got, 
you know, my own family will do it for me. 
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Mo, 1st Interview 
When talking about this friendship, Mo struggled to define the extent to which the 
relationship would sustain supportive acts.  In the above quotation, Mo equivocates in 
stating that support would be available, and yet she would be reluctant to ask for it. To 
understand why this is the case requires us to consider the meaning of support as 
indissoluble from Mo’s interpretation of this friendship.  Mo feels that to receive support 
within this relationship would be to ask too much of her friend. Mo illustrates this by stating 
that ‘she’s got a family as well that she’s… you know, very involved’. Mo affirms the 
relative meaning of support by stating that ‘my own family will do it for me’, demonstrating 
that the same supportive acts would be interpreted differently when provided by a member 
of her own family.  
In summary, there is an inalienable quality to non-economic exchange which sees 
meaning linked to the identities and to the relationship between those individuals involved 
in exchange. This form of meaning is conceptualised as symbolic-value. In the above 
examples, it has been demonstrated that without the alienating force of money, social 
resources are often experienced as inalienable from the person giving support. This is 
evident in the ways that a giver of support is understood to be giving-of-themselves. Some 
participants spoke about this aspect of meaning in a problematic fashion, as something 
which made social resources difficult to accept from friends and family. However, it has 
also been demonstrated that symbolic-value has the potential to mitigate the stigmatised 
meaning of certain forms of support, thus making them less problematic and more 
acceptable.   
7.5 Exchange-value  
Participants spoke about supportive exchanges, overwhelmingly, as occurring outside of 
commodity exchange. Despite this, several participants also identified supportive actions 
within formal economic relationships. Further, it was also apparent that for some, the logic 
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of economic exchange continued to shape the meaning of supportive symbolic exchanges 
(non-commodity exchanges). In recognition of these issues, this section details the 
contribution of exchange-value in defining the meaning of social resources.   
For some participants, the meaning of supportive acts was informed by knowledge of the 
equivalent cost of support in economic terms. Judith, for example, discussed her feelings 
about providing support to her friend:  
I said, “Liz, you’re not coming from XX [town]...  you’re not having a taxi, I’ll come for 
you”, because I used to have a taxi you see... they’re too much £5 there and £5 
back, you know. 
Judith, 1st Interview 
Judith presents herself as taking control and demanding that her friend accept the offer of 
transport. Judith is motivated by her knowledge as to the equivalent cost of this support 
from an economic provider – ‘they’re too much £5 there and £5 back’. Judith feels this 
price to be too high, and that she is able to provide the same support at minimal cost to 
herself. As a result, Judith implores her friend to accept support rather than paying for a 
taxi. This example illustrates clearly that whist social resources, by their nature, are 
exchanged within social relations (rather than economic relations), there is the potential 
for economic logic to endure and shape meaning. Judith is aware of the exchange-value 
of transport, and this knowledge contributes to her understanding of transport as a 
meaningful social resource.  
The most common instances of exchange-value came as participants struggled with the 
meaning of symbolic-value. In these cases, participants worried about asking ‘too much’ 
of their friends and family, and paying for support was widely identified as preferable.  
Pamela, for example, spoke about her decision to pay for domestic support rather than 
relying upon her family: 
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I mean it’s unrealistic to expect... you know Louisa is the nearest really and then I’ve 
got a brother in XX [15 miles away] and, my cousins are in XX [20 miles away] and 
my nieces are in XX [20 miles away]... and my brother and his wife and their two 
sons were in XX [100 miles away].… So the physical part of it... yeah we can afford 
to have some help. 
Pamela, 2nd Interview 
Pamela believes that it is ‘unrealistic to expect’ her family to support her because they live 
15-20 miles away: to ‘expect’ such support would be to ask too much of them.  Instead, 
Pamela employs a professional cleaner to provide this support.  In paying for domestic 
support, Pamela avoids asking her friends and family and this is experienced as less 
problematic. Elsewhere, David also worried about asking too much of his friends, and 
identified paying for support as less complicated: 
It’d be easier just to pay them. I know… I know that they [friends] would do it, but 
then again it’s committing them, and they’ve got their lives to live as well as me, you 
know, so it wouldn’t be right to expect them to come round here two or three times a 
week to help me out. Occasionally, no problem, but it, it wouldn’t be right to expect 
them to, to do anything on a long term. Just pay them. 
David, 2nd Interview 
David states that his friends are willing to support him; however, he does not feel 
comfortable with the prospect of receiving support over an extended period of time: ‘it’s 
committing them, and they’ve got their lives to live’. As a result, David proposes that 
paying for professional care would be ‘easier’.  In paying for support, the meaning of 
symbolic-value is no longer predominant, and support becomes less problematic and 
easier to accept.31   
                                                          
31 The reasons as to why accepting support and assistance might be difficult and 
problematic will be addressed in the following chapter. At this point, for the purpose of 
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The above examples highlight that exchange-value continues to inform the meaning of 
supportive acts, particularly where support is exchanged as a commodity. For some 
participants, the interjection of money altered the meaning of exchange.  Most notable 
was the effect of money in moderating the symbolic-value of supportive acts. In 
considering why this occurred, one plausible explanation is to recognise the power of 
money as an alienating force. As has been argued (above), a supportive act exchanged 
within symbolic exchange is experienced as inalienable. However, an economic 
transaction allows for the same supportive act to become alienated from the giver in 
exchange for immediate remuneration. As a result, where social resources were 
discussed as commodities, they were no longer referenced in terms of their symbolic-
value. Where this occurred, participants experienced economic exchange as easier or 
less problematic, and several participants identified economic providers as preferable to 
receiving support and assistance from friends and family.  
7.6 Social resource exchange: an interpretive economy of meaning 
This chapter has identified four distinct logics of meaning: use-value, semiotic-value, 
symbolic-value, and exchange-value. For the purpose of clarity, it has been necessary to 
introduce each of these aspects in an individuated way as independently occurring logics 
of meaning. However, in practice, participants did not always discuss meaning in such 
neat or disambiguated terms. Instead, these logics of meaning were represented by 
participants as coalescing and intersecting in what might be termed an interpretive 
economy of meaning (see Figure 1).   
 
 
                                                          
clarity, this chapter addresses the dynamics of this exchange in terms of meaning and 
value alone.  
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The above model is useful for our understanding of social resources, particularly in cases 
where exchange appears complex and meaning is seemingly ambiguous. The following 
section illustrates, using just two examples, the way that these various forms of meaning 
are experienced in social practice.  
As a preliminary example, we might consider David’s second interview. During this 
interview David spoke at length about what he considered to be a meaningful difference 
between instances of one-off support, and support provided over an extended period of 
time. David stated that he would not feel comfortable asking his friends for long-term 
support, and he then proceeded to discuss one example in detail: 
Int: Is it easier to ask for the help on a one off basis then? 
Social 
Resource
Use-value
Exchange-
value
Semotic-
value
Symbolic-
value
Figure 2: Interpretive Economy of Meaning 
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David: Yeah, I wouldn’t expect anybody to come and... look after me full time you 
know. I’ve, I’ve got a new hedge cutter in the garage. I think I’ve used it 
twice, and I said to Jim (male neighbour) the other day, next door, he does 
a bit of gardening... I said, ‘When you cut your hedge,’ I said, ‘come and cut 
my side.’ All right, it’ll cost me a tenner, but he’ll be out there while I’m 
bloody thinking about it.  
Int: So you, you give him a tenner did you? 
David: I give him a tenner when he comes round and cuts the grass, cuts the 
hedge for me.  
Int: Does that make it... does that make it different again, if you give, if you just 
give someone a tenner? 
David: He’s the only, the, the only one I do give money to. I don’t give it to 
anybody else.  
Int: Is it... I mean this isn’t easy to explain, maybe, but why do you give him 
money? 
David: Because he does it for a living. 
Int: Ah I see... 
David: He’s, he’s out nearly every day gardening somewhere, it’s basically a job. 
So you can’t expect him to come and cut it for nothing. But my mate up, 
down the road there, he’d come and cut it me for nothing, but he’s got his 
hands full with his brother. He’s looked after him for the past 10 years, you 
know, and I wouldn’t expect him to come and do it. 
Int: Right... 
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David: But, as I say, Jim (male neighbour) does it for a living... so you can’t expect 
him to cut mine, mine for nothing, and then go and charge the bloke next 
door for cutting his, can you? 
David, 2nd Interview 
In the above example, several distinct lines of meaning may be discerned, each of which 
must be considered if we are to understand this example in its entirety. Firstly, we might 
consider the immediate meaning of this social resource in terms of its utility relative to 
Ian’s needs and capabilities. Elsewhere in his interview, David stated that he took 
enjoyment in keeping a well-maintained garden; however, as a result of OA, David is no 
longer able to undertake the amount of physical activity he once did. Consequently, David 
is unable to keep up with gardening alone and needs supporting in this way. From this 
perspective, it is easy to recognise the support provided by David’s neighbour in 
instrumental terms as necessary to the accomplishment of a desired activity – its use-
value is clear.  
Beyond this immediate utilitarian meaning, any interpretation as to a semiotic-value might 
be inappropriate – after all, what cultural significance might hedge-cutting possibly 
assume? We might reasonably question whether this form of support has a gendered 
aspect to it; it is possible that David considers this form of support to be ‘male work’, and it 
is interesting to note that David did not mention his daughter or a female neighbour in this 
example. However, given the data available in this quotation, any further assumptions 
would be somewhat tenuous.   
The most striking feature of this exchange is, therefore, David’s decision to pay his 
neighbour for support. That David should pay his neighbour may seem incongruous given 
the apparently informal nature of their relationship and this is emphasised by David’s 
confirmation that this neighbour is the only person he pays for support. However, when 
asked why he pays this neighbour, David states clearly that this is because his neighbour 
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is a gardener by profession. Recalling Mauss’ observation of gift exchange whereby 
‘objects are never completely separated from the men who exchange them’, this may be 
recognised as a form of symbolic-value. David pays his neighbour because this specific 
form of support (gardening) when given by this specific individual (a gardener) has a 
particular inalienable quality. To receive this form of supportive act without payment would 
be to take too much of this person, it would be asking them to give of themselves in an 
inappropriate fashion. David confirms this supposition in stating that he would happily 
receive this form of support without payment from another friend. However, David then 
states this is not possible due to his friend’s existing care responsibilities; asking this 
friend for support would be to ask too much of him (here again, meaning in terms of 
symbolic-value). In paying for support and introducing exchange-value, the support of 
Ian’s neighbour is transformed into a commodity. Once commodified, the meaning of this 
supportive exchange is altered fundamentally: the supportive act becomes alienated from 
his neighbour, symbolic-value is diminished and the supportive act is no longer 
experienced in terms of the neighbour giving-of-himself. Rather, David’s neighbour 
provides a service which is bought according to the norms of economic exchange. With 
the ascendency of exchange-value, other forms of meaning recede, and David feels 
comfortable accepting support. 
As a further illustration of the interpretive economy of meaning, Isla provides an 
interesting example. As was outlined in Chapter Five, Isla has no local family (her son 
lives approximately 150 miles away), yet she is very well connected in her immediate 
neighbourhood as well as the wider community. When talking about support, Isla identified 
a small circle of friends who provide her with regular support and assistance. In the 
following quote, Isla began to detail the supportive roles people by members of this group: 
Int: so does it feel like you’ve got a circle of friends? 
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Isla: Oh yes, yes.  Indeed yes, yes.  Different people do different things.  Like I 
get... the people who take me to church and... I try not to... you see, I look 
at it this way:  I get this money to pay for these things and so I have a taxi.  
I have a taxi – I have a regular booking every Wednesday with XX 
[company].  I take my scooter on the taxi... I go with my neighbour next 
door and we do different things.  Go to the supermarket and we do – 
nothing exciting, but we go out and we have lunch out.  But if I needed to 
go again somewhere I would have the taxi, you see.   
Int: Okay, you’d rather use the… 
Isla: Oh yes, yes.  Because you see, another thing, you see… I mean I have a 
wheelchair as well, but the people that deal with me are in my age – not 
necessarily particularly in my age group, but round and about my age 
group, and are not really able now to lift wheelchairs and things into the 
boot, so that is a problem.   
Int: So thinking about the taxi example then, there’s a physical reason there 
why you... 
Isla: Yes, yeah. 
 Int:  And does it feel comfortable paying for it? 
Isla: Oh yes.  I prefer it, yes, yes.  They’re very, very good, the taxi men.   
Isla, 1st Interview 
Isla’s health and mobility are such that she is only able to walk a few yards without 
assistance. Due to her limited mobility, Isla spends the majority of her time confined to the 
downstairs rooms of her home. As a result, the occasional visits she makes – to the local 
church, shopping, lunches with friends – are paramount to her wellbeing.  In this context, 
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the provision of transport support is essential to Isla’s continuing social engagement, the 
maintenance of relationships, and her participation in valued activities. In this regard, 
having somebody who will drive her and assist her physically in these activities has a 
clear instrumental role; Isla would find these activities impossible without support.  
However, the meaning of this transport in this example is not limited to utility alone. Isla 
states that because her friends are of a similar age to her (inferring they share similar 
challenges in terms of physical activity) they experience difficulty in supporting her (lifting 
her wheelchair into their cars, for example). Here we might recognise an element of 
symbolic-value; the provision of transport takes new meaning when Isla’s friends have to 
struggle to support her. Asking friends of a similar age to support her in this way (on a 
regular basis) is to ask too much of them.  Isla recognises this meaning and she is 
uncomfortable with it: ‘so that is a problem’.  
As a result, where Isla requires this form of support on a more regular basis, she uses her 
DLA payments to pay for taxis. Here again, with the introduction of exchange-value, the 
meaning of transport is altered.  Isla states that she prefers to pay for this form of support; 
I interpreted this to mean that Isla would prefer to pay a professional rather than allowing 
her friends to struggle in supporting her. With the introduction of exchange-value, this 
symbolic-value is no longer a defining feature of the exchange and Isla experiences the 
supportive act as less problematic and easier to accept.  
7.7 Discussion 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to outline the ways in which various acts of 
support and assistance are experienced as meaningful. In doing so, this chapter has 
proposed a pluralist model of value inclusive of distinct logics of meaning. Use-value, 
economic-value, symbolic-value and semiotic-value have been shown to capture distinct 
aspects of meaning: utility, economic, relational, and cultural. It has been argued that the 
experience of social resource exchange involves the coalescing and intersecting of these 
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logics of meaning. This has been conceptualised and depicted in what has been termed 
an interpretive economy of meaning. What remains to be explored are the ways in which 
morality underpins practices of social exchange, and it is this issue towards which this 
thesis now turns.   
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Chapter Eight: Morality, ethical work and social resources 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter elucidates the role of morality in shaping the experience of giving and 
receiving social resources during illness. The previous chapter (Chapter Seven) identified 
the ways in which supportive acts are experienced as meaningful; the current chapter 
builds upon this insight, and locates the meaning of social resource exchange within the 
context of the formation of an ethical Self.   
Chapter Six (Theoretical review) identified the enduring role of morality within social 
exchange theory. Further, it was demonstrated that in contemporary perspectives – 
informed by social exchange theory and latterly RCT – morality is conceived in a limited 
sense according to the principle of reciprocity. The limitations reciprocity have been 
identified in both substantive and analytic terms. These caveats aside, empirical research 
– and qualitative research in particular – has demonstrated the continued significance of 
morality in giving meaning to peoples’ experiences of illness (Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 
1988; Williams, 1993)  as well as, to a lesser degree, shaping the meaning of cooperation 
during illness (Blaxter and Poland, 2002; Rier, 2007). In the wider sociological and 
anthropological literature, there is a clear acknowledgement as to the importance of 
morality in shaping individual dispositions, behaviour, and social action. Shweder (2012), 
for example, summarises the relevance of morality: 
Moral judgements are motivators of action in significant measure because they are 
affect-laden and produce in people powerful feelings of arousal, distress, pollution, 
repugnance, guilt, indignation, pride, or shame (Shweder, 2012: 90).  
As such, morality must be recognised as an important and enduring feature of the 
experience of illness, with the potential to shape how supportive practices are enacted 
and experienced.  This chapter assumes this position, and will describe the various moral 
dilemmas and deliberations encountered by people living with multimorbidity when 
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drawing upon others for support. In doing so, a number of distinct moral principles will be 
highlighted. It will be argued that these moral principles play a role in shaping emotions, 
feelings and actions during the receipt of support. It will then be argued that people in 
receipt of support engage in ‘ethical work’: understood to mean the dispositions or actions 
assumed in order to accomplish the aforementioned moral principles.  Finally, this chapter 
will discuss these issues critically; drawing on Foucault’s notion of the production of 
‘ethical subjects’ and C.B Macpherson’s concept of ‘possessive individualism’, this 
chapter will conclude that the receipt of support is often experienced as a form of social 
suffering wherein people living with illness struggle to maintain themselves as ethical 
individuals.32   
8.2 The virtue of independence, receiving as erring  
Independence is a complex and multifaceted concept. At its core, however, independence 
concerns the embodied and inter-subjective relationship between Self and Other. Much 
extant health literature identifies independence as a defining tenet of ‘successful ageing’, 
or as an essential feature of a ‘full’ and ‘productive’ life during older age and chronic 
illness (Alpass et al., 2007; Baltes and Carstensen, 1996; Bowling and Dieppe, 2005; 
Rozanova, 2010; Martinson and Berridge, 2014). In this respect, independence is 
represented, largely, in terms of physical independence and its concomitant psychological 
benefits emanating from feelings of autonomy, control and self-determination. In the first 
instance, it is difficult to question this rationale: independence surely is salubrious for 
physical and mental health as well as general wellbeing. Indeed, independence was 
identified by several participants in this way, as contributing to their self-defined health 
and wellbeing. For many, however, independence was not only a defining feature of 
health and wellbeing, but was also presented as a moral object or territory. The following 
                                                          
32 Here the word ‘individuals’ is not intended to be neutral, rather it emphasises the 
possessive individualist character of that which participants represented as ‘good’, morally 
virtuous or decorous. This issue will be addressed within the discussion section of this 
chapter.  
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section takes up this observation, and outlines the ways in which participants represented 
independence and dependence as moral principles.  
As has been noted in the previous chapter, the themes of independence and dependence 
were identified by several participants when discussing support-seeking. To reiterate, we 
might consider the perspectives of Isla and Mary, both of whom spoke about the prospect 
of seeking support: 
I’m the sort of person that doesn’t do that kind of thing [ask for support].  Too 
independent I suppose. 
 Isla, 2nd Interview 
I wouldn’t like to be a person who was always on the phone, “I can’t do this and I 
can’t do that”, I’ve never done that.   
Mary, 1st Interview 
For both Isla and Mary, independence is a question which speaks to the very foundations 
of who they are: it is a question of identity. In defining themselves as independent people, 
Isla and Mary are established as morally authentic subjects; this is achieved in the above 
excerpts by positioning themselves as counterpoised to a hypothetical Other – the 
‘dependent person’. Isla states that she is ‘the sort of person that doesn’t do that kind of 
thing’, whilst Mary affirms that she is not ‘a person who was always on the phone’. This 
observation is important, and illustrates that the meaning of independence is inextricably 
linked to that of dependency. In discussing independence, both Isla and Mary make tacit 
statements about dependency. In this regard, identifying themselves as independent 
serves not only to affiliate with the positive image of independence, but also distinguishes 
both women from dependence as a morally aberrant status. 
The contingent nature of independence is, of course, thrown into sharp relief by illness. 
Illness imposes itself upon social relationships; previously known friendships and kinships 
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withstand or break under the weight of illness, and those which endure often develop into 
supportive relationships. This process, however, is not always an easy one. As Rose 
described, the love and care afforded by friends and family may also be experienced as a 
threat to one’s moral status as independent.  As a result of her OA, Rose requires 
significant support and assistance on a daily basis.  Fortunately, by virtue of her extensive 
local family network, Rose has no shortage of willing supporters: ‘I’m waited on, hand and 
foot’. However, in describing her everyday experiences of support, Rose also alluded to 
her misgivings about asking for support. I questioned whether these misgivings were the 
result of any specific experiences:  
I don’t really know, they’re all pretty good, you know. But I’m a bit independent; I 
don’t like asking. And I think, ‘No, I’m not asking you,’ and then somebody will come 
along and say, ‘Oh, Nan, do you want so-and-so?’, ‘Oh, yes, all right’. 
Rose, 1st Interview 
Like many other participants, Rose describes herself as an independent person and 
identifies this characteristic as making her feel uncomfortable about support. In the above 
quotation, Rose states that she avoids asking her family for support; however, when 
support is unsolicited, Rose feels more comfortable in accepting. This case suggests that 
there is something particular about the act of requesting support which contributes to 
Rose’s discomfort.  In considering why this might be so, it is quite possible that the act of 
requesting support has a number of negative connotations such as personal failure, or 
wider cultural representations of neediness, even destitution. This would certainly seem 
logical given that such meanings are in direct contradiction to Rose’s self-proclaimed 
status as an independent person. Rose manages this situation through her efforts to defer 
support until it is offered without solicitation, and even then, only accepting with an air of 
reluctance – ‘oh, yes, all right’. For Rose, as for other participants, independence is not 
just about her own self-sufficiency, but is defined also by her dependence on others.  
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Where participants spoke about independence in moral terms, it was usually represented 
as being a ‘good’ thing out of consideration for other people. Isla explained her feelings 
towards supportive relationships – in particular that with her son – and revealed the 
tensions she experienced within this relationship. Isla, like Rose, was not comfortable with 
the prospect of asking her family for support:   
I think it’s good for your family if you can be independent.  I mean my son will say to 
me – I mean I remember when he was very busy, when he was working he used to 
travel all over the world and that, and I tended to wait until he rang me.  I would say 
to him sometimes, if I hadn’t heard from him for a bit, “Oh just a minute, I don’t 
recognise your voice.”  He would say, “Mother, it works both ways, you’ve got a 
phone as well”.  So, you see, I tended to – if I didn’t ring him, then I wasn’t bothering 
him. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla discusses independence in terms of what it means for other people - ‘it’s good for 
your family if you can be independent’. Isla considers her son’s freedom and autonomy to 
be of paramount importance. Motivated by the desire to do what is ‘good for your family’, 
Isla is determined to maintain a distal quality within this relationship. As a result, Isla 
states she would not instigate contact with her son, and reasons that she is working to 
maintain his freedom: ‘if I didn’t ring him, then I wasn’t bothering him’. Later in her 
interview, Isla returned to the same topic and reiterated her views on independence, 
support, and the need to maintain autonomy of others: 
Isla: I mean, you know, my son will say to me when I’m up there, he’ll say, “Well, 
are you sure you’re all right, Mum?”  “Yes, I’m fine”, “Well, your chest 
doesn’t sound very good”, “I’m okay, I’m all right”.  You know, I prefer to be 
like that, you see, rather than a bit of a bother. 
Int: No, that makes sense, yeah. 
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Isla: It’s just the way you are, isn’t it?  It’s just the way – I’ve always been the 
same; independent.  But independence is a good thing, I think.   
Int: Yeah, okay. 
Isla: I think, you know, you need a certain amount of independence.  I could not 
bother anybody more than I needed to do.   
Isla, 2nd Interview 
In the above exchange, Isla defines her independence as a morally virtuous quality: 
‘independence is a good thing’. Further, the virtue of independence is premised upon the 
notion that to ask for (or to receive) support from others is inappropriate or improper in 
some way. Isla states that ‘I could not bother anybody more than I needed to do’, affirming 
the moral impropriety involved in seeking and receiving support. In this sense, we might 
recognise the impropriety involved in ‘bothering’ other people as concerned with making 
claims upon other peoples’ time, their energy, and their lives in general. For Isla, 
independence is a ‘good thing’ because it maintains the freedom and autonomy of the 
people she loves.   
The theme of other peoples’ autonomy and freedom was common to several participants’ 
reflections upon independence. This theme was emphasised particularly by the language 
participants’ used to describe supportive relationships. A phrasing adopted by many 
participants was that of the ‘expectation’ made upon others; participants sought to 
demonstrate that even in close supportive relationships, they did not ‘expect’ others to 
provide support: 
So they’re there for us, I mean, they ring virtually every day, but you know, I wouldn’t 
expect them to, sort of, get on their bikes and come up at the drop of a hat. I mean, 
you know, it won’t be like that. 
Ian, 1st Interview 
 186 
 
Yeah, I wouldn’t expect anybody to, to come and [coughs] – excuse me – to look 
after me full time.  
David, 2nd Interview 
Well we – we do watering for each other and that’s, we don’t – we don’t expect 
anything else really you know. 
Pamela, 1st Interview 
In the above quotations, each participant reflects upon supportive relationships and states 
that they do not ‘expect’ support from others. Each participant spoke about expectations in 
terms of specific relationships and with regard to particular forms of support. In the above 
quotations, Ian associates expectation with the onerous requirements of giving support 
(‘get on their bikes and come up at the drop of a hat’); David considers the commitment of 
others and the prospect of ‘full time’ support; whilst Pamela concludes that gardening 
support (understood to be relatively inconsequential) marks the limit of what may be 
‘expected’ of her neighbours. Each of these statements forms an appraisal as to what 
form of support (in terms of the meaning or value) may be appropriate or reasonable to 
accept within particular relationships. However, a key point here is that each participant 
stresses the absence of ‘expectation’.  The phraseology of expectation is significant as it 
highlights that to expect of another is to oblige or demand them to concede their freedom 
and autonomy. In the above quotations, each participant recognises the meaning or value 
of particular forms of support (care at the ‘drop of a hat’, long-term care, gardening), and 
each make statements that they would not oblige or make claims upon others in this way. 
Accordingly, these statements may be recognised as performances of moral propriety; 
participants demonstrate that they understand what is acceptable to claim or accept from 
others.    
In summary, participants identified independence, almost universally, in moral terms as ‘a 
good thing’. Dependence was identified in similarly universal terms as undesirable or 
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improper. Further, where dependency was discussed – either explicitly or implicitly – it 
was addressed in terms of the consequences for other people (freedom and autonomy of 
others).  
8.3 Ethical work 
A second claim of this chapter is that people living with illness, cognisant of the moral 
principles of independence and dependence, enter into a multitude of dispositions and 
actions which may be termed ‘ethical work’. Ethical work may be understood to refer to 
any practice or mind-set engendered by a desire to do ‘the right thing’ or what is ‘proper’ 
concerning the receipt of support and assistance. This section details forms of ethical 
work as identified by participants, and describes the ways ethical work shapes supportive 
relationships and the notions of the Self during receipt of support. 
Given what has already been stated regarding independence and dependency, it is of little 
surprise that a fundamental form of ethical work concerns participants’ efforts to avoid 
seeking support. Isla, for example, revealed a strong compulsion to work hard at 
managing her illness alone, rather than involving her son in a supportive capacity. During 
her second interview, Isla stated that she had previously refrained from contacting her son 
when she needed support:   
Int: Am I reading too much into it to think then – so would you put off asking for 
help? 
Isla: Yeah. 
Int: You’re smiling.   
 [Laughter]   
 Is that something that has happened in the past? 
Isla: Oh yes. 
Int: Right, okay.  Can I ask you about that then? 
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Isla: Well I had this funny kind of – I don’t like bothering anybody.  If I can work it 
out I will – to my cost sometimes - I’m not always right.  I’ve always never 
wanted to lean on him, if you know what I mean.  I’ve never wanted to 
encroach on his life. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla states that her desire to remain independent has, in the past, resulted in her suffering 
alone rather than seeking help. Isla relates these efforts with her desire not to make 
claims upon other people; ‘I don’t like bothering anybody’. Isla interprets the supportive 
relationship as one which limits the freedom of others, and she considers this to be 
unacceptable. This issue is particularly salient for Isla with regard to her son, whose life 
she does not wish to ‘encroach upon’.  As Isla spoke about her relationship with her son, 
she began to cry; however, after some time, Isla returned to the same topic:  
Isla: It was just one of those things with me.  I like to try and be independent, to live 
my own life like I always have.  But she went [a former friend] – my husband 
died and she’s 76 [neighbour] and of course XX [deceased son] was here 
then.  And when XX died [deceased son], I didn’t want him [living son] to have 
all the responsibility. 
Int: So you’d rather do it yourself and… 
Isla: Yeah, yeah.  He [living son] used to get on the phone to me and say, ‘Why 
didn’t you tell me?  Why didn’t you let me know?’.  Because I should, but I 
never did, never did.  Now I have to. It’s a different situation now.   
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla describes her social network and how, in recent years, she has lost a number of 
important friends and family. Most significantly, the deaths of her eldest son (as a child) 
and her husband have had an enduring affect upon her relationship with her remaining 
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son. Isla’s abiding objective (as during his childhood) is to ensure that her son’s life is not 
oriented towards her, and that he does not feel responsible for her wellbeing. As a result, 
Isla considers it preferable to remain detached and to struggle alone rather than to involve 
her son in support. This may be recognised in practical terms as a form of illness self-
management; however, it should also be recognised as an instance of ethical work: Isla 
works hard to maintain the independence and freedom of her son.   Isla concludes by 
reflecting upon her current situation and the fact that her illness means she can no longer 
eschew supportive relationships. The prosody of Isla’s voice conveyed a sense that she 
had come to accept this situation, but that she remained ambivalent about the future and 
the supportive aspect within her relationship with her son. This example reveals a 
particular form of suffering; Isla works towards satisfying the principle of independence 
and dependence, however her deteriorating health means that she is forced to confront 
the prospect of transgressing these same principles.   
For the majority of participants, living with multimorbidity meant that support was an 
everyday occurrence. Despite being commonplace, however, even incidental or 
apparently mundane examples of support were often described in moral terms. Indicative 
of this was the way that participants spoke about how they ‘ought’ to feel or behave in 
response to support. Rose, for example, spoke of conflicting emotions with regard to her 
supportive family: 
...they’re in touch with me all the while… I don’t get a lot of peace…it sounds 
ungrateful but there’s times when I think. “Oh, I’ll have half an hour now”, and 
somebody comes in. Still, I should be grateful really. 
Rose, 1st Interview 
Rose experiences her family’s efforts to support her as somewhat stifling and intrusive; 
however, she feels uncomfortable with the fact that she harbours these feelings. Rose 
states that the she ‘should be grateful’, and that speaking about her annoyance ‘sounds 
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ungrateful’.  These comments reveal an ideal affective response to the receipt of support: 
the feeling of gratitude. Rose feels uneasy about falling short of this ideal response and 
challenges herself to feel differently, castigating herself for feeling ungrateful.  In this 
instance, we see a form of ethical work which involves the management of emotions and 
feelings according to what is morally decorous.  In a further example, Isla described her 
experience of receiving advice and support from a neighbour (a nurse):   
She came in last week – oh I did ask her advice – my son thinks I need a hearing 
test and I wanted to know what the procedure was.  She just popped in to tell me 
what you do; the stages you have to go through. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
 
Having described this instance of support, Isla continued to detail how she felt she should 
conduct herself in receipt of this support:  
 
Isla: We did talk about that and, you know, she just said, ‘if you ever want any 
help in that, you know, let me know.’  But, you know, you’ve got to be 
careful because you’ve only got to say to somebody, 'XX [nurse neighbour] 
was very good and she did….’  They could go on from there and she 
wouldn’t want that, would she?  I mean - you know. 
Int:  So other people? 
Isla:  Other people yes, yeah.  You’ve got to be careful how you – I would keep it 
confidential really that she spoke to me about it, you know. 
Int:  Is that because you would just be – you wouldn’t want…. 
Isla:  I wouldn’t want everybody ringing her up and saying, ‘can you help me with 
this or can you help me with that?’ 
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Int:  Because of what she might think. 
Isla: Yes, yeah, yeah.  I wouldn’t like that – no. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Isla feels as though the appropriate response to this instance of support is to maintain 
some form of confidentiality. Isla makes no suggestion that the issue of confidentiality was 
discussed with her neighbour; rather, I understood confidentiality to be something Isla felt 
to be appropriate only intuitively. The importance of confidentially in this example is likely 
associated with the identity of the support giver – a nurse who provides her professional 
expertise outside of the formal professional domain. Isla recognises how useful this 
support is, and she does not want her neighbour to become overburdened with similar 
requests from others. Whereas Rose’s (above) example concerns a purely affective 
response to support, Isla’s example illustrates that ethical work may also require more 
practical efforts.  In the examples of Isla and Rose we see how, for people living with 
illness, the receipt of support is rarely a morally neutral event. Both Rose and Isla are 
aware of an appropriate response to support, and both strive toward feeling or enacting 
these responses. Further, these examples illustrate just what an involved process ethical 
work is, and the degree to which the principles of moral authenticity guide dispositions and 
actions during the receipt of support.  
For many participants, the most common instances of ethical work concerned efforts to 
remain active providers of support to others.  In such cases, participants identified 
supportive relationships as mutually beneficial to all involved; the notion of reciprocity was 
invoked regularly as an indication of this mutuality. David, for example, spoke about his 
relationship with his neighbours and the degree to which he was able to call upon them for 
support. In describing these supportive relationships, David provided an example of 
reciprocal exchange which, although somewhat peculiar, captured an important sense of 
mutuality: 
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David: I don't go round there drinking coffee and what else have you, like... I don't 
want that myself.  But if I buy a pair of trousers and they want shortening, I 
put them in a bag, hang them on the fence and then two days later they're 
back on the fence again, I bring them and they've been done. 
Int: Really, that's good.   
David: It doesn't cost anything. 
Int: No, right.  Do you feel as if you - do you have - do you do stuff in return?  
Or is … 
David: Yeah. 
Int: Or is it that they're just happy to do it, kind of thing?  
David: Oh, they're happy to do it.  But I get certain things given me in the food line, 
you know.  I come in a week or two back and I got two bloody great big 
Savoy cabbages.  I like cabbage.  I can't manage them two so I give one to 
[gestures towards neighbour’s house] you know. 
David, 2nd Interview 
David explains that this neighbourly relationship is not particularly close – ‘I don't go round 
there drinking coffee’.  David also details the reciprocal exchange of favours; whilst these 
favours are important to David we might recognise that, when compared to some forms of 
support, they lack significant value (as conceptualised in the previous chapter).  This 
example is typical of the ways in which reciprocity was identified by participants: relatively 
weak relationships (acquaintances and neighbours, for example) where the reciprocal 
exchange of support concerned relatively minor or incidental acts. A similar dynamic is 
apparent in Pamela’s discussion of neighbours and support: 
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They came over and helped me dig up my borders and pot things up and I said, and 
they took things home with them you know.  So she’s took some plants up to XX 
(North) and XX has got plants there and then I helped her actually plant them in her 
garden as well so yeah we – we have a good relationship with the neighbours and – 
and, yeah they’re very good yeah. 
Pamela, 1st Interview 
Pamela’s example bears a number of similarities to that of David (above) in that the type 
of support described (gardening) may be understood to have relatively little inherent 
meaning or value (in terms of symbolic, semiotic, or economic meaning).  Despite her 
illness, Pamela is able to reciprocate co-operation and provide similar support to her 
neighbour. The ability to reciprocate support is important for Pamela, and contributes 
towards her evaluation of this relationship as successful: ‘we have a good relationship’. In 
another example, Bill and his wife (Cath) identified the role of neighbours in similar terms. 
Bill detailed how certain neighbours would provide transport or assist in manual tasks, 
Cath then stressed that these supportive relationships were not one-directional:  
Cath: The lady next door, it works both ways, she’s got a car and he’s got a car. 
Now, if she’s not very well, you’ve [Bill] taken her to the doctor and different 
places, haven’t you…? 
Bill: Yeah 
Cath: …you know, it just works one with the other. 
Bill and Cath, Bill’s 1st Interview 
This relational dynamic was reiterated by Cath later in the same interview:  
Cath: If somebody’s poorly, or wanted to go somewhere, the hospital or the 
dentist… 
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Bill: I usually can take them and… 
Cath: …or whatever, he jumps in the car and takes them. 
Bill and Cath, Bill’s 1st Interview 
In a similar way to Pamela (above), Cath considers the reciprocal dynamic of neighbourly 
relationships to be important; she suggests reciprocity is key to these relationships 
functioning successfully – ‘it just works’. The above examples share common features. 
Firstly, the relative strength or emotional proximity of these relationships determines, to a 
large extent, what forms of support are exchanged. In the above examples, weaker 
relationships (relative to the strength of family or closer friends) sustain only modest forms 
of support and assistance. Secondly, the nature of these relationships means that the act 
of reciprocation assumes increased moral significance. In such relationships, the lack of 
any institutionally constituted obligation to support (as might be the case in a parent-child 
relationship, for example) means that the impropriety of unreciprocated acts is amplified. 
In contrast to institutionalised relationships, neighbours and acquaintances enter into such 
relationships freely. As a result, these social ties are experienced as more contingent, and 
there is a tacit expectation that these relationships should be mutually gratifying; it is for 
this reason that participants identified reciprocity as important. In demonstrating their 
reciprocation of support, the above participants present themselves as attending to the 
moral assumptions of neighbourly relationships.  This proposition is supported by Pamela 
and Cath’s assertions that reciprocity contributes to successful or well-functioning 
neighbourly relationships.    
The notion that the supportive actions should be repaid was not limited to discussions of 
reciprocity. For some participants, illness and disability meant that direct reciprocation of 
support was impossible. In such cases, the same moral precept of mutuality was apparent 
in slightly modified forms. Isla, for example, was unable to reciprocate the domestic and 
transport support she received from friends and neighbours.  During her second interview, 
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while discussing the prospect of paying for formal support, Isla stated that she had 
recently employed a professional cleaner rather than relying upon her neighbour for 
support:  
Isla: I get a disability allowance, you see, so I use it for that purpose. 
Int: So you now pay this new cleaner and did you pay the neighbour? 
Isla: No, no, no.  I do it in kind, in different ways.   
Int: How do you mean? 
Isla: Well, as it’s her birthday next week I shall put money in the envelope for her.   
Isla, 2nd Interview 
Later in the interview, I pursued this issue further with Isla: 
Int: You said, ‘I’ll pop some money in the birthday card or whatever.’  I was just 
wondering what you meant by doing something in kind.  What kind of thing 
did you mean? 
Isla: Well, it’s very difficult with Penny [neighbour/friend].  She’s not very good at 
accepting presents or anything like that and she’s a bit difficult.  So the only 
way I can do it is – I mean I have – when she used to clean for me, I used 
to put an extra £10 in a – and she’d always give it me back, you know.  
She’s very difficult to really– and you can only really do it to people like 
Steven [male friend] and Liz [female friend], who take me to church every 
week.  I couldn’t give them any money for petrol but, of course, I buy them 
an extra special present.  That’s the only thing – that’s the only way you 
can do it.     
Int: That makes absolute sense, and is that important for you? 
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Isla: Oh yes.  Well, it’s very difficult to show appreciation.  You can do it verbally 
and say, ‘Thank you very much’ as many times as you like, but you don’t 
feel as if you’re rewarding them enough.  But then if, if I was in that position 
I’d probably be the same.  But Penny is very difficult to reward, as you 
might say.  I feel with Sandra [paid cleaner], who cleans for me, I feel what I 
give her is adequate.  I don’t feel for one moment that I’m not paying her, 
you know, for what she’s doing.  But I don’t mind – it’s probably over – 
more than shall we say the going rate, if that’s – but I don’t mind that 
because the work’s done to my satisfaction. 
Isla, 2nd Interview 
The above exchange highlights the importance of repaying or rewarding others for acts of 
support; Isla wishes to demonstrate gratitude to others by rewarding their benevolence. 
However, as Isla details, her efforts to reward and repay are complicated by the fact that 
her friends are reluctant to accept her gestures of recognition, or to accept any direct 
payment. To resolve these concerns, Isla works to demonstrate her gratitude through 
subtle forms of repayment, such as giving presents and gifts. Here there are clear 
parallels with the above examples pertaining to reciprocity, and similar moral precepts 
appear to be at play. Isla feels it is important to give to others and not be a passive 
recipient of support: she wishes for these relationships to be balanced.  
In summary, the most common forms of ethical work concerned participants’ efforts to 
remain independent and, by avoiding dependence, preserve the independence of others. 
However, a range of other ethically motivated actions and dispositions have been 
identified which concern the mutuality of supportive relationships. In its most elementary 
form, mutuality may be identified in the recognition of supportive acts – feeling or 
demonstrating gratitude ensures that a supportive act is not entirely one-directional. 
Mutually is most apparent, however, in instances of rewarding or reciprocating the 
supportive acts of others. Just as in economic exchange (where it would be immoral to 
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renege on the payment of others), it is ethically dubious to engage in social relationships 
which are not mutually worthwhile in some sense. Demonstrating gratitude, giving gifts, 
and reciprocating the benevolence of others is an important part of recognising the 
supportive other as a dignified person. Such actions of mutuality also enable the person in 
receipt of support to feel as though they too are a morally authentic subject.  
8.4 Co-dependence 
The moral precepts of independence, dependence, and mutuality were ubiquitous in 
participants’ discussions of support and assistance. However, some participants identified 
certain relationships as transcending these concerns. Married participants spoke often 
about their partners and the spousal relationship as a qualitatively unique form of 
supportive relationship. Ian, for example, spoke about his relationship with his wife in 
these terms:   
All my family are in different parts of the country and different parts of the world. So 
I’m not a, you know, I’m not local to this, to this part of the world. Obviously, it’s a bit 
of a concern, because there’ll come a point in time when you know, you have to 
decide what, you know, what, whether you can continue to look after yourself, or 
look after one another. So, you know, I’ll be dependent upon my wife, she’ll be 
dependent upon me. That’s, that’s, that’s the way it’s going to be. 
Ian, 1st Interview 
Earlier in his interview, Ian spoke about the fact that he had an extensive local network of 
friends which enabled him to lead a rich and varied social life. However, in the above 
excerpt, Ian states that he does not consider these friends to be a viable source of support 
given his deteriorating health.  Ian identifies that his single most important supportive 
relationship is that of his wife. What is particularly interesting in this example, however, is 
the ease with which Ian confronts the prospect of dependency, stating – ‘that’s the way it’s 
going to be’. Clearly, the meaning of dependency within this particular relationship is 
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different to dependency as imagined in any other (acquaintances, neighbours, friends, 
even one’s children). For Ian, this relationship is one in which dependency is modified into 
co-dependency: ‘I’ll be dependent upon my wife, she’ll be dependent upon me’.    
Similar sentiment was apparent in Theo’s discussion about his wife and the supportive 
aspect of their relationship. Theo explained how, despite his wife’s very extensive local 
friendship network, neither he nor his wife looked beyond one another for meaningful 
support and assistance:   
Int: So in terms of getting help from other people, is it mostly between the two 
of you then? 
Theo: Yeah, yeah. Because we have our own means of transport. I mean we’ve 
got the car there so if I wanted to go to the hospital now, a stroke, or if she 
wanted to go to the hospital, we’re in the car and gone before anybody 
knows about it. So we are – we depend on each other a great deal because 
– well there’s no kids here and there’s no other people and then we tell the 
neighbours or what have you. But basically we depend on each other.   
Theo, 2nd Interview 
Theo describes his relationship with his wife in terms similar to those described by Ian 
(above). The co-dependency between Theo and his wife is heightened by the fact that 
their two sons live a great distance away. In this example, Theo presents co-dependency 
as a form of self-sufficiency; through co-dependency, Theo and his wife are able to remain 
independent from other people – ‘we’re in the car and gone before anybody knows about 
it’. As in the case of Ian, Theo appears comfortable with the prospect of dependency when 
it occurs within a relationship of co-dependency. Elsewhere in participants’ interviews, 
participants spoke about marriage as being akin to a ‘team’ rather than being two distinct 
individuals. In the examples of Ian and Theo (both of whom had been married 
approximately 40 years) the spousal relationship is one where the distinction between 
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individuals has, to an extent, become blurred. In these cases, the principles of 
independence and dependency were less pronounced to the degree that they were 
seemingly irrelevant. 
8.5 Discussion 
This chapter has outlined the ways in which the receipt of support and assistance is 
experienced as a moral practice. In detailing the experiences of participants living with 
multimorbidity, this chapter has identified a number of moral principles which shape the 
meaning of support. While these principles may be seen to be related, it is useful to 
characterise them in three distinct forms.  
 Firstly, the principle that one should be independent, self-sufficient and in control 
of one’s own person.   
 Secondly, the related principle that dependence upon others must be avoided. It 
has been argued that this principle is based upon the notion that one should not 
make claims towards the freedom and autonomy of others.   
 Thirdly, where supportive exchanges do occur, the supportive relationship must 
retain a degree of mutuality.  
Having identified these aspects of morality, this chapter presented participants’ accounts 
of striving towards these ideals. The ways in which participants sought to meet these 
ideals – through dispositions and actions – has been termed ‘ethical work’. The term 
‘work’ is apposite given the energy, effort, and deliberation required to feel and act 
according to such principles during illness. However, to address these issues in greater 
depth and clarity requires a more thorough consideration of morality in sociological terms. 
What this means is attending to questions such as: what is morality? How should we 
understand the function of morality? And what are the consequences of morality for 
people in receipt of support?  
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It has been argued (within this thesis’ theoretical review chapter and throughout this 
chapter) that the moral mechanism of reciprocity is insufficient to account for morality 
within supportive exchanges – the data presented in this chapter supports this assertion. 
However, further normative theories of ethics – including virtue theory, duty theory, and 
consequentialist ethics, also seem ill-equipped to account for the complex intersections of 
morality, the relationship between self and other in exchange, and the gamut of embodied 
and existential threats posed by illness. In contexts such as this, the logical rigor of moral 
philosophy seems at odds with the messy reality of support during illness. These tensions 
are reflected in Taylor’s comments as to the limitations of moral philosophy: 
...moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it is right to do rather than on what it 
is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good 
life; and it has no conceptual place left for a notion of the good as the object of love 
or allegiance  (Taylor, 1992; 9). 
This chapter has illustrated that for participants in this study, what it means to be good 
and to lead a good life (in short, what it means to be an authentic moral subject) during 
the receipt of support is intimately tied to the notions of love and allegiance. This is why, 
perhaps, it seems somewhat insufficient to speak about the principles of independence, 
dependence and mutuality simply in terms of obligations or duty – duty and obligation fall 
short in both descriptive and explanatory terms. A more appropriate way to consider the 
dynamics of morality during the receipt of support may be gleaned from Foucault’s 
writings on ethics.  Foucault was not concerned with identifying or describing moral codes 
and edicts; rather, he sought to identify the role of morality in shaping the relationship 
between the individual and the Self. In this regard, Foucault’s ethical project was 
consistent with his wider theoretical positions on governmentality and the disciplinary 
‘technologies of the self’. Accordingly, Foucault presented morality not as prescriptive 
rules, obligations, or duties per se, but as the starting point for the ethical work undertaken 
by the individual in the production of the Self as a moral subject. The following excerpt is 
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taken from The History of Sexuality (volume 2) and outlines Foucault’s approach to 
morality: 
All moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a 
relationship with the self. The latter is not simply “self-awareness” but self-formation 
as an “ethical subject”, a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself 
that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the 
precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his 
moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and 
transform himself (Foucault, 1985: 28).  
From this perspective, moral and ethical action is concerned less with extraneous duties, 
obligations or rules, and speaks instead to the principles around which the individual 
knows the Self as ethical or good. Recalling Taylor’s claim that morality must be 
understood in terms of what it is good to be, rather than just what it is good to do, it is 
useful to think of morality in Foucauldian terms as the ethical action we undertake to make 
us the kinds of people we want to be. This sentiment accords with the ways that moral 
principles were represented by participants in this study. Participants did not discuss the 
morality of receiving support in terms of duties or obligations as such, but rather, they did 
so in terms of how they wished to be recognised by loved ones and by themselves – as 
independent, as not being dependent, and as active participants in relationships of 
mutuality.  While this is a useful way to consider the functional workings of morality, it 
does little to further our understanding of the specific moral principles identified in this 
chapter. More may be said in this direction.  
The finding that independence is considered virtuous and dependence aberrant is not 
entirely novel, and has been identified elsewhere in critical gerontology and disability 
studies (Breheny and Stephens, 2009, 2012; Rozanova, 2010). However, much of this 
commentary assumes that the principles of independence and dependence function 
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through the stigmatisation of support as a representation of idleness, malingering, or 
being at odds with the ‘Occidental story’ that there is always work to be done (DeCerteau, 
1998: 190).  While this may be true in part, it is the contention of this thesis that the 
principles of independence, dependence and mutuality speak to yet more fundamental 
human concerns.  Specifically, these principles concern what it means to be an individual 
in liberal democratic thought. In this respect, the three principles identified within this 
chapter bear striking affinity and similarity to literature within social and political thought 
concerning the relationship between individualism, liberalism, and capitalism. For 
example, the themes of independence, dependence, and mutuality are recognisable in the 
concept of ‘possessive individualism’ as contributed by C.B. Macpherson (1962). 
In what is now a seminal text of contemporary political theory, Macpherson (1962) traces 
the historical development of economic, social, and political theory from the inception of 
seventeenth-century liberalism to modernity. In doing so, Macpherson claims to identify a 
particular form of ‘possessive individualism’ specific to capitalist liberal democracies. 
Whilst a thorough discussion of this concept is beyond the remit of this chapter, 
Macpherson’s analysis of possessive individualism warrants further quotation as it 
illuminates the perspectives offered by participants in this chapter. Concerning the 
historical taproots of possessive individualism, Macpherson states: 
Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the 
proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The 
individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, 
but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and 
more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and 
actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of 
the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of 
his person and his capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on 
the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of 
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free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and 
of what they have acquired by their exercise (Macpherson, 1962: 3).  
Macpherson argues that the development of liberalism, from Hobbes to Locke, has 
witnessed a movement towards conceiving of the individual as defined through 
possession in ideal and material senses.33 Macpherson extends this insight and identifies 
the role of possessive individualism in allowing liberalism to flourish alongside private 
enterprise and the capitalist mode of production. Macpherson’s contribution is not, 
however, one of purely historical analysis and his work concerns the construct of the 
liberal individual in contemporary terms. In concluding his thesis, Macpherson provides 
seven axioms of possessive individualism – three of these axioms concern particular 
economic, political, and macro-social spheres, and are less relevant to this chapter. Four 
of Macpherson’s axioms, however, resonate immediately with the moral principles 
identified and alluded to by participants in this chapter: 
1) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the will of 
others 
2) Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations 
with others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily 
with a view to his own interest 
3) The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, 
for which he owes nothing to society 
4) Since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human, each 
individual’s freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and 
rules as are necessary to secure the same freedom for others 
(Macpherson, 1962: 263). 
                                                          
33 Macpherson was an ardent critic of this mode of individualism, and the above axioms are the 
outcome of an analysis into what he considered a malaise within contemporary liberalism.     
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Accordingly, the possessive individual is defined through self-proprietary and by freedom 
from dependence on the will of others. Freedom is sacrosanct and relations which 
threaten to compromise this autonomy are to be guarded against as a direct threat to the 
status of the individual. For the purposes of this thesis, Macpherson’s critique invites us to 
re-consider the moral principles of independence, dependence, and mutuality as identified 
within this chapter. Rather than considering these principles in terms of stigma (support as 
meaningful by its associations with stigmatised representations of idleness and 
malingering) or with virtues such as stoicism, we might more productively recognise these 
principles as foundational to the constitution of the individual in liberal society. From this 
perspective, the ethical work described by participants in this chapter concerns not only 
the desire to be recognised as virtuous, but is also a means towards preserving and 
asserting their status as individuals. Further, the meaning of ethical work towards 
preserving the autonomy of friends and family assumes yet more significance as it 
concerns the preservation of loved ones’ ‘human essence’ (to use Macpherson’s term) as 
free individuals. The credibility of this argument is underscored by reference to those 
participants for whom independence and dependence were not salient concerns. In this 
regard, where participants described marriage and the supportive aspect of spousal 
relationships, the principles of independence and dependence were less pronounced (to 
the point of being irrelevant). This is understandable given that in such relationships the 
individual is not defined in strictly delimited terms, but rather, as an individual in the world 
with another; co-dependency inheres not just in the practices of support, but also in the 
formation of Self. Accordingly, where participants reflected upon supportive spousal 
relationships, they did so from a position whereby their (and their partner’s) status as an 
individual was less contingent upon the possessive qualities of freedom and self-
proprietary.34     
                                                          
34 Or at least these qualities (as constituent features of the individual) are diminished within the 
dynamic of a ‘team’ (participant and spouse as a self-sufficient partnership). It might be argued that 
such relationships are a form of possessive dualism whereby the same principles of independence, 
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In summary, chronic illness has been described insightfully by Charmaz (1983) as a 
‘fundamental loss of self’. This chapter affirms such a viewpoint, but would add that the 
moral principles and ethical work described by participants in this chapter attest to a 
particular kind of loss: the Self and Other as possessive individuals. In a society which 
considers freedom and the individual to be the very substance of ‘what is good’, the 
principles of independence, dependence, and mutuality come to exert a powerful 
influence over the experience of support during illness. These concerns must also be 
understood as a particular form of social suffering. For the participants in this study, the 
realities of living with multiple chronic illnesses meant that remaining independent from 
other people was an increasingly unrealistic prospect. The notion that ‘independence is a 
good thing’ is as much an aphorism as one is likely to encounter; however, for several 
participants in this chapter, the unattainable nature of this maxim constituted one of 
illness’s crueller ironies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
dependence and mutuality remain relevant to others outside of this relationship (with regard to 
children and friends, for example).    
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Chapter Nine: Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, key findings from preceding chapters will be drawn together and the 
central narrative of this thesis made clear. General themes and specific issues raised in 
the Literature Review and Theoretical Review will be recalled, and in doing so, this thesis 
will be situated in terms of its contribution to knowledge. The implications of this study for 
health and social care policy and practice will be considered and discussed. Finally, 
avenues for future research will be proposed.  
9.2 Reflecting upon findings and research questions 
This thesis is concerned with two distinct but related issues: the ways in which 
multimorbidity is understood to be meaningful by lay participants, and the meaning of 
supportive practices among lay people living with multimorbidity. Following the literature 
review chapter, this thesis established two exploratory research questions:  
 How do people living with multimorbidity make sense of illness and understand 
their experience of illness as meaningful? 
 How do people living with multimorbidity experience social resources, and how is 
the receipt of support and assistance understood to be meaningful?  
These questions address distinct areas of policy and practice. On the one hand, the need 
to understand how people living with multimorbidity understand and make sense of illness 
speaks to the emergence of multimorbidity as a major population health concern which 
places increasingly complex demands upon health systems and the management of 
patients in primary care. In a separate development, the emergence of social 
connectedness as a key theme within health and social care policy and practice requires 
that processes of social exchange are better understood. Therefore, whilst social 
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connectedness is important in shaping the experience of multimorbidity, the insight 
delivered by this thesis is also relevant to the experience of support and assistance during 
illness more generally. The following sections will outline the findings of this study with 
respect to each research question before drawing together findings and discussing the 
implications of this thesis.  
9.2.2 How do people living with multimorbidity make sense of illness and 
understand their experience of illness as meaningful? 
This thesis has made the general argument that people living with multimorbidity often 
understand and make sense of illness in ways that are at odds with a biomedical 
perspective. Specifically, it has been argued that they make sense of illness according to 
distinct logics of meaning. These logics refer to frameworks of meaning derived from 
individuals’ engagement with, and enactment of, the motifs of normality, control, 
biography, and biomedicine.  
In this respect, findings from this thesis support and advance those made by recent 
studies into the lived experience of multimorbidity (identified within the Literature Review 
of this thesis: Hurd Clarke and Bennett, 2013; Ong et al., 2013; Pickard and Rogers, 
2012). This thesis affirms Pickard and Rogers’ assertion that multimorbidity is experienced 
as a ‘variegated but unified existential state’ (Pickard and Rogers, 2012: 112) – lay people 
make sense of multimorbidity accordingly to multiple (sometimes contradictory) logics of 
meaning which are experienced and expressed under the unifying rubric of the individual 
Self. This general finding poses specific questions in terms of how multimorbidity is 
understood: is it possible to speak of an ‘experience of multimorbidity’ in any unitary way? 
How can might such a variegated but unified experience be accommodated within 
healthcare systems designed towards treatment and management of single conditions?  
The Literature Review of this thesis reported that multimorbidity is defined in clinically 
informed literature as ‘co-existence of two or more long-term conditions in an 
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individual’ (Mercer et al., 2009). This concept has been heralded as a ‘more democratic’ 
approach towards conceptualising illness (in contrast to the concept of co-morbidity) 
(Valderas, Mercer and Fortin, 2011). However, the accounts provided by participants in 
this study suggest that conceptualising illness in this way makes (at least) two 
unsatisfactory assumptions about the lay experience of multimorbidity.  
Firstly, the notion that multimorbidity is defined by distinct diseases, conditions, 
syndromes, or by other neatly delimited episodes of illness. Participants in this study did 
not identify or describe their experience of illness in these terms. Where participants did 
speak about specific conditions, they did so because some aspect of the illness 
experience – be that a symptom, medication, physical limitation, future risk etc. – 
propelled that particular condition into the forefront of experience. For many participants, 
however, the experience of illness could not be explained by reference to clinically 
diagnosed conditions. Several participants identified the importance of conditions for 
which they had not received a clinical diagnosis; others described illness in diagnostically 
ambiguous ways (one participant identified ‘coffee granules’ as a salient health concern); 
several participants identified acute illnesses as disruptive and debilitating; others 
experienced unexplained or un-attributable symptoms; whilst for many, illness was 
understood primarily in terms of its impact upon personal and social worlds. These 
observations make clear the biomedical emphasis of multimorbidity (as defined within 
clinically informed literature) upon a disease model of illness (according to which illness is 
defined reductively as the dysfunction of various biological forms, with diseases existing 
as distinct entities (Atkinson, 1988: 180). Accordingly, multimorbidity as a biomedically 
informed concept privileges the identification and enumeration of diseases as distinct 
entities, and does so in neglect of the social, cultural, and biographical spheres which 
underpin the lay experience and meaning of multimorbidity.  
Secondly, data in this study suggested that from the lay perspective, the concept of 
concurrency may be somewhat erroneous. Some participants stated that they 
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experienced conditions in a singular fashion rather than as immediately co-occurring. 
Other participants questioned the label of concurrency on biographical grounds; 
participants for whom long-term conditions had been a part of everyday life for many 
years (particularly congenital conditions) did not recognise associated symptoms, 
therapies, or physical limitations as a co-occurring condition per se. Rather, where such 
conditions were consistent with an individual’s biography and did not threaten their 
accepted mode of normality, conditions were incorporated into everyday life and were not 
experienced as concurrent in any manifest sense. In view of these findings, it is important 
to recognise that the lay experience of multimorbidity may not be characterised by 
concurrency as imagined biomedically. To understand lay concurrency, concurrency must 
be understood as framed by biography, and in terms of whether or not, and how, illness, 
conditions, and symptoms come to be salient in the lives of individuals.  
Following these observations, a key finding of this thesis is that multimorbidity as currently 
conceived in clinically informed literature may not accord with the lay experience of 
multiple chronic conditions. Given this claim, the question must be posed as to how 
multimorbidity ought to be conceptualised in order that lay experience is better 
represented? One perspective – alluded to in Chapter Four – more attuned to the 
experiences described by participants in this study may be gleaned from Paterson’s 
widely cited shifting perspectives model (2001). This model argues against the trajectory 
model of chronic illness (illness depicted as a phased process wherein the individual 
follows a predictable trajectory). Rather, according the shifting perspective model:  
Living with chronic illness is an on-going, continually shifting process in which 
people experience a complex dialectic between themselves and their “world”… As 
the reality of the illness experience and its personal and social context changes, the 
people’s perspectives shift in the degree to which illness is in the foreground or the 
background of their “world” 
(Paterson, 2001: 23).  
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This thesis does not seek to apply Paterson’s model in a rigid or deterministic way, rather 
the shifting perspective model acts as a sensitising concept which reminds us of the 
contingent and dynamic nature of illness experience, and the links between illness and 
personal and social context. Paterson’s model asks us to be critical of the trajectory model 
of illness; a critique which may be usefully extended to the biomedical principles of 
multimorbidity. Firstly, multimorbidity as a model of illness considered in additive terms 
whereby illness is defined through the delineation and enumeration of discrete conditions. 
The findings of this thesis highlight the reductive nature of such an approach, and 
emphasise that the lay experience of multimorbidity cannot be understood in such terms. 
Participants in this study described experiences in which long-term conditions or episodes 
of illness had been incorporated into their everyday lives and which were, consequently, 
not particularly salient or disruptive; in contrast, some participants identified unexplained 
symptoms or illnesses which had not been clinically diagnosed as disruptive and 
dominating their daily lives. Secondly, the shifting perspectives model highlights the link 
between illness and contextual factors – be they contextual factors relating to the 
environment, individual psychology, socio-cultural, or economic. Context, according to 
Paterson’s model, affects how, and when, the inward and outward signs of illness shift in, 
and out, of prominence during the individual’s experience. This thesis has argued that 
multimorbidity, as informed by clinical literature, is often premised upon a mode of 
concurrency which is static and atemporal. The accounts provided by participants in this 
study highlight that the lay experience of multimorbidity must be recognised as historical, 
temporal, and biographical. These arguments accord with those advanced by Paterson 
(2001), and would support a reading of multimorbidity in terms of how and why illness, or 
wellness, come to be foregrounded in individual experience.35 This thesis has begun to 
                                                          
35 Paterson defines a ‘perspective’ as the ‘beliefs, perceptions, expectations, attitudes and 
experience about what it means to be a person with a chronic illness in a specific 
contexts’ (Paterson, 2001: 23).  According to Paterson’s model, the perspective of people 
living with chronic illness may be understood in terms of whether illness or wellness 
assume position in the foreground of individual experience. Paterson identifies the 'illness 
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answer this question, and has identified several ways by which people living with 
multimorbidity make sense of multiple chronic conditions.  
Many participants identified normality and control as important factors which shape and 
transform the impact and importance of multimorbidity. This finding is consistent with 
recent studies identified within the literature review of this thesis. In particular, Cheraghi-
Sohi et al. (2013) illustrate the role played by ‘self-perceptions of control’ in defining the 
importance of particular conditions during multimorbidity. Control, however, does not 
simply relate to the control exerted over one’s body and the symptoms of illness (although 
these are the principal registers of control). Rather, control also pertains to the individual’s 
knowledge of illness and, to use Bury’s conceptualisation, being able to ‘re-establish 
credibility in the face of the assault on self-hood which is involved’ (Bury, 1991: 456). 
Control, in this sense, pertains to actual or perceived control over the self. In this study, 
participants spoke about their efforts to gain and maintain control over their bodies, the 
symptoms of illness, the self and their social worlds; each of these representing a site of 
normality at risk during multimorbidity. Where participants were able to exert control over 
their illness, their bodies, and their lives, normality was a realistic prospect and, to use 
Paterson’s terminology, wellness came to be foregrounded in experience. By contrast, 
where control was not possible, normality seemed a remote prospect and illness was 
propelled into the foreground, dominating individuals’ personal and social worlds. 
                                                          
in the foreground perspective’ as ‘characterized by a focus on the sickness, suffering, 
loss, and burden associated with living with a chronic illness; the chronic illness is viewed 
as destructive to self and others’ (Paterson, 2001: 23). By contrast, the ‘wellness in the 
foreground perspective’ is one in which ‘the self, not the diseased body, becomes the 
source of identity. The body becomes something to which things are done, not what 
controls the person... Distancing from sickness allows for a focus on the emotional, 
spiritual, and social aspects of life, rather than primarily on the diseased body’ (Paterson, 
2001: 24).  
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Biographical reasoning was also central to how participants made sense of multimorbidity 
(a finding consistent with that of Lindsay (2009)). Chapter Four identified instances of 
illness-specific biographical reasoning; OA and cardiovascular disease, for example, were 
identified by several participants as a ‘normal’ part of growing old. However, in general, 
biographical reasoning was highly individualised, and followed personal, social, economic 
and life course factors as well as illness specific factors. Accordingly, for some, illness 
was biographically disruptive, whilst for others, biographical reconstruction and 
biographical flow were evident. Bury’s (1982) concept of biographical disruption is helpful 
in understanding the meaning of multimorbidity for some participants. The advent of 
certain conditions – particularly conditions or illness events which were new and yet to be 
understood by the individual – are often experienced as a disruptive event during which 
cognitive and material resources are thrown into relief and questioned (Bury, 1982: 178). 
For others, the intersection of ageing and chronic illness meant that multimorbidity was a 
point of biographical continuity rather than disruption. Faircloth et al. (2004) use the term 
‘biographical flow’ to depict the ways in which illness may be integrated with various other 
social contingencies and thus construct coherent and consistent biographies. Chapter 
Five presented case studies of three participants for whom biographical reasoning was 
central in defining the meaning of multimorbidity in general, and also particular conditions 
within each participant’s multimorbidity. The meaning Mary attached to her recent (and 
uncertain) diagnosis of diabetes was very different from Theo’s understanding of his 
congenital impairment. For Mary, the sudden onset of illness, enforced changes to her 
diet, and uncertainty over diagnosis meant that diabetes was biographically disruptive. 
Theo, by contrast, has always lived with impairment; the knowledge, resources and skills 
he has developed over a lifetime of disability mean that he is able to incorporate 
impairment into his everyday life. Clearly, the impact and meaning of illness in these 
cases is closely related to the biographical context within which it plays out. Biography, 
therefore, is an important register of meaning for people living with multimorbidity, and 
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attempts to understand the lay experience of multimorbidity must consider biographical 
context of paramount importance.   
Finally, several participants made sense of multimorbidity by reference to biomedicine, or 
as a result of interactions with HCPs. For some participants, the meaning of illness was 
informed by their knowledge of risk and the risk of future illness events; for example, many 
participants talked about being at increased risk of cardiovascular events as a result of 
hypertension. For most of these participants, the risk of cardiovascular events was the 
only perceptible feature of hypertension (given that it was otherwise asymptomatic and 
controlled through medication). Prognostic knowledge also informed the meaning of 
certain conditions; cancer, for example, was discussed in terms of mortality whereas 
diabetes was understood as a chronic condition which could be managed effectively. 
These observations highlight that the distinction routinely made between expert and lay 
knowledge is little more than a trope and does not accurately reflect how lay people 
understand illness. Rather, as has been discussed by McClean and Shaw (2005), 
knowledge of illness is spectral, not binary, and lay people regularly appropriate, adapt 
and deploy biomedical knowledge within their own sense making practices. Accordingly, 
the forms of biomedical knowledge which lay individuals appropriate, and the ways in 
which this knowledge shapes beliefs and practices, are likely to play an important role in 
defining whether or not – to use Paterson’s metaphor – illness or wellness come to be 
foregrounded during an individual’s experience of multimorbidity.  
These findings have further implications for the conceptualisation of multimorbidity in 
academic literature. Early research into the lay experience of multimorbidity identified that, 
among individuals with common conditions, a discernible pattern to individual experience is 
often lacking (Bayliss et al., 2003). Subsequent research regarded this observation as a 
challenge, and a burgeoning literature now addresses the ways in which certain conditions 
come to be ‘prioritised’ during lay experience. However, this thesis extends the critique of 
biomedical principles towards the concept of illness prioritisation (Elliot et al., 2007; Kerr et 
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al., 2007; Morris et al., 2011; Schoenberg et al., 2009). Illness prioritisation, as a concept, 
risks assuming the same flawed principles which appear in clinically informed multimorbidity 
literature. Namely, that people with multimorbidity understand illness by reference to neatly 
delimited conditions, and according to a biomedical model of concurrency. This thesis 
affirms the early assertion made by Bayliss and colleagues (2003) and cautions against any 
approach which focuses solely upon condition-specific patterns in lay experience. As the 
foregoing discussion has set out, the individuated nature of multimorbidity is not an obstacle 
to be overcome through closer observation and classification. Instead, variegation should 
be seen as a key characteristic of multimorbidity. To understand the lay experience of 
multimorbidity is to recognise the manner in which corporal, biographical, and socio-cultural 
logics intersect to inform meaning in individual cases. This thesis is among the first to argue 
for such an approach, and makes an important contribution towards how this might be 
realised.  
9.2.3 How do people living with multimorbidity experience social resources, and the 
receipt of support and assistance as meaningful?  
Answering the second question posed by this thesis has been a difficult and involved 
process, not least because the data presented in this study demonstrates how participants 
experience support and assistance in very different ways. Participants in this study 
experienced a wide range of medical conditions and physical impairments; social and 
economic circumstances were equally diverse. Accordingly, whilst some participants 
relied upon other people for frequent and regular support, other participants needed very 
little support and assistance in order to maintain social roles and accomplish valued 
activities. From an analytic perspective, data appeared difficult to comprehend and 
categorise. 
The diversity of participants’ circumstances and experiences was illustrated in Chapter 
Five. Three participant cases presented the complexity and diversity of participants’ 
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material and emotional experiences of support. In doing so, this chapter also highlighted 
the difficulties involved in conceptualising social resources according to perspectives 
which prevail in health sciences literature.  Chapter Six was, in part, an explication of my 
efforts as a researcher to understand various theoretical shortcomings inherent in such 
perspectives, and to confront and question my own theoretical assumptions (these issues 
are outlined in greater detail within the reflexive section of Chapter Three and throughout 
Chapter Six).Hence, chapter Six detailed the conceptual lineage of social capital and 
individualist social network perspectives. It was argued that these approaches are limited 
by their reliance upon rationalist models of agency and individualist modes of social 
action. As redress, this thesis introduced literature from gift exchange (a fundamentally 
collective form of social exchange) and promoted Baudrillard’s (1981) model of value. Gift 
exchange literature also highlighted the importance of morality in social exchange, a fact 
which shaped the findings of this thesis further. Specifically, it was argued the concept of 
reciprocity – which prevails in social capital theory – fails to adequately conceptualise 
morality and is not sufficient to explain the moral implications of support and assistance 
during illness.   
The final two chapters of this thesis applied the insight delivered in Chapter Six to the 
interpretation of participant data. Chapter Seven presented participant data and identified 
the meaning of supportive acts as falling into four logics of value: exchange-value, use-
value, semiotic-value, and symbolic-value. These logics were presented individually, 
before being applied to the analysis of more complex examples of supportive exchange. 
The term interpretive economy of meaning was coined in conceptualising the coalescing 
and intersecting nature of value forms during supportive exchanges.  
Chapter Eight focused upon the role of morality during the receipt of social resources. 
Through close analysis of participant data, this thesis presented three moral principles 
common to the receipt of support and assistance.  The virtue of independence, the 
aberrance of dependence, and the need to maintain mutuality within relationships were 
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identified. It was argued that these principles are not experienced as extraneous rules or 
obligations, but rather, are central to the individual’s understanding of selfhood – what it 
means to be a ‘good person’. The ways in which participants attempted to realise these 
ideals was termed ‘ethical work’ (Foucault, 1985) in recognition of the arduous and 
onerous nature of such moral actions; various practical actions and affective dispositions 
were identified as examples of ethical work. In discussing these issues, this thesis 
introduced the concept of possessive individualism (Macpherson, 1962) and posited that 
the above moral principles are derived from a socio-politically constituted notion of the 
individual which pervades liberal democratic societies – the possessive individual.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, possessive individualism (Macpherson, 1962) and ethical 
work (Foucault, 1985) act as a heuristic aids, sensitising us to the indissoluble relationship 
between possession; the moral enactment of possession during exchange (through 
autonomy, self-sufficiency, and independence); and selfhood. Where participants were 
able to meet the moral principles surrounding independence, dependence and mutuality, 
their sense of self retained a vital possessive aspect. Where participants fell short of these 
principles, the loss of a possessive self resulted in emotional pain and suffering. The 
validity of these findings were underscored by participants for whom the above moral 
principles – derived from the possessive nature of selfhood – were less important: married 
participants spoke about spousal relationships being deeply interdependent, and 
transcending possessive individual concerns. These findings are theoretical in their focus 
and may appear somewhat detached from the applied issues concerning social 
connectedness and health which were outlined in the initial Literature Review of this 
thesis. However, when allied to the insight offered in Chapter Seven (modes of value), the 
possessive aspects of selfhood and the ethical work undertaken to preserve this status 
describe the essential features of social resource exchange during multimorbidity. 
Consequently, this theoretical contribution speaks directly to nascent policies which seek 
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to utilise social resources in policies of health and social care. These issues will be 
outlined further in the sections which follow.  
9.3 What does this study add? 
This study contributes to knowledge in a number of ways. A primary contribution of this 
thesis is towards knowledge of an under-researched patient population, that is, people 
living with multimorbidity and the ways in which they give meaning to the experience of 
illness. In this regard, this study is also among the first to identify and question the 
biomedical assumptions which underpin the concept of multimorbidity: specifically, the 
focus upon disease rather than illness and the application of a biomedical model of 
concurrence.  
A corollary of this has been a critique of the concept of illness prioritisation which has 
emerged in recent literature. Illness prioritisation accepts (implicitly) the biomedical 
assumption that the experience of multimorbidity consists of discrete or delimited 
conditions, with these conditions experienced or perceived by the individual as 
immediately concurrent. To reject illness prioritisation altogether may yet be hasty – 
people living with illness do understand particular conditions to be meaningfully different – 
however, this thesis sounds an important note of caution within a body of literature which 
has, to date, been resolutely in favour of illness prioritisation.  
The critique of social capital and individualist social exchange afforded by this thesis is 
itself an important contribution to knowledge, given that social capital and social networks 
continue to be employed uncritically within health service and policy literature. However, 
the primary contribution of this thesis has been its treatment of social resources and in the 
conceptualisation of social resource exchange. This thesis has synthesised concepts and 
theory from wide-ranging perspectives not usually drawn upon within the sociology of 
health and illness. Specifically, this thesis contributes a pluralist reading of value, adapted 
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from Baudrillard (1981), and a conceptual model for how value and meaning are realised 
in supportive practice (the interpretive economy meaning).   
Further, this thesis details the moral dilemmas and deliberations experienced during the 
recipient of support (a perspective which is often overlooked in favour of the perspective 
of care providers). In doing so, this thesis contributes to an understanding of support and 
the role of morality in shaping selfhood, individual dispositions, and actions in response to 
support. This thesis allies Foucault’s writings on ethics (1985) with the concept of 
possessive individualism (Macpherson, 1962) to illustrate the ways in which people in 
receipt of support work to produce themselves as ethical individuals according to 
particular socio-political parameters (possessive individualism within a liberal democratic 
society). This is a novel contribution in both conceptual and empirical terms. 
9.4 Policy implications 
In recent years, multimorbidity has attracted increasing attention and support from 
academic research, and professionals from clinical practice, policy, and service design. In 
large part, this development is to be welcomed; services, therapies and clinical guidelines 
should reflect the empirical reality of multimorbidity rather than an outdated single-disease 
model of illness. Clearly, there is the potential for people living with multiple chronic 
conditions to face particular challenges in terms of navigating healthcare systems, self-
managing multiple medications, and with regard to poorer physical and mental health 
outcomes (Fortin et al., 2007). However, as the concept of multimorbidity is adopted within 
academic and clinical practice, it is important to recognise the biomedical principles upon 
which it is premised. The chairman of the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) has stated recently that ‘We have to find a way of addressing the 
whole complex issue of multimorbidity ‘ adding, ‘Finding a way to determine what looks 
good for a patient [with multimorbidity] is extraordinarily important’ (Haslam, 2014). In this 
regard, policies addressing multimorbidity would benefit by affirming the distinction 
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between disease and illness, and should recognise multimorbidity as a concept which 
privileges a disease perspective rather than an illness perspective. Recognising 
multimorbidity as an illness experience akin to Paterson’s (2001) shifting perspectives  
model – with its focus upon illness and wellness rather than disease – would likely lead to 
a more sensitive and effective treatment of multiple chronic conditions. Such insight might 
be delivered through a genuine engagement with the concept of person-centred care, and 
by recognising the potential for highly individualised needs within this patient population.  
The literature review of this thesis identified social resources, social networks and 
community as salient themes in emerging health and social care policy. At a national 
level, ‘capable communities’ (DH, 2010) are promoted as a means towards re-orientating 
services and care provision from centrist to localised  delivery – a policy which is 
representative of wider UK public services (Christie, 2011). This trend is apparent in the 
representation of health and social care users as ‘active citizens’ (DOH 2010) – a status 
which asserts the responsibility of communities towards their members rather than the 
rights of the individual – and social networks, neighbourhoods, and the public sphere 
more generally as ‘capable communities’ (DOH 2010) – communities are ‘capable’ insofar 
as they afford social resources.  Emerging models of service organisation conceive of 
individuals and social groups in a similar way. An offshoot of community development 
theory (Kretzmann and McKnight 1996), asset-based models of health purport to make 
visible ‘the skills, knowledge, connections and potential in a community’, promoting 
‘capacity, connectedness and social capital’ (McLean 2011: 2). In primary care, the 
concept of ‘social prescribing’ seeks to extend the tools available to general practitioners 
beyond those of biomedical intervention, to include the prescription of community based 
assets. Such assets may include voluntary work agencies, libraries, social or lunch 
groups, self-help groups, befriending organisations, hobby clubs, horticulture, sports 
clubs, nature conservation, book groups, art or dance classes, and the like (Brandling and 
House 2009: 454). The role of family and friends in the self-management of chronic illness 
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has also been recognised (Gallant, Spitze, and Prohaska 2007; Rosland and Piette, 2010; 
Vassilev et al. 2010), and calls have been made for patient’s social networks to be 
recognised and incorporated into the self-care agenda (Rogers et al. 2011). Following 
this, the Theoretical Review chapter of this thesis identified and problematized several 
theoretical assumptions which underpin the turn towards social connectedness in health 
and social care policy. Current perspectives upon social resources, social networks and 
community routinely rely upon modes of social exchange which are, at their core, 
individualist. The concept of social capital continues to be the most visible example of this. 
This thesis has outlined the conceptual lineage of individualist exchange and in doing so, 
has highlighted inherent weaknesses; namely, an impoverished understanding of human 
agency, a reductive reading of social action (as instrumental action), and a general 
negligence of affective, social and cultural factors. The model of value and the critique of 
morality offered by this thesis are useful in considering how social resources might 
realistically be applied in health and social care policy. If policies such as those identified 
above are to be genuinely progressive in their incorporation of social resources, then 
vicissitudes of value and meaning must be recognised. Further, such policies must 
appreciate the moral dilemmas posed by social exchange. People in need of support and 
assistance often struggle to meet the principles of virtue and aberrance which are 
experienced during the receipt of support. As such, promoting social resources without 
heeding these issues may inadvertently contribute to suffering as the compunction to 
maintain the possessive self becomes unattainable. One way of recognising these 
concerns, whilst reconciling them with emerging modes of service delivery, may be 
gleaned from the field of disability studies and the notion of independence according to an 
independent living philosophy. The independent living movement has been critical of 
independence in its possessive modes, and has contributed a model of independence 
premised upon interdependence with an emphasis on empowerment (Morris, 2004). The 
applied mechanism for such a philosophy is self-directed support (such as direct 
payments and personal budgets in social care) which enables the receipt of care and 
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support whilst simultaneously empowering the recipient of support. In this regard, the 
advent of personal health budgets is to be welcomed, as is the nascent integration of 
health and social care budgets and systems of support.   
9.5 Future research 
This thesis has highlighted a number of issues which would benefit from further research, 
and there are aspects of interest within this thesis which have not, as yet, been fully 
developed. The following section outlines these issues as topics for future research. 
People living with multimorbidity remain an under-researched patient population. While 
this thesis has been somewhat critical of multimorbidity in conceptual terms, demographic 
factors and developments in healthcare determine that increasing numbers of people are, 
and will be, living with multiple chronic conditions. Accordingly, it is important that 
qualitative research continues to engage with the issue of multimorbidity and to shape 
debate concerning service design, therapies, and interventions aimed towards this patient 
population. Further, as biomedical and clinical research continues to advance 
understanding of the aetiology and pathophysiology of concurrent conditions, social 
research might seek  to understand how aetiologically linked or commonly co-occurring 
chronic conditions are experienced in terms of health services, interactions with HCPs, 
and health promotion interventions. As healthcare systems transition from a focus on 
single diseases to ones which recognises the predominance of multimorbidity in ageing 
populations, new models of care may be informed usefully and effectively by insights from 
sociological theory and research. 
Another focus of future research ought to be the experience of multimorbidity within 
distinct communities. This thesis has highlighted socio-cultural aspects of meaning, and 
has illustrated how these logics of meaning shape the receipt of support. However, this 
study recruited only participants of White British ethnic background and while social class 
varied within the sample, this study was relatively homogeneous in cultural terms.  It is 
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conceivable that supportive practices may be interpreted differently within culturally 
distinct communities – LGBT communities as compared to South Asian communities, for 
example. As such, applying similar research questions, and considering the findings of 
this thesis in relation to different cultures and communities would be worthwhile.  
In a similar vein, the forms of social resources considered in this study were largely – 
although not exclusively – examples of informal social support. As policies and services 
continue to incorporate social resources, the boundaries between formal and informal 
care are likely to become increasingly blurred. As such, considering the exchange of 
social resources in the spaces between informal and formal services is important. In this 
regard, services such as befriending and reading groups, or settings such as support 
groups and food banks warrant further research in relation to the illness experience and in 
terms of how they are to be usefully incorporated into primary care.  Further, the role of 
third sector organisations (who are increasingly delivering services formerly undertaken by 
the public sector) should be addressed. Such models of service provision represent an 
important avenue of research in that these services are neither purely informal (often 
requiring some form of payment), nor formal, but represent new forms of hybridised 
service.  
Another issue for future research concerns the divide between health and social care. 
There have been, in recent decades, widespread calls to integrate health and social care 
systems in the care of people living with complex and long-term conditions. Understanding 
the experience of older people living with multimorbidity would benefit from similar 
integration between health and social care research. The distinction between health and 
social care research risks duplication of knowledge and may result in the promotion of 
solutions which reinforce the divide between health and social care. Future research into 
the experience of multimorbidity (a patient population that are high users of both health 
and social care services) would benefit from a ‘whole systems’ approach which draws 
upon knowledge and expertise from health and social care researchers – as well as those 
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with expertise in policy and service organisation – to deliver sensitive and sophisticated 
solutions to the challenges faced by people living with multimorbidity.  
In terms of sociological research generally, issues of support, co-operation and social 
networks would benefit from incorporating gift-exchange literature into the conceptual 
repertoire. Baudrillard’s early work – which bridges anthropology, semiotics, and political 
economy – may be particularly useful in this direction. Future research might seek to 
explore the possibilities and limits of these theoretical issues in applied terms.  
9.6 Conclusion 
The concept of multimorbidity – taken to mean the ‘co-existence of two or more long-term 
conditions in an individual’ (Mercer et al., 2009) – does not conceptualise adequately the 
lay experience of illness. Lay individuals often do not consider their health in terms of 
delimited conditions, nor as immediately concurrent conditions. Rather, experiences of 
multimorbidity vary enormously and are made sense of according to intersecting corporal, 
social, cultural and biographical logics.   
Social resource exchanges are complex social practices and cannot be understood 
through individualist, rationalist, or instrumental perspectives. Rather, understanding 
social resource exchange requires an appreciation of the various coalescing logics of 
value which inform the meaning of supportive acts. Morality is of central concern in these 
processes. Identifying the moral principles of exchange and recognising these principles 
as constituted by a particular (socio-politically informed) mode of individualism is essential 
to understanding social resource exchange. 
These findings are of relevance to clinical practice, the design of interventions, and also at 
the level of health and social care policy. Acknowledging the findings of this thesis may, in 
some small fashion, contribute to an experience of illness wherein suffering is less 
pronounced. 
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Appendix 1: Baseline Participant Details 
 
Pseu-
donym 
Sex 
M/F 
Emplo-
yment 
status 
Age 
Group 
Social-class / 
occupation 
held for most 
of life 
Marital / 
Accommod-
ation status 
Self-reported 
illnesses (in addition 
to OA and CVD) 
Mary F Retired 65-74 N/a long-term 
unemployed 
Single, Lives 
Alone 
Mental health (non-
specific), asthma, 
angina, type II 
diabetes, reactive 
arthritis (eye), 
Raynaud’s 
phenomenon, clawed 
toe. 
Ian M Retired 65-74 Managerial Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Osteomyelitis (as 
teenager, permanent 
limitation), glaucoma.   
Bill M Retired 75+ Routine 
manual  
Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Asthma, COPD, 
regular episodic chest 
infections and stomach 
ulcers, ‘collapsed 
vocal chords’. 
Pamela 
 
 
F Retired 65-74 Professional Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Rheumatoid arthritis, 
bunions. 
Rose F Retired 75+ Skilled non-
manual 
Single, Lives 
Alone 
Type II diabetes, 
‘underactive thyroid’, 
glaucoma, 
‘breathlessness’, ‘fluid 
renention’, bronchitis. 
George M Retired 75+ Managerial Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Asbestosis, stomach 
ulcers, prostate cancer 
(14 years ago, 7 years 
ago) COPD. 
James M Retired 65-74 Skilled manual Single, Lives 
Alone 
Heart attack (10 years 
ago), prostate cancer 
(2 years ago).  
Theo M Retired 65-74 Skilled manual Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Heart failure, multiple 
‘mini strokes’, ‘clubbed 
foot’ (congenital), mild 
cognitive impairment.  
David M  Retired 65-74 Skilled non-
manual 
Single, Lives 
with 
Daughter 
and 
Grandson 
 Type II diabetes 
(borderline), back pain.  
Elaine F Retired 65-74 N/a Long-term 
unemployed 
Single, Lives 
Alone 
Depression, anxiety.  
Isla F Retired 75+ Skilled non-
manual 
Single, Lives 
Alone 
Hip surgery 
complications (limited 
mobility and pain), 
bronchitis. 
Mo F Employ
ed full-
time 
55-64 Professional Single, Lives 
with 
Daughter 
Systematic lupus, 
depression, addiction 
(pain killers) 
  
Judith F Retired 65-74 Domestic work Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Congenital 
neuromuscular 
condition (left side of 
body significantly 
impaired, limited 
mobility), ankylosing 
spondylitis (neck), 
vertigo,   
Kirsty  F  Employ
ed part-
time 
65-74 Professional  Married, 
Lives with 
Spouse 
Fibromyalgia, coeliac 
disease, diverticulitis. 
Dan M  Retired 65-74 Managerial Married, 
Lives with 
Son 
Prostate cancer (18 
months ago), neck 
pain / stiffness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2: Social Contact Participants List 
 
 
Social Contact Name Name of Patient 
Participant 
Anne Theo 
Geoff  Pamela 
Cath Bill 
Sandra George 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Participant Recruitment by Mailing Batch 
 
 
Participant Recruitment by Mailing Batch 
Mailing batch 
number  
Number of full 
consents 
Batch 1 3 
Batch 2 4 
Batch 3 3 
Batch 4 3 
Batch 5 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 4: Invitation Letter (Patient Participant) 
 
[Headed Paper] 
 
Dear (Name),  
 
In the past 12 months you have kindly taken part in research in which you completed several 
questionnaires about your general health; these questionnaires were called the ‘General 
Health Questionnaire’ and the ‘General Health Monthly Questionnaire’.  
 
In the final questionnaire, you ticked a box suggesting that you would be willing to take part in 
further research. We are currently asking people if they would be willing to take part in a new 
study.  
 
The new study is called ‘The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses’. 
This study looks at people’s experiences of living with more than one illness, and also the role 
that friends and family play in their lives.  
 
More details of this new study are enclosed within this letter. We have included a study 
information leaflet should you wish to find out more about the study. Also enclosed is a 
consent form, to be signed and returned if you would like to take part in this new study.  
 
If you would like to speak to somebody about the study you can call Tom Porter on: 01782 
734721. You can also write to us here at the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre 
(address below). If you do not want to help with any more research we apologise for writing to 
you now.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
Tom Porter,  
PhD researcher.  
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 5: Invitation Letter (Social Contact Participant) 
 
 
[Headed Paper] 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter.  
 
The person that gave you this letter is taking part in an on-going study, this study is called; 
‘The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses’.  
 
The study looks at people’s experiences of health and illness, and also the role that other 
people play in their lives, such as friends and family.  
 
The person that gave you this letter has suggested that you are important in their life. We 
would like to hear your views about this person’s health, the role they play in your life, and also 
the role you play in their life.  
 
If you would like to help us with this study, we would like to invite you to take part in a short 
interview – either in person or by telephone. We have included a study information leaflet 
should you wish to find out more about the study. Also enclosed is a consent form, to be 
signed and returned if you would like to take part in this study.  
 
If you would like to speak to somebody about the study you can call Tom Porter on: 01782 
734889. You can also write to us here at the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre 
(address below). If you do not want to help with this research we apologise for writing to you 
now.  
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
 
 
 
Tom Porter,  
PhD researcher.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 6: Study Information Leaflet (Patient Participant) 
 
[Headed Paper] 
 
Study title: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses 
 
You are invited to participate in the above study which is being conducted within the 
Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele University.  
 
This leaflet explains what will happen if you agree to take part in this study. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. If you 
would like to discuss anything with a member of the team, please call Tom Porter Tel: 
01782 734721. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand people’s experiences of living with more than 
one chronic illness at any one time.  
 
The study also looks at how people’s experiences of illness are shaped by the people 
around them, such as family, friends, and work colleagues.  
 
We hope that by understanding these issues, we may be able to contribute to the 
development of services that better meet the needs of people living with multiple illnesses.   
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you are free to decide whether or not to take part.  
 
You have been chosen because, when you filled in a questionnaire earlier this 
year, you agreed to further contact. The questionnaire was called “The general 
health questionnaire”.  
 
If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form 
(enclosed). If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time, and without giving a reason.  
 
Your decision as to whether or not to take part in the study, or any 
decision to withdraw from the study, will not affect the treatment you will 
receive, or any legal rights. 
 
If you would like to take part, please complete and return the enclosed consent 
form and we will contact you. 
  
Please turn over 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you choose to take part, we would send you two questionnaires (spaced between three 
and six months apart), and invite you to take part in two interviews about your health 
(again, spaced between three and six months apart).  
 
At the beginning of the study you would complete one questionnaire and one interview, 
then, at a time of your choice between three and six months later, you would complete the 
second questionnaire and the second interview.  
 
The questionnaires 
 
The questionnaires are designed to help us understand which people you are in 
contact with on a day-to-day basis. Each questionnaire asks you to record the 
people that you are in contact with over a 7 day period; this takes the form of a 7 
day diary. In this diary you may name any person that you wish. 
Upon completion of this 7 day diary, the questionnaires ask some questions about 
the people you have recorded; questions include their age, their sex, and how 
close they live.   
 
The interviews 
 
The interviews will focus upon your experience of living with more than one illness at the 
same time, and also the role that other people play in your life. 
Each interview will last approximately 1 hour, and can be arranged at a time and 
place that is best for you. During the interview, you can choose not to answer 
questions, or to end the interview at any time, and for any reason. 
We would like to audio-record the interviews, the interviews will then be typed out; 
this is called a transcript. The transcript will be fully anonymised and will not bear 
any information that would identify you by name. Both the tape and the transcript 
of the interviews will be kept in a secure location and will only be used by 
researchers directly concerned with this study.  
We will ask you if you would like a copy of the transcripts of your interviews. We 
will store the tapes securely for 20 years, and after this time they will be destroyed.  
Quotations from the interview may be used in reports of this study. Your identity 
will be hidden in any such report, and you will not be identified personally. The fact 
that you have taken part in the study will not be revealed to anyone outside the 
research team. If the interview contains comments or information that might 
identify a third party, or an institution (e.g., a GP, clinic or hospital), we will ensure 
  
that the person or institution cannot be identified in any account or published report 
of this study. 
During the interviews, you can choose not to answer questions, or to end the 
interview at any time. Any information that you give in the interview will not be 
passed on to anyone else without your permission. 
 
In addition to the two questionnaires and the two interviews, you will be given  
the option to contribute in two further ways. These include; 
Monthly update letter 
 
Each month, you would receive a letter via post, asking you about your recent 
health and the role of other people. If you felt that something important had 
occurred or changed in that month, and you felt you wanted to share these 
experiences, we would provide an opportunity for you to do so. You may wish to 
take part in a short telephone interview; this would be done at your convenience.  
We would continue to send you a monthly update letter until your second 
questionnaire. Each monthly letter also allows you to indicate that you do not wish 
to take part in the study.  
 
Interview with an ‘important’ other person 
 
Because we are interested in the role that other people play in your experience of 
health and illness, we would welcome the opportunity to interview someone you 
identify as being important in your life, such as a family member or a friend.  
 
This interview would focus on this other person’s understanding of your illness, 
and the role they play in your life.   
 
If you were agreeable to this part of the study, you would choose the person to be 
invited to take part in the interview. You would then pass on information about the 
study, and that person could contact us if they wanted to take part. This person 
would then be invited to take part in a short interview.  
 
This interview would last approximately 30-60 minutes and would be audio-
recorded and transcribed in the same way as your interviews. We would not 
discuss your interview or any of your personal information with this person. We will 
ask you about this part of the study at the end of your interviews.  
 
How long will it take? 
 
If you complete the two questionnaires and two interviews, it will take approximately 6 
hours.  
 
  
If you would like to take part in additional interviews following the monthly update letter, 
this may add another 2 - 4 hours. 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct risks relating to medical treatment in this study nor is there 
intended to be any direct medical benefit. There may be an indirect benefit to 
you and other patients from the insights we gain f rom this study, but we cannot 
be sure about this.   
   
Sometimes during interviews like these, a small number of people may feel 
some distress, for example, an interview topic might bring back unhappy 
memories or distressing thoughts. If this happens and you do not wish to 
discuss the issue further, the topic will not be followed up again during the 
interview. Furthermore, you may end the interview at any point. In the event 
that any interview were to become upsetting, we would like to make sure you 
are supported; we would be happy to stay in touch or visit you if you wished, or, 
should you prefer, we will direct you towards your GP.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
 
This study is part of a programme of work into osteoarthritis being conducted 
by the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele University. The 
study is being funded by Arthritis Research UK. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The North West Cheshire Research Ethics Committee has approved this study. 
 
What should I do if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (contact Tom Porter tel: 
01782 734721). If you remain unhappy, and wish to complain formally you can do this. 
Details and advise about making a complaint may be obtained from your local Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) (telephone 01606 544444). 
How can further information about the study be obtained? 
 
We will be glad to answer any questions that you may have about this study. 
You can call us at the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre, Keele 
University on (01782) 734721. Please ask for Tom Porter who is one of the 
researchers working on this study. You can also email us at 
t.porter@ipchs.keele.ac.uk or write to us at the address below. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this leaflet 
 
  
Appendix 7: Study Information Leaflet (Social Contact Participant) 
[Headed Paper] 
Study title: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses  
You are invited to participate in the above study which is being conducted within the 
Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele University.  
This leaflet explains what will happen if you agree to take part in this study. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. If you 
would like to discuss anything with a member of the team, please call Tom Porter Tel: 
01782 734721. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to understand people’s experiences of living with more than 
one chronic illness at any one time.  
We hope to speak to people living with chronic illness, and also the people in their lives 
that they identify as being important in some way. 
The study looks at how people’s experiences of illness are shaped by the people around 
them, such as family, friends, and work colleagues.  
By better understanding these issues, we hope that we may be able to contribute to the 
development of services that better meet the needs of people living with multiple illnesses.   
Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because Mrs Kathleen Walley 
has identified you as being important in their life.  
 
We are interested in understanding your views on your relationship with Mrs 
Walley and the role you play in their life.  
Do I have to take part? 
No, you are free to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take 
part you will be asked to sign a consent form (enclosed). If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time, and without giving a reason.  
 
Your decision as to whether or not to take part in the study, or any decision to 
withdraw from the study, will not affect any treatment you may receive, or any 
legal rights. 
 
If you would like to take part, please return the enclosed consent form and  we 
will contact you. 
  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be invited to take part in a short interview about your 
relationship with Mrs Walley and the role you play in their life. 
The interview can be conducted in person or by telephone, and at a time and 
place that is best for you. During the interview, you can choose not to answer 
questions, or to end the interview at any time, and for any reason.  
 
We would like to audio-record the interview, the interview will then be typed 
out; this is called a transcript. The transcript will be fully anonymised and 
will not bear any information that would identify you by name.  Both the 
tape and the transcript of the interview will be kept in a secure locat ion and will 
only be used by researchers directly concerned with this study.  
 
We will ask you if you would like a copy of the transcripts of your interview. We 
will store the tapes securely for 20 years, and after this time they will be 
destroyed. 
 
Quotations from the interview may be used in reports of this study. Your 
identity will be hidden in any such report, and you will not be identified 
personally. If the interview contains comments or information that might 
identify a third party, or an institution (e.g., a GP, clinic or hospital), we will 
ensure that the person or institution cannot be identified in any account or 
published report of this study. 
 
How long will it take? 
 
The interview may be conducted in person or via telephone, and will be 
arranged entirely at your convenience. The interview will last between 30 and 
60 minutes.  
 
What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part?  
 
There are no direct risks relating to medical treatment in this study nor is there 
intended to be any direct medical benefit. There may be an indirect benefit to 
you and other people from the insights we gain from this study, but we cannot 
be sure about this.   
 
Sometimes during interviews like these, a small number of people may feel 
some distress, for example, an interview topic might bring back unhappy 
memories or distressing thoughts. If this happens and you do not wish to 
discuss the issue further, the topic will not be followed up again during the 
interview. Furthermore, you may end the interview at any point.  
 
 
Please turn over 
  
 
 
In the event that the interview were to become upsetting, we would like to make 
sure you are supported; we would be happy to stay in touch or visit you if you 
wished, or, should you prefer, we will direct you towards more formal support 
such as your GP. 
 
What should I do if I have a complaint? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
to the researchers who will do their best to answer your questions (please call 
Tom Porter in 01782 734721). If you remain unhappy, and wish to complain 
formally you can do this. Details and advise about making a complaint may be 
obtained from your local Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) (telephone 
01606 544444).  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study is part of a programme of work into osteoarthritis being conducted 
by the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele University. The 
Study is being funded by Arthritis Research UK.  
 
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds 
for compensation against Keele University but you may have to pay your own 
legal costs. The normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms will 
still be available to you (if appropriate).  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The North West Cheshire Research Ethics Committee has approved this study.  
 
How can further information about the study be obtained? 
 
We will be glad to answer any questions that you may have about this study. 
You can call us at the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Centre at Keele 
University on (01782) 734721. Please ask for Tom Porter who is one of the 
researchers working on this study. You can also email us at 
t.porter@ipchs.keele.ac.uk or write to us at the address below.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this leaflet 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 8: Consent Form (Patient Participant) 
 
[Headed Paper] 
Patient participant consent form 
Study title: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic 
illnesses  
This form signifies that you consent to take part in this study. You are reminded to read 
the information letter about this study before giving consent to take part.  Please tick 
where appropriate: 
                  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information leaflet (version 2.1 
dated 12.12.2012) and have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had 
these answered 
satisfactorily................................................................................................................ 
 
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary. I also understand that I 
may withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, and that this does not affect 
my medical care or legal 
rights........................................................................................................................... 
 
3. I understand that I will be sent two postal questionnaires (over a three to six 
month period)............................................................................................................. 
 
4. I understand that I will be contacted about participating in two interviews about my 
health (over a three to six month 
period)........................................................................................................................ 
 
5. I understand that I will be contacted monthly (in the months between first and 
second interview/questionnaire) and given the opportunity to participate in 
further interviews about my health and 
wellbeing.................................................................................................................... 
 
6. I understand that the interviews will be taped and transcribed, but will bear no 
personal identifying information. I also understand that the tapes will be stored in a 
secure location for 20 years and after this time they will be 
destroyed.................................................................................................................... 
 
7. I understand that relevant data collected during the study, may be looked at by 
individuals from the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Research Centre at Keele 
University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to 
my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to this 
data……………………………………………………………………............................... 
 
8. I understand that quotations from the interview may be included in reports or 
publications from this study, but that these will be anonymous and I will not be 
identifiable.................................................................................................................. 
 
  
9. I give permission for my medical records to be reviewed in 
confidence................................................................................................................ 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in the study.............................................................................................. 
 
Name...................................................................................................................................... 
 
Signed ................................................................................................................................... 
 
Date........................................................................................................................................ 
 
 
Thank you for your help with this study. If you have any further questions about the 
study please contact Tom Porter on 01782 734721. 
 
 
 
To be completed by the researcher: 
 
Name of researcher............................................................................................................... 
 
Signed...............................................................................   Date.......................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 9: Consent Form (Social Contact Participant)  
 
[Headed Paper] 
 
Social contact consent form 
 
Study title: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses  
 
This form signifies that you consent to take part in this study. You are reminded to read 
the information leaflet about this study before giving consent to take part. Please tick 
where appropriate: 
                  
Yes 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information leaflet (version 1.2 dated 
21.12.2011) and have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily............................................................................................... 
 
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary. I also understand that I 
may withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, and that this does not affect 
my medical care or legal 
rights........................................................................................................................... 
 
3. I understand that the interview will be taped and transcribed, and the transcript will 
bear no personal identifying information. I also understand that the tapes will be 
stored in a secure location for 20 years and after this time they will be 
destroyed.................................................................................................................... 
 
4. I understand that relevant data collected during the study, may be looked at by 
individuals from the Arthritis Research UK Primary Care Research Centre at Keele 
University, from regulatory authorities or from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to 
my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to this 
data…………………………........................................................................................ 
 
5. I understand that quotations from the interview may be included in reports or 
publications from this study, but that these will be anonymous and I will not be 
identifiable.................................................................................................................. 
               
6. I agree to take part in the study.................................................................................. 
 
 
 
Name  .............................................................................................................. 
 
 
Telephone number ………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Signed.............................................................................................................. 
 
Date.................................................................................................................. 
 
  
 
 
 
Thank you for your help with this study. If you have any further questions about the 
study please contact Tom Porter on 01782 734721. 
 
 
 
 
To be completed by the researcher: 
 
Name of researcher.............................................................................................................. 
 
Signed.................................................................................................................................. 
 
Date...................................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 10: Confirmation of Interview Letter 
                  [Headed Paper] 
 
Study title: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses     
 
 
Dear (Name),  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the above study. This letter is to confirm the time 
and date for your interview with a member of the research team.  
 
Your interview is scheduled for [Time and date] 
 
If you have any further queries, or would like to arrange for a more convenient time and/or 
date, please contact Tom Porter on Tel: 01782 734 721. 
 
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tom Porter,  
PhD researcher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 11: Interview Topic Guide (Patient Participant)  
 
Explain the study – I hope to understand how people live with more than one illness as 
the same time. I am also interested in the role that other people play in your life and the 
role you play in other people’s lives.  
Explain the interview: All is confidential, I will not discuss anything from this interview 
with your family /friends/other social contacts or anyone outside the research team.   
You do not have to answer any of the questions, and you can stop the interview at any 
time. Confirm audio-record.  
 
Multiple chronic illnesses 
 Tell me about your general health? 
 Do you consider any of your conditions to be more important than other 
conditions? 
o Why do you think this is? 
 Do you feel that the doctors or health-services understand what is important to 
you? 
o Why do you think this is? 
 How do you manage your different conditions?  
 How do you manage your day-to-day activities? 
 
Social network 
You recently completed a questionnaire in which you recorded the people you were in 
contact with over a week: 
 Was this week usual or unusual in any way? 
 Is there anyone that is important in helping you with your health? 
 How does your health affect how/when/why you see people? 
 Do you do things for other people?  
 Do you think that your health has changed your relationship with anyone? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 12: Interview Topic Guide (Social Contact Participant)  
 
Explain the study – I hope to understand how people live with more than one illness as 
the same time. I am also interested in the role that other people play in the lives of people 
with multiple illnesses.  
Explain the interview: All is confidential, I will not discuss anything from this interview 
with your family /friends/other social contacts or anyone outside the research team.   
 
You do not have to answer any of the questions, and you can stop the interview at any 
time. Confirm audio-record. 
 Tell me about this person’s general health? 
 Do you consider any of this person’s conditions to be more important than any 
other conditions? 
o Why do you think this is? 
 Do you feel that doctors or health-services understand what is important to this 
person? 
o Why do you think this is? 
 
 What role do you play in this person’s life? 
 What role do they play in your life? 
 Do you think that this person’s health has affected your relationship? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 13: Social Network Diary Cover Letter 
 
Dear (name), 
Study title – The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in the above study.  
Enclosed is a questionnaire which we would ask you to complete and return in the enclosed 
pre-paid envelope.  
This questionnaire has two sections. Section1 is called ‘Your daily diary’. In section1, you 
are asked to record the people that you are in contact with over 7 days. You should record 
the names of people that you meet face to face, and also the people you are in contact with 
by telephone, by letter, or by email etc. This may include a partner, family members, friends, 
work colleagues, or even strangers.  
Section 2 is called ‘Details of your contacts’. In section 2, you are asked some questions 
about each of the people you recorded in section 1, you should complete a row of questions 
for each of these people.  
This study aims to better understand the role of other people in shaping the experience of 
illness. In completing sections 1 & 2, you will be helping us to understand the type of people 
that you are in contact with over a week. We will discuss these issues further in your 
interview. If you have any issues at all, or would like to speak with someone about how to 
complete the questionnaire, please feel free to contact Tom Porter Tel: 01782 734 721. 
Once you have completed sections 1 & 2, please return the questionnaire in the enclosed 
pre-paid envelope.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Tom Porter,  
PhD Student   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14: Social Network Diary 
  
Section 1 – Your daily diary 
Over the next 7 days, please use the diary below to record the people that you are in 
contact with.  
Please feel free to record any person that you have been in contact with. It would be 
helpful to record all the people that you are in contact with, including those people you 
meet face-to-face, but also those that you are in contact with by telephone, by letter, or by 
email etc.  
Please record any contact that feels ’important’ to you. The people you record will often be 
people that you already know, such as family and friends. However, sometimes you may 
not know the person very well or they may even be a stranger to you.  
You do not need to record people’s full names; a first name and initial is all that is needed 
(e.g. Joe B). Where you do not know a person’s name, record them as ‘unknown 1’, 
‘unknown 2’, ‘unknown 3’ etc.  
The following is an example of how each day should be completed: 
 
 
 
 
In this example you met with James J, and Sarah J. There was also contact with a third 
person – ‘Unknown 1’ – although you did not know their name, you chatted for some time 
and they felt quite important to you. 
 
 
 
 
In this example, you wrote a letter to Sarah J. You also chatted with a local person – you 
do not know their name, however, this chat was quite important to you, so they are 
recorded in your diary as ‘Unknown 2’.  
 
If you have any questions, please contact Tom Porter:  
01782 734 721 
Your daily diary begins overleaf 
Your Daily Diary 
Day 1 example - Who were you in contact with today? 
 
James J, Sarah J. and Unknown 1. 
 
Day 2 example -   Who were you in contact with today? 
Sarah J. and Unknown 2. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day 1:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Day 2:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Day 3:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Day 4:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day 5:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Day 6:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Day 7:  Who were you in contact with today? 
 
Finally, if there are any ‘important’ people in your life that you have 
not contacted in the 7 days, record their names here: 
 
  
Section 2 – Details of your contacts 
Now that have completed section 1, please complete the table below. For each person recorded in 
section 1, complete a row of information. In cases where you did not know a person’s name, record their 
name as ‘unknown 1’, ‘unknown 2’ etc, and complete as much of the row as possible.  The survey 
provides enough space for up to 25 people, if you require additional pages or have any questions, please 
contact Tom Porter on: 01782 734721.  
Person 1 
 
Name  
 
_________ 
 
 
Their age? 
 
  _____ Years 
 
 
Their sex? 
 
Male/Female 
 
_________ 
Their relationship with 
you? 
 
1 – Family 
2 – Friend 
3 – Neighbour 
4 – Other (please state) 
___________________ 
 
How important is this 
person to you? 
 
1 – Very important 
2 – Fairly important  
3 – Not particularly          
important 
4 – Not at all important 
_________________ 
How long have 
you known this 
person? 
 
______ Years 
 
______ Months 
 
How many miles 
away does this 
person live? 
 
________ Mile(s) 
 
Person 2 
 
Name  
 
_________ 
 
 
Their age? 
 
  _____ Years 
 
 
Their sex? 
 
Male/Female 
 
_________ 
Their relationship with 
you? 
 
1 – Family 
2 – Friend 
3 – Neighbour 
4 – Other (please state) 
___________________ 
 
How important is this 
person to you? 
 
1 – Very important 
2 – Fairly important  
3 – Not particularly          
important 
4 – Not at all important 
_________________ 
How long have 
you known this 
person? 
 
______ Years 
 
______ Months 
 
How many miles 
away does this 
person live? 
 
________ Mile(s) 
  
Appendix 15: Monthly Update Sheet (Patient Participant) 
 
 
Study: The social networks of people living with multiple chronic illnesses 
 
Monthly update sheet 
 
 
 This month, have there been any developments in your health and 
wellbeing? 
 
 No, nothing this month 
Yes, but I do not wish to be contacted  
Yes, and I would like to be contacted about my experiences this 
month 
 
 
 In your interview we discussed the role of other people in your life. 
This month, have there been any developments in the role that other 
people play in your life? 
 
 
 No, nothing this month 
Yes, but I do not wish to be contacted 
Yes, and I would like to be contacted about my experiences this 
month 
 
 
I do not wish to take part in this study anymore 
 
 
If you would like to speak to the researcher, please ring Tom Porter on tel: 
01782 734 721. 
 
Please return this form in the envelope provided 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 16: NRES Letter (Request for Further Information) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 17: NRES Letter 2 (Confirmation of Ethical Approval) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 18: NRES Letter 3 (Confirmation of Ethical Amendment) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 19: Example of Anonymised Interview Transcript 
 
I: Okay. There we go. So, basically, all I really know about yourself is that you completed 
those questionnaires [yeah]. And I think the people that completed those questionnaires 
had some kind of osteoarthritis [yeah], and some kind of cardiovascular condition [yeah], 
so like blood pressure or, that and the other. So, I’m assuming that you’ve got a couple of 
conditions there? 
IV: No, I’ve got diabetes, thyroid…what else have I got? Blood pressure and, er, fluid 
retention. I don’t think I want much more, do I? 
I: No [laughs], that’s enough, I’d have thought, is it? And…and do you have arthritis as 
well? 
IV: Yes, I’ve had both me knees done, operated on, you know, renewed, but they’re going 
old now.  
I: Is it just in the knees that you have…? 
IV: No, I’ve got it in me back, and all me elbows and, and been, since I’ve been on this 
[01:03 – metformin] for me diabetes, I get nothing but blooming cramp [right], in my hands 
now, and it’s most annoying. 
I: Is that something you put directly down to that, the medication? 
IV: Well, apparently it does, that does cause it, for diabetes [yeah], so they tell me, so I don’t 
know. 
I: No, no, okay, but that would, that would… 
IV: But I don’t want any more tablets, I’m sick of them. 
I: Really? 
IV: I’ve just ordered some; I ordered them now. God, there’s about 14 things I have to order. 
So, er… 
  
I: Is that quite a major part of… 
IV: Well, I take 9, 13, 14 tablets a day, and you get sick and fed up of them. And they say 
you should take them at different times; if I had to take them at different times I’d never 
get them down. What I do, I put them all in my hand and I just…with a drink, else they’d 
never go down [yeah]. So, whether they fight or whether they work properly, I don’t know, 
but I certainly couldn’t take them one at a time like some people do.  
 [Door slams] 
 Oh, God, I hope he remembers to put my black bin out. 
I: Do you want me to chase after him? 
IV: Yeah, if… 
I: Or I can do it when I leave, if you want? 
IV: Will you, do you mind? [No] It’s just at the corner. 
I: Yeah, no problem. 
IV: Only I can’t take it out and the man downstairs does, but he’s on holiday, so it… 
I: Okay. Yeah, no problem. 
IV: Will you. Oh, bless you. 
I: So, you said you had 14 different pills a day? [Yeah] So, you’re supposed to take them, 
kind of, at breakfast and then throughout the day? 
IV: No, I take them at breakfast…oh,, I take some at breakfast and some at night. The [02:38 
– metformin] I take in a morning and teatime, and I also take a statin at night [uh-huh]. 
And, that’s all I take at night, them three. But the others are just fluid tablets, blood 
pressure tablets. Don’t ask me what they’re for [yeah].  
  
 But I don’t take many painkillers now, I’ve stopped them, because I found the painkillers 
weren’t helping me, like, but they were making me feel lousy, you know, I felt as if I 
wanted, oh, I’d dose off all the while. So, I’ve been suffering. I’ve had a bad leg this last 
week, butI haven’t gone back on painkillers, and it is going easier now, so I’m hoping it 
goes before I go to XX (Europe). I daren’t go to the doctors in case he tells me I can’t go 
[laughs]. 
I: Yeah. So the painkillers, do you get painkillers on prescription or [yeah], yeah, and you 
don’t take those? 
IV: Co-codamol and they say take two in a morning and two at night. They make me feel 
lousy, and [00:02 -that’s it].  
I: Uh-huh. So, you’ve stopped taking your painkillers. Do you take, all the others as your, as 
the doctor would tell you to, or…? 
IV: Oh, yes, I take all the others. I religiously do as I’m told [00:23] tablets [yeah]. Because 
I’m always told, ‘Don’t stop taking this one or that one. You must [00:29], no, don’t stop 
taking that one,’ you know, when I go in and ask if I can drop them off. ‘No.’ So, now, I 
just don’t ask, I just keep taking them [hmm]. And if he adds another on, then I want to 
know why [laughs]. 
I: Yeah, how do you feel when they do that though, when they say…? 
IV: Oh, I just feel, oh, God, I’m, I’m just sick of taking tablets [hmm]. And, of course, with the 
hypertension, the water tablets, rather, I can’t go out in a morning for two hours, because 
I’m spending me time in the blooming bathroom [hmm], and you just get fed up with it. 
Same as when I fly to XX (Europe), I usually go about 6 o’clock in the morning. Well, I 
have to take the fluid tablets at 12 o’clock at night, and then I’m in and out of bed. Oh, it’s, 
once I get there I’m all right [uh-huh], but that’s the bit of a bug bind with it. 
I: So, you’ve got to, kind of, plan ahead, I guess, to…? 
IV: I have to plan ahead with it, yeah. 
  
I: Yeah. Is it just the, kind of, water tablets that that’s with or is it…? 
IV: Yeah, it’s, er, water… 
I: Is there any, any side effects from the other, any of the other pills that you’re on that you 
think [01:35 – participants talking over each other]? 
IV: No, I don’t think so, because I’ve had this, I’ve had it… I had an operation, oh, God, when 
I was 40, and, er, I’ve been taking them since then, fluid tablets, and they’ve had to 
strengthen them and give me different ones because of me blood pressure. So, don’t ask 
me what they’re all for, because I don’t know [hmm], and I don’t want to know. 
I: You don’t want to know?  
IV: No, I say, ‘I’ll take them but I don’t want to know.’ [Laughs] 
I: Yeah, okay. So, erm, in terms of just trying to understand the overall picture of your 
health, you said, erm, you’ve got diabetes. What type is that? 
IV: Two. 
I: And, erm, thyroid? 
IV: Er, I take 50mls of, er, [02:26 – thyroxine] a day [uh-huh] for that. It’s, er, underactive 
[yeah], so… 
I: The blood pressure? 
IV: That is up and down. It’s usually - just lately, when I’ve gone to the doctors, it’s keeping 
itself fairly low, you know [okay], it’s not been too high. 
I: Erm, the arthritis, well, you’ve had your knees done, but you said it’s also in your back 
and your elbows and…? 
IV: Yeah, oh, it’s all over me. This, this leg’s worse. Well, I’ve fell down that many times on 
my knees, and, er, I think I’ve probably knocked something out of place in this one. But, I 
won’t go…they keep grumbling at me and saying I should go to the hospital, but once 
  
you’ve had them done, you’re not going to have them done again, if you can help it 
[hmm], so I keep managing on walking sticks [uh-huh]. And after all, I’m 83, why put 
yourself through pain when you’ve no need to, you can manage? [Hmm].  I could…well, I 
could still drive, I’m deciding I’m not going to drive anymore, for the simple reason I’ve 
lost my confidence [yeah], you know, when you [3:40 - see] all these cars [hmm] buzzing 
past, and I’ve had one or two near misses with people passing and, and I don’t go slow 
myself, I’m not a slow driver, so  I’ve decided I shall only cause trouble for somebody one 
day, so I’ll pack it in while I can.  
I: I see, okay.  
 Is there anything else, in terms of your health, that you can think of that, kind of…? 
IV: Oh, I’ve got glaucoma, that’s another thing I’ve got, in this eye [yeah], and that doesn’t 
help matters … 
I: No, no [laughs]. 
IV: So, er… 
I: I’m assuming that you’re on, er, medication for that as well? 
IV: Yeah. Yeah, I, well, I have to go to XX hospital with that. And I have to have, erm…well, I 
had my eye x-rayed for diabetes in June, and I’ve got to have it done,  when the six 
months is up, it’s getting near now, I’ve got to have it x-rayed again this time [uh-huh], as 
the, it’s beginning, my diabetes is beginning to affect the eye. So, I don’t know what they’ll 
do [uh-huh], but, er...oh, well, I don’t know, I keep forgetting, I, I put it in the back of my 
mind.  
I: Yeah, yeah. 
IV: It’s no good worrying about them. They’re there, they’ll come, and they’ll go. 
I: Yeah. 
  
IV: So, I mean I’ve had six children and I’m very, very lucky, they’re all healthy and they’re all 
really good to me. And, er, I’ve got, er, 12 grandchildren. I’ve got 12 great grandchildren. 
So, I’m not lonely [laughs]. 
I: No [laughs], exactly the opposite I’d have thought, yeah. 
IV: Oh, God, aye. 
I: So, in terms of, health, then, is that everything that you’d think, you think you could, you 
can think of that’s…? 
IV: Yeah. I can’t get out and about. I can’t walk far I’m breath…I get breathless. But, they 
checked my heart out and they said it’s not that. Something here, but it’s gone no farther, 
so I’m not bothering them, I’m still going. 
I: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
IV: They’ll send for me if they decide to do anything. 
I: Yeah, okay. 
IV: But, it does annoy me when I’m out, and I want to go somewhere and then me back’ll 
start aching. I used to have injections in my spine, well, back [yeah], but they stopped 
doing them. I think it’s because I’ve got to the age I am, they don’t do them, only for so 
long [okay], so I don’t get them anymore, which were, they weren’t nice, but they did ease 
it after a while. 
I: Uh-huh, hmm... just so – you’ve got a - so there are a number of different, kind of, things, 
conditions, that you’re living with [hmm]. I’m just trying to understand, are any of them, on 
a day-to-day basis, are any of them more important to you than the others? 
IV: I think the fact that I can’t get about and can’t, I can’t bend down very well and pick things 
up, and me use is going in me hands, I think them are the things that really get me [uh-
huh], because my mind’s pretty alert; I do forget things. But, it’s me hands and me legs 
that are, and me back, that are the thing and same as me breathing. 
  
I: Because? 
IV: I can’t get out and…I mean, going up and down stairs, I do make myself, though, go up 
and down stairs to keep me legs going, but mainly, now, I use me lift. I shouldn’t use it all 
the while but I’m getting idle. 
I: [laughs] [07:26]. 
IV: And then I’ve got that chair but that damn thing’s not working at the moment, the flaming 
thing. 
I: It’s gone, has it gone, has it? 
IV: Well, the motor’s gone. My son took the chair to pieces and took it in his factory and 
checked it all out, and there’s nothing wrong with that. He thought it’d jammed in, oh, this 
thing underneath it, but it hadn’t. So he’s put it all back together, and then he was going 
to XX, golfing, Saturday morning I got a message, ‘Mother, don’t get in touch with XX. I 
know what’s up with that chair,’ he said, ‘it’s a switch.’ I says, ‘All right,’ but I’d already 
rung them and they wanted £60 to come out. And I argued with them and said I was a 
pensioner and this, that and the other. It was only eight months old. Anyway, I couldn’t 
get…I said, ‘Oh, well, you’ll have to come then, I’ll have to have it.’ And just after I’d done 
all that he rings up to tell me, ‘Don’t get XX Mother, I know what it is.’ I thought, ‘Blimey.’ 
So, er, he was supposed to come and do that at dinnertime today, finish it, but he’s all 
golf [laughs]. 
I: [laughs] Yeah. But he’s dropping in lunchtime to sort that? 
IV: Yeah, well he’s got a factory at XX. 
I: Oh, okay. 
IV: XX  Engineering. 
I: One, and, er, he’s one of six kids, is he? 
  
IV: Yeah, he’s one of them, yeah. He’s the third lad. The eldest lad’s in XX. He’s been there, 
good God, 40 years. 
I: Really? Yeah, yeah. 
IV: And then XX (Son), he lives up, erm, oh, [09:06 – XX. And then I’ve got another one 
that’s in XX (local), the oldest lad, XX (Son). He does car repairs. He’s got a place at XX 
(son's) factory, where he does car body repairs [yeah]. And, er, XX (Daughter) works at 
XX (Local), the one girl, and the other girl lives down XX (South), which is XX 
(Grandson's) mother.  
I: Aah, right. 
IV: She’s down XX (South). She’s, er, in charge of a big kitchen, a school kitchen [yeah]. So, 
I don’t…we ring each day, but I don’t see so much of her.  
I: Yeah, okay. 
IV: But the others are in and out all the while. 
I: Literally visiting [yeah] all the time?  
IV: Yeah. And then, same as he was on about XX (Granddaughter), he told me XX 
(Granddaughter) might be calling round later on, well, she’s XX’s daughter. But XX 
(Daughter) comes up most days [uh-huh], to see if I’m all right. And if they don’t come, 
‘Are you all right Mother?’ I don’t know what they told if I told them I wasn’t. 
I: [laughs] Yeah. 
IV: Oh, me tea’s gone cold. I don’t know what he’s give me that big cup for. 
I: It’s a bucket, yeah. 
IV: Yeah, it’s me breakfast cup. 
I: Oh, I’m the same. I have a big bucket. 
  
IV: I can’t do with a, halfway through me breakfast, having to go and get another cup of tea… 
I: No, it’s not worth the while, is it, yeah? Erm, so the, so the six kids, well, obviously, apart 
from the couple that are living a way away, they’re in and out? [Yeah] What about the, 
your grandkids, are they…? 
IV: Yeah, they’re in and out? 
I: How old are they? Well, like, the oldest and the youngest? 
IV: The eldest great grandchild is 17, and the youngest is just starting school, four. 
I: Oh, wow, okay. 
IV: But the others are all grown up. 
I: And the grandchildren? 
IV: I’ve got one grandchild who is 14, but the others are all in their 20s. 
I: Right, okay, yeah. Are they, kind of, in and out all the time? Are they local and… 
IV: Well, they’re in touch with me all the while. 
I: Yeah, great. 
IV: Yeah, I don’t get a lot of peace [laughs]. 
I: No, no, it’s… 
IV: It sounds ungrateful but there’s time when I think, ‘Oh, I’ll have half an hour now,’ and 
somebody comes. Still, I should be grateful really. 
I: Is that, is it – I know, like, we, I often feel like that with my family, is it, but is that 
genuinely something you feel, like, that you do get too much attention? 
IV: Oh, you can get too much. Well, XX, his wife kicked him out; she didn’t love him 
anymore. And he’s got three children. One’s 14, the other’s 10, the other’s 6. Well, he 
  
came and stopped with me because he’d nowhere else to go, and the kids used to come 
three nights a week.  
 Well, this place was like a tip, and I’ve just got it sorted out. But their little bedroom you 
couldn’t get in for junk, and there was a bed in there which they used to sleep in, but it 
was just chaotic [hmm]. And, er, that did, it got me down a bit, they were here 12 months, 
and that was a bit too much. Because, plus, the others were grumbling at me and, my 
family, and saying, ‘Well, Mother, you must tell him he’s got to make the children do.’ I 
did, but he didn’t [hmm], because he was worried about losing his children [uh-huh] and 
[tut], well, life isn’t easy, you know.  
I: No, no. But it can be a bit of a double-edged sword then.  
IV: Well, it was getting, really getting me down, because, I mean, this place, they were…oh, 
the furniture and everything was a mess and carpet. It really did drive me daft.  
 [Noise] 
 Oh, it’s the lawn cutter. 
I: I thought that was a big wasp. 
 I’m just gonna stop this and turn it off a bit if, er, he’s going to start that. So just bear with 
with… 
 [Interruption] 
 There we go. You should be able to hear it over the lawnmower [yeah].  
 What were we saying? Oh, yeah, we were just chatting, chatting about your family. 
 So, I’m assuming that if you need anything… 
IV: They’re there. 
I: …any help or that? 
  
IV: Yeah, same as, I wanted some shopping and I just write, I wrote a list and asked XX if 
he’d come and do it. Well, he doesn’t go on work till half past one, so [uh-huh], of course, 
he come and did it, did it.  
 And, XX, who he lives with, she comes on a Saturday afternoon and cleans all through 
and does all through for me. And then XX (daugher) will come during the week and she’ll 
run the hoover round. But I can’t do a lot of things now, which annoys me [hmm]. But, er, 
oh, I’m looking forward to going to XX (Europe) [laughs]. 
I:  so people who come and do your shopping and hoover through for you, that, kind of, thing. 
Erm… 
 [Loud lawnmower noise] 
IV: Oh, go home.  
I: Is that something that you, kind of, need to ask for, or is that something that people do for 
you automatically? 
IV: Well, they ask me if I’m all right, if I want anything [yeah], or…I don’t actually have to ask 
them for it.  
I: Is it – do you ever feel as if you couldn’t say, ‘I need something doing,’ for one reason or 
another, or…? 
IV: Well, I do feel that they do a lot for me, and I don’t like asking [yeah], but in the end I’d 
probably have to ask. Or if I’m talking to one of the others and I say, ‘Oh, God, I shall 
have to get our Ian or our John to do so-and-so,’ it gets back to them.  
I: Yeah, aah. 
IV: You know, they have discussions, discussions about Mother, I think. 
I: [laughs] So they, so, they’ll, er, so it’ll work its way through to [yeah] someone else 
who…? 
  
IV: It gets round, yeah.  
I: Okay, and that, that… 
IV: Or if I’m talking to XX from XX (South), she’ll be ringing up to XX (Son) or one of the 
others, and she’ll tell them. So it’s quite, a little chain that goes round [laughs]. 
I: Yeah. I suppose in a sense that must be quite nice though? 
IV: It is nice. I live here on me own now. I lived here before XX come. My husband died 10 
year, 11 years ago, and I’ve been on me own since then.  
 And I love my little flat, me tree out here [uh-huh], and, XX (Son) bought it for me, so the 
flat is mine. And, er, he did all this up, re-carpeted, carpeted it all through, and painted it 
while I was in XX (Europe). Well, I knew when I come back I’d got a new back kitchen 
and everything. So I was quite pleased when I got back, it was a bit of a shock [laughs].  
I: Fantastic. 
IV: I knew that he was going to do something in, to me…no, I asked him to clean the carpet 
in here and clean the suite, but when I come back there was a new carpet and new suite 
[uh-huh], so I got rather a shock. 
I: Yeah, fantastic. Just what you want when you come back from holiday as well. 
IV: Yeah, oh, it really… 
I: Picks you up. 
IV: …did me for the winter, I’ll tell you. 
I: Yeah, I bet. 
IV: Yeah. I knew they were doing something but…and when we come back we had [04:32] 
‘Oh, I’ve got to go and get some bread, they’ve got no bread.’ And I thought, ‘They’ve got 
no bread, what’s going on?’ And they were trying to finish putting the lights up in the back 
kitchen before we got here [laughs]. Oh, God. 
  
I: It’s like on, er, something off the television show, isn’t it [yeah], the surprise. 
IV: Well, he wasn’t going to do the back kitchen [yeah], and then on the Friday, as I was 
coming back on…no, on the Sat…Fri…yeah, that was it, the Friday, as I was coming 
back on the Sunday; he decided to do the back kitchen. And they’d got that back kitchen 
in and ripped the other out and everything by the time I, we got back.  
I: Fantastic. It’s a lovely job as well, isn’t it? 
IV: Yeah, well [fantastic] XX, his son, is a plumber, and the other son is a general bugger 
about, I might as well say what I think [laughs]. 
I: [laughs] Yeah. 
IV: And, between them they got all that done, and got everybody in helping and sorting out, 
so I just couldn’t believe it when I walked in the back kitchen.  
I: Fantastic. 
IV: Because my husband had done it about 30 years ago and it was dated [hmm]. We had 
brown cupboards and, of course, it had gone all white. 
I: Uh-huh, yeah, lovely. 
IV: So, yeah.  
I: Is there anything, like, you, that you feel you can’t ask for? 
IV: I don’t really think there is. I know I’m going to have a struggle telling them I don’t want to 
drive anymore [uh-huh]. They’re going to try to…’You’ll lose your independence Mother.’ 
But, there again, I haven’t had me car for weeks, XX's got it, he’s using my car. So it 
means that I haven’t got a car here if I want one [hmm]. And then he takes me 
everywhere, because he’s got the car, so I’ve not been driving, you see. And at my age I 
don’t think you want to. I had to stop quick the other day and then I got cramp in me 
blooming leg after I’d stopped. And it’s an automatic car [uh-huh], and I thought, ‘Oh, God 
XX, you’re not having this.’ But, I suppose it… 
  
I: So, you think, you think that, you said you’re going to struggle, be a struggle to tell them 
that, so they’re… 
IV: They’re going to try and persuade me not to give up driving [hmm]. Because I’ve been 
expecting them to tell me I can’t drive because of my eyes, but the trouble is, I can sit 
here and I can read that number on that car down there and the one behind it [uh-huh]. 
I’ve no dist… I’ve no trouble with it. And the optician says, ‘You’ve no need to worry about 
losing your licence with your eyes.’ So, er, but it’s not me eyes, it’s me. I see old people 
and I see them making mistakes, and I think, ‘Oh, God, do I do that?’  
I: Yeah, yeah. 
IV: You know, you see them going, er, slow, about 20 mile an hour sometimes, and you’re 
stuck behind them, and I think, ‘Oh, God, I’m not like that am I?’ Or if you’re in the car 
with someone and they say, ‘Oh, God, why don’t they get a move on?’ And I look and it’s 
old people, and I think, ‘No, XX, you give it up. You’ll get to that stage yourself if you’re 
not careful.’ [Laughs] 
I: uh-huh. 
IV: So, before I get to that stage I’m packing it in.  
I: Okay. So that might be a bit difficult telling, persuading them that that’s the right thing to 
do? 
IV: Yeah, because XX (son) bought me the car, you see. I only tax and insure it. 
I: Okay. 
IV: That’s what I say I’m looked after hand and foot. 
I: Yeah. But with that comes - that’s what you said, you, are you worried about telling 
because they’ve bought you the car, are you…? 
IV: No, er, I’m worried that they’ll try and make me go on driving [hmm], not give it up, but I’m 
rather determined to this time [okay]. Besides, I go out in it once a week, well, I’m paying, 
  
it’s a big engine, it’s, er, 220, or whatever it is, for the tax, and the insurance was 500 odd 
[hmm]. Well, I think that’s a lot for going out just once a week in it. I can get a taxi, call for 
a taxi, and get a taxi to run me to the XX and to the shops, if need be [uh-huh]. So, er… 
I: Okay. But that – I mean, I, I initially asked, if there’s things you can’t ask for, or, but 
there’s not - there’s always – there’s some - are there some people that you can ask 
things of that you can’t ask of other people, kind of, thing, or…? 
IV: I don’t really know, they’re all pretty good, you know. But I’m a bit independent [hmm]; I 
don’t like asking. And  I think, ‘No, I’m not asking you [yeah],’ and then somebody will 
come along and say, ‘Oh, Nan, do you want so-and-so?’ ‘Oh, yes, all right.’ [Laughs] 
I: Okay, yeah. 
IV: It’s - that’s how it goes, you know. 
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